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
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**COMPLIMENTS
OF
MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE**





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PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS

—of—

President Abraham Lincoln,
General Ulysses S. Grant
—AND—
General William T. Sherman

BY—

MAJOR-GENERAL GRENVILLE M. DODGE

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The following
manuscripts, etc., from
(Berkeley Collection)

PREFACE


My personal recollections of President Lincoln and Generals Grant and Sherman, all three of whom, up to the time they died, showed their personal friendship to me in many ways and many acts.

Many years ago I had compiled data and written most of the following pages, and from time to time I have read papers before different patriotic gatherings upon each of these distinguished men, and have had many requests for copies and have also been urged to publish my recollections.

During this summer while on my vacation, I have compiled my data and rewritten the recollections, adding letters and official documents that I thought would be of interest.

GRENVILLE MELLEN DODGE.

September, 1914.





PRESIDENT ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1864

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF LINCOLN

If there is any person living who should be grateful for an opportunity to pay his tribute to Abraham Lincoln, it is myself, for as President he raised me from a citizen to the highest command and highest rank in the army. He was my friend from the time I first met him until I helped to lay him away in Springfield, Illinois.

No one can appreciate what that friendship and what his acts were to me, unless they have experienced the benefit of it as I have.

Now, before I take up the subject I am to write upon, I want to give you Abraham Lincoln's own biography of himself, to show you from what a simple and low station he arose to be a great Statesman, a great Commander, a most just and kind ruler—the best of this era.

In a letter to Mr. F. Fell he writes:

I was born February 12, 1809, in Hardin county, Kentucky. My parents were both born in Virginia of undistinguished families—second families perhaps I should say. My mother, who died in my tenth year, was of a family of the name of Hanks, some of whom now reside in Adams, and others in Macon counties, Illinois. My paternal grandfather, Abraham Lincoln, emigrated from Rockingham county, Virginia, to Kentucky about 1781 or 1782, where a year or two later he was killed by Indians, not in battle but by stealth, when he was laboring to open a farm in the forest. His ancestors, who were Quakers, went to Virginia from Berka county, Pennsylvania. An effort to identify them with the new England family of the same name ended in nothing more definite than a similarity of Christian names in both families, such as Enoch, Levi, Mordecai, Solomon, Abraham, and the like.

My father, at the death of his father, was but six years of age, and he grew up literally without education. We removed from Kentucky to what is now Spencer county, Indiana, in

my eighth year. We reached our new home about the time the state came into the union. It was a wild region with many bears and other wild animals still in the woods. There I grew up. There were some schools, so called, but no qualification was ever required of a teacher beyond "readin', writin', and cipherin' to the rule of three."

If a straggler, supposed to understand Latin, happened to sojourn in the neighborhood, he was looked upon as a wizard. There was absolutely nothing to excite ambition for education. Of course, when I came of age I did not know much, still somehow I could read, write and cipher to the rule of three; but that was all. I have not been to school since. The little advance I now have upon this store of education I have picked up from time to time under the present necessity.

I was raised to farm work, which I continued till I was twenty-two. At twenty-one I came to Illinois and passed the first year in Sanganaw, now in Menard county, where I remained a year as a sort of clerk in a store. Then came the Black Hawk war and I was elected a Captain of Volunteers—a success which gave me more pleasure than any I have had since. I went into the campaign, was elected, ran for the Legislature the same year (1832) and was beaten—the only time I ever have been beaten by the people. The next and then succeeding biennial elections, I was elected to the Legislature. I was not a candidate afterward. During the Legislature period, I had studid law, and removed to Springfield to practice it. In 1846 I was elected to the lower house of Congress. Was not a candidate for re-election. From 1849 to 1854, both inclusive, practiced law more assiduously than ever before. Always a Whig in politics, and generally on the Whig electoral tickets (making active canvasses). I was losing interest in politics when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused me again. What I have done since then is pretty well known.

If any personal description of me is thought desirable, it may be said: I am, in height, six feet four inches, nearly; lean in flesh, weighing on an average one hundred and eighty pounds; dark complexion with coarse black hair and grey eyes; no other marks or scars recollected.

My first acquaintance with Mr. Lincoln was in Council Bluffs, Iowa, in August, 1859, I think the 11th day, right after his great debate with Douglass. He came here to look at some property in the Riddle Tract on which he had loaned some money to Mr. N. B. Judd, the attorney for the Rock Island Railroad. Mr. Judd was also the manager in the campaign

with Douglass. Mr. Lincoln, accompanied by Mr. O. M. Hatch, Secretary of State of Illinois, came from Springfield to St. Joseph by rail, visited Kansas, then came up the Missouri River by steamboat. He found here two old friends who had lived in Springfield before they came to Council Bluffs, W. H. M. Pusey and Thomas Officer. While he was here the Hon. W. H. M. Pusey gave a reception at his residence that enabled our citizens generally to meet the two distinguished visitors. He was also induced to make a speech in Concert Hall, and the local paper notices of that speech and the comments were as follows:

From the Council Bluffs "Weekly Nonpareil," August 13, 1859.

HON. A. LINCOLN SPEAKS AT CONCERT HALL THIS
EVENING AT HALF PAST 7 O'CLOCK—
GO AND HEAR HIM.

Hon. Abe Lincoln and the Secretary of State of Illinois, Hon. O. M. Hatch, arrived in our city last evening, and are stopping at the Pacific House. The distinguished "sucker" has yielded to the earnest importunities of our citizens—without distinction of party—and will speak upon the political issues of the day, at Concert Hall this evening. The celebrity of the speaker will most certainly insure him a full house. Go and hear "Old Abe."

From The Nonpareil, August 20, 1859.

ABE LINCOLN.

This distinguished gentleman addressed a very large audience of ladies and gentlemen at Concert Hall in this city, Saturday evening last. In the brief limits of a newspaper article. it were impossible even though we wielded the trenchant pen of a Babbitt, which we do not, to give even an outline of his masterly and unanswerable speech. The clear and lucid manner in which he set forth the true principles of the republican party, in the dexterity with which he applied the political scalpel to the democratic carcass—beggars of all description at our hands. Suffice it, that the speaker fully and fairly sustained the great reputation he acquired in the memorable Illinois campaign, as a man of great intellectual power—a close and sound reasoner.

The Bugle, edited by Lyronder W. Babbitt, had this notice :

The people of this city were edified last Saturday evening by a speech from Honorable Abe Lincoln of Illinois. He apologized very handsomely for appearing before an Iowa audience during a campaign in which he was not interested. He then, with many excuses and a lengthy explanation, as if conscious of the nauseous nature of the black Republican rostrum, announced his intention to speak about the "Eternal Negro," to use his own language, and entered into a lengthy and ingenious analysis of the "nigger" question, impressing upon his hearers that it was the only question to be agitated until finally settled. He carefully avoided going directly to the extreme ground occupied by him in his canvass against Douglass, yet the doctrines which he preached, carried out to their legitimate results, amount to precisely the same thing. He was decidedly opposed to any fusion or coalition of the Republican party with the opposition of the South, and clearly proved the correctness of his ground in point of policy. They must retain their sectional organization and sectional character, and continue to wage their sectional warfare by slavery agitation; but if the opposition in the South would accede to their views and adopt their doctrines, he was willing to run for president in 1860, as southern man with northern principles, or in other words, with abolition proclivities. His speech was of the character of an exhortation to the Republican party, but was in reality as good a speech as could have been made for the interest of the Democracy. He was listened to with much attention. for his Waterloo defeat by Douglass has magnified him into quite a lion here.

Among others, I listened to his speech, which was very able, attractive and convincing. His manner of presenting his argument was very simple, his points so clear and well defined that it was easy for anyone to comprehend it. It was his method that made him so attractive as a public speaker. The crowd, as well as myself, was absolutely convinced that what he had said was true, and that his policy in the negro question in national affairs should be adopted.

During the summer of 1859 I had been engaged in making reconnaissances west of the Missouri River for the Union Pacific Railroad. I came back to Council Bluffs with my party, arriving here some time in August. Mr. Lincoln heard from

someone of my explorations and surveys, also that I was in Council Bluffs, and he sought me out, and on the porch of the Pacific Hotel, for two hours, he engaged me in conversation about what I knew of the country west of the Missouri River, and greatly impressed me by the great interest he displayed in the work in which I was engaged.

He inquired particularly as to the comparative merit of the forty-second Parallel, or Platte Valley lines, with the two southern and the northern lines surveyed by the Government. As to the two southern, I had no information; but about the northern survey I had obtained much valuable data.

As a boy, I worked on Mrs. Edward Lander's farm in Danvers, Mass. Her son, Frederick W. Lander, was a civil engineer, and I was acquainted with him. He was employed by Lieut. Isaac N. Stevens, who had charge of the northern survey from St. Paul to Oregon.

Upon the arrival of their party on the Pacific Coast, young Landers left it to examine what he believed to be a superior route—following the Columbia and Snake River Valleys, thence through the South Pass and down the Platte Valley nearly a thousand miles to the Missouri River at Council Bluffs. I met him, and he gave me full information as to the main features of the northern route, and how far superior the natural line was he had followed—holding the Snake and Platte River line to be far superior to the northern survey.

This seemed to please Mr. Lincoln, and the building of both these lines—the Union Pacific & Oregon Short Line, and the Northern Pacific—has fully proved Lander's statements.

He stated that there was nothing more important before the nation at that time than the building of the railroad to the Pacific Coast. He ingeniously extracted a great deal of information from me, and I found the secrets I had been holding for my employers in the East had been given to him. This interview was of the greatest importance to me. It was a milestone in my life, and Mr. Lincoln never forgot it.

While he was in Council Bluffs the citizens took him up what is now Oakland avenue, to the point where the road turns into Rohrer Park, and he was greatly impressed with the beauty of the landscape. It is one of the most beautiful views in the world. You can look up and down the broad Missouri River valley for ten miles, and can look across into Nebraska and see Omaha, and from Florence to Bellevue.

The Lincoln Memorial Association organized in this city in connection with the Daughters of the American Revolution erected on that spot a monument or memorial to Abraham Lincoln.

The property which Mr. Lincoln had in the Riddle Tract was joined by that of Mr. C. L. Vallandigham of Ohio, a very bitter rebel during the war; a man of great ability, and who was a member of Congress. He spent his time fighting and opposing the administration with great bitterness—so much so that he was arrested by General Burnside and tried for treason. He was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment during the war, I think at Fort Lafayette or some other national prison, and President Lincoln, notwithstanding the bitterness shown toward him and the attacks made upon him, commuted the sentence and ordered him sent through the lines to the South. Vallandigham went through the lines, but he did not think the South treated him with proper consideration and he left there and went to Canada. He remained there until the war was over, then he came back to Ohio and ran for Governor and was defeated by over 100,000 majority. He then became, to the astonishment of everyone, a great advocate of universal suffrage for the negro. It is a singular fact that Vallandigham met death by a pistol shot, the same as President Lincoln. He was trying a case in the courts of Ohio—a case of murder—and while he was showing the pistol used by the murderer he let it fall, and in falling it was discharged, wounding him, and he died from the wound.

In 1860 when President Lincoln was a candidate of the Republican party, Mr. N. B. Judd of Chicago wrote me a letter and requested me to come to Chicago and aid as far as I could in the nomination of Mr. Lincoln. I went to Chicago and was greatly surprised when I got to the convention and found that there were only two votes for Abraham Lincoln in the Iowa delegation, the rest being scattered to Seward, McLane, and others. I thought the state next to Illinois should cast their entire vote for a man of Lincoln's ability and standing, and I did what I could to turn them to Lincoln. I was present at the conference the evening before the last day of balloting, when the Pennsylvania delegation led in an agreement with other states to cast their votes on the next day for Lincoln, and that would insure his nomination. I was anxious that the Iowa delegation should vote for him, which they all did with the exception of one or two. After his nomination and election, I went to Washington to the inauguration. I remember there was with me, Kasson, Allison, Gurley, David, Hoxie, and others, representing Iowa. We hired a house in the rear of the National Hotel, which we made our headquarters, and which became the headquarters for the state of Iowa. We all attended the inauguration and listened to Lincoln's inaugural speech. It impressed not only us but everyone who attended. When it was over we returned to the National Hotel. Judge Denio of Springfield, a very tall man—I should say six feet four inches—was very enthusiastic in praise of Lincoln and they induced him to make a speech. He got up on a table and in describing the speech he said: "There has only one address ever been made better than that of Lincoln and that was Christ's sermon on the Mount."

During the time we were in Washington, there was great alarm and a great deal of discussion as to what the policy of the Government would be, what part Lincoln would take in it, and what his acts would be. I visited Lincoln with ex-Senator

Nye and Mr. Davis of New York and we had a long conversation with him in relation to the conditions, what should be done, and giving him our opinions. He listened very attentively to what we had to say, and by referring to my diary I see that he replied that he was not alarmed; that he felt that he could take this country safely through the crisis. When we left we were greatly strengthened in our belief in his ability, and felt he would carry the country through, no matter what occurred.

In the spring of 1863 I was in command of the district of Corinth, Mississippi. I had just returned from the campaign to the rear of Bragg up the Tennessee Valley. There had followed me back to Corinth thousands of negroes which were a great burden to us. We had to feed them, and as yet there had been no policy determined by the Government as to how they should be treated or what should be done with them. I had them on my hands and made a camp outside of Corinth for them. I put at the head of it the Chaplain of the 27th Ohio Infantry, named Alexander, and endeavored to utilize the negroes by putting them on plantations to work, so as to partially earn their living, and using them as teamsters and in camp work. I first put over them a guard of white soldiers, but the troops at that time objected very seriously to guarding negroes and there was a great deal of trouble in relation to it. Finally Chaplain Alexander came to me and said he believed, if I would let him have the arms, he could organize two negro companies that would guard that camp much better than the white soldiers. I agreed to do this and, although I had absolutely no authority for doing so, I gave him the arms and he organized two companies of negroes, officering them with some sergeants from my command. That action caused a great deal of criticism but it worked admirably. Soon after I had armed these negroes, I received an order from General Grant to go to Washington and to report to the Adjutant General. He

gave no reasons for my going there. I could not but think that they were going to call me to account for the action I had taken in arming the negroes, and I went with a good deal of anxiety until I reached Washington and reported to the Adjutant General, and he informed me that the President wished to see me and he made an appointment with President Lincoln for me. I went in and met the President, who greeted me very cordially, and learned from him that I had been called there for the purpose of aiding him in determining the location on the Missouri River where the Union Pacific Railroad should have its initial point. When I heard this it was a great relief to me. I sat there with him and we discussed that question very fully, and I saw he was thoroughly posted on the sentiment of the country locally, as every town from Sioux City to Kansas City was contending for the location. The people interested at that time remember what a discussion there was in regard to where the initial point of the Union Pacific should be located. From an engineering point of view, I pointed out clearly to the President where the line should start and what our surveys had determined. He listened and discussed this question with me for a long time. I saw from his talk and his indication that his views coincided with mine, and I have no doubt he made his decision at that time, as recommended by me, and soon after made this order:

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do hereby fix so much of the western boundry of the State of Iowa as lies between the north and south boundaries of the United States township within which the city of Omaha is situated as the point from which the line of railroad and telegraph in that section mentioned shall be constructed.

This order was not considered definite enough by the company and on March 7, 1864, President Lincoln issued the second executive order as follows:

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, do, upon the application of said company, designate and establish

such first named point on the western boundary of the State of Iowa, east of and opposite to the east line of Section 10, in Township 15, south of Range 13, east of the sixth principal meridian in the Territory of Nebraska.

On March 8, 1864, he notified the United States Senate that on the 17th day of November, 1863, he had located the "Eastern terminus of the Union Pacific Railway within the limits of the township in Iowa opposite to the town of Omaha." Since then, he says, "the company has represented to me that upon additional survey made, it has determined upon the precise point of departure of the branch road from the Missouri River, and located same within the limits designated in the order of November last." This point is near where the Union Pacific Transfer now stands.

After my talk with Lincoln in relation to the fixing of the terminal, naturally the question of the building of the Union Pacific came up. The law of 1862 had been passed but the promoters of the road had been unable to raise a single dollar to build it; they could not induce the capitalists to take hold of it, notwithstanding the fact that the United States had loaned its credit—it having the first lien on the property while the company's bonds were only second mortgage bonds. There was no one in the United States then who had enough confidence in the future of the Union Pacific Railroad to buy second mortgage bonds at any price. I discussed that question with him. I thought that the Government of the United States should build this road; it was too big a job for private enterprise. He said the Government of the United States had all it could care for then, but that he and the Government were willing to do anything they could to aid any company who would take this matter up in earnest and raise the money and go forward with the work. He intimated that he was perfectly willing to have the law changed so that the Government should take the second mortgage and the promoters of the road should take the first. From my visit with President Lincoln, I went

to New York to see my friends who had organized the Union Pacific road, Mr. John A. Dix, Mr. Henry Farnam, T. C. Durant, Francis Train, and others, and I told them in a board meeting what President Lincoln had said and they were greatly encouraged, and made up their minds to take the matter up, and they went before Congress and in 1864 they passed the law which placed the mortgage bonds of the company ahead of the mortgage bonds of the Government, and with the Government's and other mortgage bonds they were enabled to start the road, and by 1865 they had built the road as far west as Fremont. When I came back from the army in 1866 I took charge, and in three years it was finished. It was the foresight, the nerve and determination of Abraham Lincoln that forced Congress to give the promoters of that road the first mortgage bonds and the Government taking a second lien that insured its completion. In discussing this matter President Lincoln said it was not only a commercial necessity but a military necessity for the purpose of holding the Pacific coast in the Union.

I did not see Mr. Lincoln again until in October, 1864. I was given confederate leave of absence at Atlanta in August, 1864. As soon as I was well enough to travel General Grant invited me to visit him at City Point, where his army was lying after the great campaign of the Wilderness and the Potomac. I went to City Point and spent two weeks with General Grant. I saw there the finest of all our armies, the best equipped, the best organized, and it had everything that a soldier could need. Rufus Ingles took us up to their sample room, showing me the supplies they had ready to furnish the soldiers. General Grant said, "Dodge, if you just had this sample room it would be all you would want for your Corps." I met most of the officers of his army. I visited the Army of the James, and I saw the efforts of General Butler, who commanded that Army, to break through the enemies' line into Richmond.

I was greatly impressed as I saw the troops move up to the enemies' works and stand so steadily and receive the destructive fire of the enemy without taking cover. In the West, under the same conditions, our men would have gone to cover when they saw there was no possibility of carrying the works before them, but here they seemed to wait for an order, and my anxiety for them was such that I could not help expressing my surprise that they did not either charge or go to cover, but they stood and took the murderous fire until the command to retire was given. In the West, during the time they stood there, our whole line would have found shelter behind trees or buried themselves in rifle pits.

In the evening, we would sit around the camp fire at City Point, and General Grant, in that comprehensive and conversational way he had of describing any affair when he felt at liberty to talk freely, and which is shown so plainly in his Memoirs, told me of his campaigns from the Wilderness to City Point; of many of his plans that failed to materialize for various reasons which he gave. After listening several evenings to the discussion of these matters, I asked General Grant, very innocently and naturally, who was responsible for the failure of these plans, and looking at me in a humorous way, which was in his disposition, he said, "That, General, has not yet been determined." I said, "If it had been in the West, some of us would have lost our heads." General Grant was never known to publicly make a criticism of an officer.

I want to say that these were the darkest days of Grant's career in the East, for the country had commenced to talk about his campaign as not being a success, his great battles as butcheries, and there was a great deal of criticism of them. There was about as many men deserting from that army—drafted men—as there were recruits coming to him, but General Grant was certain that his next campaign would be a success.

When I was starting back to my command, General Grant requested me to call on President Lincoln. He did not give me any reason why I should go, but, of course, a request from him was an order, and I went to Washington on his steamer. There was on board this steamer, General Rufus Ingalls, the Quartermaster of his Army, and Major-General Boyle, Commander of the British forces in Canada. Major-General Boyle was an old, gray-haired man. I was a young man and the one thing that troubled the General was that he could not understand why I, so young, could have the same rank as he did—an old man sixty years of age.

When I arrived at Washington and went to the White House to call on President Lincoln, I met Senator Harlan of my state in the ante-room and he took me in to see the President. It happened to be at the hour when the President was receiving the crowd in the ante-room next to his room. Senator Harlan took me up to him immediately and presented me to him. President Lincoln received me cordially and said he was very glad to see me. He asked me to sit down while he disposed of the crowd. I sat down and waited; I saw him take each person by the hand and in his kindly way dispose of them. To an outsider, it would seem that they all got what they wanted, for they seemed to go away happy. I sat there for some time, and felt that I was over-staying my time with him, so stepped up and said that I had merely called to pay my respects and that I had no business, so would say goodbye. President Lincoln turned to me and said, "If you have the time, I wish you would wait; I want to talk with you." I sat down again and waited quietly until he had disposed of the crowd. When he was through, he took me into the next room. He saw that I was ill-at-ease, so he took down from his desk a little book called "The Gospel of Peace." I think it was written by Artemus Ward and was very humorous. He opened the book, crossed his legs, and began to read a portion of a chapter,

which was so humorous that I began to laugh, and it brought me to myself. When he saw that he had gotten me in his power, he laid the book down and began to talk to me about my visit to the Army of the Potomac and what I saw. He did not say a single word about my own command or about the West, showing his whole interest was in the Army of the Potomac. While we were sitting there talking we were called to lunch. During the meal he talked about the Army of the Potomac and about Grant, and finally led up to the place where he asked me the question of what I thought about Grant, and what I thought about his next campaign. Just as he asked the question, we got up from the table. I answered, "Mr. President, you know we western men have the greatest confidence in General Grant; I have no doubt, whatever, that in this next campaign he will defeat Lee—how, or when he is to do it, I cannot tell, but I am sure of it." He took my hand in both of his and very solemnly said, "You don't know how glad I am to hear you say that." I did not appreciate then what a great strain he was under—not until reading Welles' Celebrated Diary, showing that Lincoln had no person around him to advise him; that everything he did was from his own thoughts and decision. It is a wonder to me that he ever got through the war so successfully. I did not know then that Lincoln's table was piled with letters demanding the change of Grant, declaring that his campaign was a failure and wanting to have a different commander sent, etc. When I was ready to leave, I thanked President Lincoln for what he had done for me and asked if there was anything I could do for him. He said, "If you don't care, I would like to have you take my respects to your Army."

On leaving President Lincoln, I returned to my own command, or as near to it as I could get, expecting to go to the command of my Corps under Sherman. I was still physically not very strong, and Sherman said that he would not take me

with him as he did not think I could stand the trip. Therefore, I was assigned to a command at Vicksburg, Mississippi, with a view of taking a command to the rear of Mobile when Sherman marched to the sea, expecting, with the aid of General Canby and the fleet to capture that place. When I reached Cairo on my way to Vicksburg, I received a dispatch from the War Department to proceed immediately to St. Louis. Soon after my arrival I received an order to relieve General Rosecrans, and as soon as I was in command to notify the War Department. I learned from a private dispatch that I received from General Grant that he had requested General Rosecrans to be relieved and I to take his command, because he and the War Department did not consider that General Rosecrans had made a proper use of his command in defeating the movement of Price into Missouri, as Price had a force much smaller than that of General Rosecrans. I assumed command of that Department and Army on the second day of December. I found that there had been a great many dispatches sent to General Rosecrans to send all the troops he could spare to General Thomas, who was in a death struggle with General Hood in Nashville. I received a similar dispatch from General Halleck, at the end of which he quoted a part of Grant's dispatch to him giving the order, which was: "With such an order, Dodge can be relied upon to send all that can properly go." I learned afterwards that President Lincoln was present when this order was given, and that it was he who suggested to General Halleck that that portion of Grant's dispatch should be added, saying, it might induce Dodge to make an extra effort to help Thomas out.

When I received this dispatch, I looked my command over. There were no organized Rebel forces in Missouri, nothing but guerrillas and partisan bands who were robbing and killing, not fighting anyone, and I made up my mind that there was really no necessity for any federal troops in Missouri: there-

fore, I gathered together every organized regiment in that state and sent Thomas some fifteen thousand men, including two Divisions of the 16th Corps, under the command of Major-General A. J. Smith. At the Battle of Nashville, this force turned Hood's left and started the defeat and destruction of Hood's Army.

I found in Missouri a state of affairs existing in no other state in the Union. It was one-half Rebel and one-half Union. It was brother against brother and father against son. There had been a great many murders in the state and they were continually being committed. President Lincoln took a great interest in Missouri. The fact that Blair, Lyons, Siegle and the Germans had held the State of Missouri in the Union against all the efforts of its Rebel Government, made it very interesting to him, and he had been endeavoring for a long time to bring it back under its own civil government. He assigned General Schofield, a very fine soldier and executive officer, to the command of the department, with a view of his carrying out this policy, but he had failed. General Schofield's policy did not satisfy either side, it was too conservative for the radicals and too radical for the half-Union men; therefore the War Department relieved him. But President Lincoln believed in General Schofield and when he left there he made him a Major-General, but the State of Missouri was strong enough to stop his confirmation in the United States Senate and it was one year before he was confirmed. President Lincoln said he saw his opportunity when he received a dispatch from General Grant in 1864, asking to have General Schofield sent to the command of the Department of the Ohio at Knoxville, Tennessee, and he said he then put the pressure right on the Senate and they had to come to time and confirm him.

As soon as I had gotten well settled in the Department of the Missouri, President Lincoln wrote me a long letter. It was in no wise an order or a suggestion that I was obliged to carry

out. It was simply his views of the conditions in the country; also what he thought, not what he thought I ought to do, and as I looked the country over I came to his views—that there was absolutely no necessity for any military forces in the State of Missouri. That state had just elected Colonel Fletcher Governor. Colonel Fletcher had been a good soldier in the service and I made up my mind that if it was in my power I would turn over the Civil Government entirely to him, but as soon as my policy was known, both sides were opposed to it; one side because they were afraid of the guerrillas, and the other side because they did not want to go under a Union soldier as a Governor. I was in a great dilemma, and wrote the War Department that I had made up my mind to give it a trial, and sent to General Halleck at Washington my plan—that was, to withdraw all the federal troops from the small towns and railroad lines and relieve them from all civil duties and concentrate them at the prominent strategic point in the state where I could handle them as a body, and call on the citizens of the counties to take care of themselves. I did not get a very hearty response from General Halleck. His response was something like this: “If you do this and succeed, all right; but if you do this and fail, you must not charge any of it up to us.”

Before doing this, President Lincoln thought I should consult and get the consent of the Governor of the state; this, I had expected to do. I had to struggle with the Governor quite a long time but he finally consented. He did not feel like assuming the responsibility of enforcing the law without a large military force behind him. There were some eight or ten thousand State Militia that had been mustered into the United States Army for service in the state, and I proposed that this force should be used by the Governor to do the work which the federal troops had been performing.

I issued an order that citizens of the state, of southern

sentiment, must hereafter comply with the Civil Authorities, and those who could not or would not would be forced to leave the state. I gave them permission to go through the lines south or north. This order also provided that any citizens of the state who harbored a guerrilla, or where any of the bands of guerrillas camped upon their land, or where they had any knowledge of any being present, must, within twenty-four hours, notify the nearest federal post. If they did not, they would be arrested and shot. This was a very drastic order and was complained of bitterly by the citizens of southern sentiment. A few days after the order was issued, a Lieutenant of one of the companies, discovered a citizen harboring some guerrillas and he took him out and shot him. This, of course, he had no authority to do. He should have arrested the man and reported the fact to the commanding officer and given him a trial, but the fact of the prompt execution of the order struck terror throughout the state, especially to those of southern sentiment, and they felt that their lives were not safe, and thousands of them emigrated immediately to Idaho and Montana, while others who remained entered protests to the War Department, and there was a general complaint and denunciation of the order. I was called upon immediately by the War Department for an explanation of this officer's acts. Before I had gotten the order, however, I had investigated the case and found that the party he had killed was without question guilty, and I wrote the War Department that, while it was a lack of judgment on the part of the officer—he thought he had the right to kill the man immediately—still, it had been of great benefit in bringing peace to the state, and I felt that it was not necessary to take any further action in the matter and assured them that it would not be repeated. It was wonderful how quickly the state quieted down and how many reports went into the different posts of guerrillas or partisan bands, or even people suspected, so that as soon as they found

that they did not have the support of the southern sympathizers and could not quarter upon them without being reported, they immediately left the state.

These complaints, of course, finally reached President Lincoln, but it was a long time after they occurred. In the meantime Governor Fletcher, who was taking great satisfaction in the rapidity with which the state had been brought under Civil Government, had written a letter to President Lincoln stating that the order had had a wonderful effect, and that the state was then as quiet as any other state in the Union. Some of the members of Congress from Missouri called on President Lincoln, quite a long time after this occurred, and still demanded a repeal of the order, but President Lincoln showed them Governor Fletcher's letter and he said that, under the conditions, he would not interfere in the matter.

Years afterwards when I went West, to the station opposite Boise on the Union Pacific Railroad, where they were investigating the question of putting in some irrigation works, and while my car was standing on the siding, one day there came up from the Boise Valley a delegation of citizens, who loaded my car with fruit. I was absent and did not see them, but they told the station agent that they were citizens whom I had driven out of Missouri and that at one time they would have hung me if they could have gotten hold of me, but now they were thankful for the movement, and brought me this fruit with their compliments.

Within sixty days I had left the Department in perfect peace and had gone on to the plains to make the Indian campaigns.

While I was in command of the State of Missouri, there was hardly a day passed but what I saw some evidence of President Lincoln's kindness. The appeals that would go to him from the people whose sons or themselves were in trouble, would always have his attention and he would give them one

of his cards, with a little note written on the back to me, asking if something could not be done for this person. He disliked to have anyone executed, shot or imprisoned. When I went into Missouri, I found the prisons full and overflowing with prisoners of war and citizens who had been taken up for treason, etc. I therefore proposed to send them through the line or to release them, and I so notified the War Department. In my letter to them I said it was a good deal easier to fight them than to feed them, but they seemed to think that the policy that had been maintained there of holding these citizens in prison should be continued. When the Indian campaigns began, some of these prisoners made known to me that they were willing to enlist in the army to go on the plains. I reported this to the War Department and received authority to organize five regiments known as the United States Volunteers, known on the plains as the "Reconstructed Rebs." This emptied the prisons. Nearly all of the confederate prisoners of war were willing to enlist to fight Indians and only took the oath for that purpose, declining to take it to fight against their own people and we did not require it of them. These regiments served up the Missouri River, in Minnesota against the Indians there, and were in my campaigns on the plains in 1865 and 1866. They made splendid soldiers and endured great hardships. Afterwards a great many of them went down on the Union Pacific and into the States of Idaho and Montana, where there are now a great many of the members of those regiments, many of whom are prominent citizens.

The day before the assassination of President Lincoln, a lady called upon me who had been to Washington to see President Lincoln. Her son had been arrested and tried for murder as a guerrilla. He had been in one of the guerrilla bands which had been caught, and it was proved that he had murdered two or three convalescent Union soldiers. He was sentenced to be hung in a very short time. This lady obtained

an interview with President Lincoln and, the night before the day of the assassination, she came to my office with the President's card, with a little note on the back of it to me, which read, "My Dear General Dodge: Is it possible for you to do anything for this poor woman who is in so much trouble?" I took the card, but I did not see my way clear to comply with her request. If I had commuted the sentence of that guerrilla, after the great number of men who had been murdered by these guerrillas, it would have brought down upon me a great criticism from the Union people in the State. But I treated the lady nicely and told her that I would consider it. She thought that card was an absolute pardon for her son, and was very indignant, and said she would communicate with the President immediately.

That night about midnight I received a dispatch from the War Department notifying me of Lincoln being shot. I was also cautioned about making arrangements so that there would be no uprising in the State. They felt that such a tragedy might cause an uprising of the Union men against the citizens of southern sentiments on account of the bitterness existing there. I brought into the city of St. Louis such troops as were near, and issued an order suspending all business and ordered all the citizens, both Federal and Rebel, to remain in their houses and prohibited any gatherings or crowds on the streets. I found that the southern people were as greatly distressed as those of the North. The streets of St. Louis were deserted for two days and there was nothing but sorrow exhibited on both sides.

The lady called the next day and asked me for the card, she desiring to keep it as a memento, and no doubt giving up all hopes for her son, but I did not have it in my heart, after Lincoln's death, to carry out the order of the court and therefore commuted the sentence to imprisonment.

At the time of Lincoln's funeral I was ordered to go to

Springfield with my staff and troops. I went to Springfield on the day of the funeral and took my position in the procession. It was the saddest sight of my life. Those streets were lined with thousands and thousands of people, evidently in great distress and sorrow, and at every step we could hear the sobs of the sorrowing crowd and every little while a negro would come out and drop down on his knees and offer a prayer. There was hardly a person who was not in tears, and when I looked around at my troops I saw many of them in tears. As we paid the last rites to this great man the sorrow was universal, for it was one of the greatest calamities of this or any other nation.

Among all the public men in the funeral procession, no grief was keener than that of his War Secretary, Edwin M. Stanton. None of them had tested, as had Edwin M. Stanton, the extraordinary resources of his strong Chief. It was fitting, therefore, that he, as passed the strong heroic soul away, should pronounce its eulogy: "There lies the most perfect ruler of men the world has ever seen. Why the most perfect ruler the world has ever seen? Because he was the perfect ruler of himself."

The following letter, that has never been published, shows Lincoln's ideas upon a subject that has often been discussed:

Executive Mansion,

Washington, Sept. 4, 1864.

Eliza P. Gurney,

My Esteemed Friend:—I have not forgotten—probably never shall forget—the very impressive occasion when yourself and friends visited me on a Sabbath afternoon two years ago. Nor has your kind letter, written nearly a year later, ever been forgotten. In all, it has been your purpose to strengthen my reliances on God. I am much indebted to the good Christian people of the country for their constant prayers and consolations, and to no one of them more than to yourself. The purposes of the Almighty are perfect and must prevail, though we erring mortals may fail to accurately perceive them in advance. We hoped for a happy termination of this terrible war long

before this, but God knows best and has ruled otherwise. We shall acknowledge His wisdom, and our own error therein. Meanwhile we must work earnestly in the best light He gives us, trusting that so working still conduces to the great ends He ordains. Surely He intends some great good to follow this mighty convulsion, which no mortal could make and no mortal could stay.

Your people—the Friends—have had, and we are having, a very great trial. On principle and faith, opposed to both war and oppression, they can only practically oppose oppression by war. In this hard dilemma some have chosen one horri and some the other. For those appealing to me on conscientious grounds, I have done, and shall do, the best I could and can in my own conscience under my oath to the Lord. That you believe this I doubt not, and believing it I shall still receive for our country and myself your earnest prayers to our Father in Heaven.

Your Sincere Friend,
A. LINCOLN.

A more beautiful letter it would be impossible to write.

When the second nomination of Lincoln was about to be made, the people who were dissatisfied and disgruntled at what he had done, many who thought he was not radical enough or aggressive enough in the war, called a convention to meet in Cleveland in May of 1864.

The movement was supported by men of prominence in the party, dissatisfied and disappointed with the conducting of affairs, and their action caused much anxiety. This convention nominated for President, John C. Fremont, and for Vice-President, John Cochran, and instead of there being thousands in attendance at the convention, as was expected, there were only about 400.

A friend of Mr. Lincoln seeing this, hastened to the White House to impart it. Lincoln, thereupon, reached for his well thumbed Bible and opening it at First Samuel, 22; 2, read:

And everyone that was in distress, and everyone that was in debt, and everyone that was discontented, gathered themselves unto him and he became a Captain over them, and there were with him about four hundred.

Even the London Punch, that criticised and ridiculed Mr. Lincoln during his administration, changed, and after his death, said it was sorry and regretted its course, holding that it was a remarkable man who could indite in a car on a train, while on his trip to Gettysburg, that remarkable tribute so strong in English, so expressive, eloquent and sympathetic, and said that his Gettysburg speech had changed their whole course and opinion of Lincoln.

Lincoln was a man of keen vision, of almost prophetic ken. He penetrated almost intuitively the thin veneer of patriotism which often covered self. He was not deceived by the wretched shams and pretexts behind which men, under the pretense of serving their country, sought upon to see, in all its naked deformity, the utter selfishness of self, and yet, notwithstanding it all, he believed, and rightly believed, that in the main and on the average the plain people wanted to be, intended to be, and were, right.


With his trained reasoning faculties, he reached conclusions which were far in advance of the general thought of the people; hence, in thought, in speech, in the discussion of great fundamental principles Lincoln was a radical; and yet in administration, in the discharge of executive duties, where he was called upon to act for others, he was a conservative. He said to Greeley, Chase and Stevens, and others of like fiery temper and spirit:

You are theoretically right but practically wrong. If I am to lead these people I must not separate myself from them. Whatever my individual thoughts may be, whatever the logical conclusions of my mind, based upon the premises which I admit to be sound and true, nevertheless I must not separate myself from the people. If I am to lead, I must stay with the procession.

Lincoln embodied in the mind of the people two great issues that were really only one—the preservation of the American Union and the abolition of slavery. At the root of both

there lay a moral principle and both appealed with overwhelming force to sentiment. They were so plain, so vividly defined, that no sophistry could obscure them, no shrewd debater reason them away. And so, back of him were the masses of the people, their eyes fixed with pathetic faith and loyalty upon that tall, gaunt, stooping, homely man, who to their minds meant everything that makes a cause worth dying for.

Lincoln's great ability, his pure administration, his kind but firm hand has disarmed all criticism, and today no one names him but in words of respect and love, and his name the world over, is coupled in the trinity—Washington, Lincoln and Grant, the creators and saviors of the Union.





LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT

Photo Presented to General Dodge at City Point, October, 1864

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL U. S. GRANT

As a soldier, General Grant stands first in all the history of warfare. As a citizen, his acts, his foresight, and his methods of meeting and settling all great questions, stamp him as the peer of the best statesmen that the world has produced. In fact, in the old world his statesmanship is considered equal to his great achievements as a soldier. As he came to be known only after he was forty years old, the question naturally arises, was there anything in his boyhood or early manhood that indicated the abilities that were so rapidly developed during the Civil War? He says that as a boy he loved horses, not books, and worked on the farm, and that even the uniform of a soldier had no attractions for him; that he was an indifferent scholar, and that he preferred to read a novel than study his lessons; that his great desire was to travel and see our country, and when he was appointed to West Point the only inducement for him to accept was the disgrace it would bring upon him to decline after his father had asked for the appointment; and, finally, he was reconciled to it because it would enable him to see Philadelphia and New York, and that his long stay in those cities, instead of repairing promptly to West Point, brought a sharp reminder from his father.

At West Point Grant was an indifferent scholar, had a positive dislike to anything military, and neglected his studies. After he graduated he remained in the army hoping to be professor at West Point rather than an officer in the field. He considered the Mexican war an unholy one. He says:

I regarded the war as one of the most unjust ever urged by a stronger against a weaker nation, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation—a conspiracy to ac-

quire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the American nation. The Southern Rebellion was the outgrowth of the Mexican war.

He joined General Taylor's command on the Rio Grande, and, although acting as Quartermaster, he took part in nearly all of the battles of the Mexican war. He says:

At the Battle of Monterey, my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. I had been there but a short time when the order to charge was given, and lacking the courage to return to camp, where I had been ordered to stay, I charged with the regiment.

He evidently took in the tactics, logistics and strategy, and sometimes criticised them. In one or two of the fights near the City of Mexico he thought the enemy could have been driven out by flank movements, without the great losses in front attacks on the enemy's strong positions. At the gates of Mexico, he developed some of those wonderful qualities that were so prominent in the Civil War, when he took his little squad of men to flank the Mexican troops out of their position at the Garita San Cosma, and caused the fall of the City of Mexico, and received the commendation of the commanding officer, and was brevetted.

After this campaign in the Mexican war he seemed less inclined than ever to follow the army permanently, and soon resigned and returned to civil life.

General Grant entered the service in the Civil War as Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Infantry, and brought the regiment to great efficiency. He was sent to Northern Missouri. His first order was to march against Colonel Harris, who had a rebel regiment near the town of Florida. General Grant says:

As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp, and probably find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher

and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have been back in Illinois, but I had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do. I kept right on, and when I found that Harris had left, it occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a view of the matter I had never taken, and it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war I never experienced trepidation upon confronting the enemy, although I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that the enemy had as much reason to fear my force as I had his. The lesson was a valuable one.

BELMONT.

From North Missouri he was sent to Southeast Missouri, and was then made a Brigadier-General, and ordered to Cairo. His first important battle was Belmont, brought about by his movement to threaten Columbus. His orders were to make a demonstration against the Confederate force at or near Columbus, Kentucky, to prevent their sending reinforcements to a Confederate command that a Federal force had been sent to attack on the St. Francis River. Grant had no intention of fighting a battle when he started out for Belmont. His orders did not contemplate an attack, but after he started he says that he saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of doing what they volunteered to do—fight the enemies of their country—and he did not see how he could maintain discipline or the confidence of his command if he returned to Cairo without an attempt to do something. This battle first brought the country's attention to Grant. He displayed that confidence, good judgment and self-reliance that afterwards became so conspicuous.

FORT HENRY AND DONELSON.

General Grant was ordered soon after Belmont to make a demonstration up the Tennessee River, and towards Columbus, Kentucky, with a view of holding the Confederate forces there while the campaign around Bowling Green was proceed-

ing. In this movement General C. F. Smith reported that Fort Heineman, opposite Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, could be captured. Grant believed the true line of operation for his force was by the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and asked permission to visit St. Louis and lay the plan before General Halleck, but says:

I was received with so little cordiality that I perhaps stated the subject of my visit with less clearness than I might have done, and I had not uttered many sentences before I was cut short as if my plan was preposterous, and I returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.

On his return he consulted Flag Officer Foote, who commanded the gunboat fleet on the Mississippi River, and he agreed with Grant, and notwithstanding his rebuff, Grant renewed the suggestion, and on January 28th, wrote General Halleck fully in regard to his plans. On the 1st of February General Grant received instructions from General Halleck, going fully into every detail, to march upon and capture Fort Henry. On the 2d the expedition was started; on the 6th Fort Henry was captured, and Grant wired Halleck that on the 8th he would move on Fort Donelson, not even waiting for orders to do so. On February 16th, 1862, Fort Donelson surrendered to him with its entire force. Grant, in this battle, displayed the tactics which were ever in his mind—that when the enemy attacked, to also attack on some other portion of the line, and when the enemy attacked and turned his right he immediately attacked and turned the enemy's right, and carried their intrenchments, forcing the final surrender.

In writing Mrs. Grant of the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, he says:

These terrible battles are very good things to read about for persons who lose no friends, but I am decidedly in favor of having as little of it as possible. The way to avoid it is to push forward as vigorously as possible.

After Forts Henry and Donelson had been taken General Grant started to carry out this program, and visited Clarksville and Nashville. Because General Halleck, his commanding officer, did not receive prompt reports from General Grant, he issued this order:

You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders and report strength and position of your command?

Up to this time Grant had not received one word from Halleck, and all his reports sent to Halleck went to the end of the telegraph line, where the operator was a rebel, who deserted and took all these dispatches with him. Buel, Halleck and McClellan all seemed demoralized by Grant's great victories. They, looking for the enemy to recover, while Grant thought of nothing but their demoralization, and the desire to follow them. Grant, on the ground, was the only person who saw the situation, and had any power to take advantage of it. The rebels, in their consternation, abandoned everything as fast as possible, and even evacuated Chattanooga, three hundred miles away.

When Halleck got into communication with Grant he informed him that he was advised to arrest him because he went to Nashville, a point within his own command, and no one could hear from him. They could not trust the man who within thirty days had broken through the entire rebel line, driven their forces beyond the Tennessee, and captured their fortified places and all the troops in them. In writing of this to his wife, General Grant says:

All the slanders you have seen against me originated away from where I was. The only foundation was from the fact that I was ordered to remain at Fort Henry and send the expedition up the Tennessee River under the command of Major-General C. F. Smith. This was ordered because General Halleck received no report from me for near two weeks after

the fall of Fort Donelson. The same occurred with me; I received nothing from him. The consequence was I was apparently totally disregarding his orders. The fact was he was ordering me every day to report the condition of my command. I was not receiving the orders, but knowing my duties, was reporting daily, and when anything occurred to make it necessary, two or three times a day. When I was ordered to remain behind it was the cause of much astonishment among the troops of my command, and also disappointment. When I was again ordered to join them they showed, I believe, heartfelt joy. I never allowed a word of contradiction to go out from my headquarters, thinking this the best course. I know, though I do not like to speak of myself, that General Halleck would regard this army badly off if I was relieved. Not but what there are Generals with it abundantly able to command, but because it would leave inexperienced officers senior in rank. You need not fear but what I will come out triumphantly. I am pulling no wires, as political Generals do, to advance myself. I have no future ambition. My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully, and I am perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out of it.

General McClellan, on Halleck's representations, ordered that Grant should be relieved from duty and an investigation made. He even authorized Grant's arrest; this within two weeks of his great victory that electrified the country. Grant's explanation of delays in receiving dispatches, his visit to Nashville, etc., reached Halleck, and Grant was restored to his command on March 13th, Halleck claiming his explanation to Washington had exonerated Grant, but he did not inform Grant that his whole trouble came from his (Halleck's) misleading reports to Washington.

Grant proceeded immediately to Savannah, Tennessee, where he found General C. F. Smith in command, sick, and he soon died.

General Grant says of the condition of the South after the fall of Donelson:

That his opinion was and still is that the way was open for the National forces to occupy any part of the Southwest without much resistance. If one General was in command of

all the forces west of the Alleghanies, who would have taken the responsibility, he could have moved to Chattanooga, Memphis, Corinth and Vicksburg, and with the troops pouring in from the North he could have kept all these places, leaving his army to operate against any body of the enemy that could have been concentrated in his front. Rapid movements, with the occupation of the enemy's territory, would have discouraged a large number of young men who had gone from that territory into the rebel army, and brought them home, and we would have permanently held that territory that cost so many lives to conquer later, but our delays gave courage to the enemy, and they collected new armies, fortified their positions, and twice afterwards came near making their line on the Ohio River.

SHILOH.

No campaign or battle of Grant's has received such unjust and severe criticism as the Battle of Shiloh, but as we now read the official reports of that battle, we see that at night on the first day of the battle Grant was master of the field, with Wallace's Division of 12,000 fresh troops that had not fired a gun; that the enemy were exhausted and demoralized, and had no reinforcements; and, as Grant claims, he would have wiped them out the second day without the aid of Buel. The fact is, from the very moment of the attack on the second morning, Beauregard, who was in command after the death of Albert Sidney Johnston, commenced retreating, and fell back to Corinth, and Grant, if he had not been restrained by orders, would within a week have had his forces facing Corinth, less than twenty miles away. The one mistake made by General C. F. Smith, which Grant had not rectified at Shiloh, was in not intrenching their forces as they arrived from day to day, on the general line of defense. Grant admits this, but says as it was his purpose to proceed immediately against the enemy at Corinth he did not think it necessary, and it never entered his mind that the enemy would attack him. Besides, these troops were mostly green and needed drilling and discipline more than they did experience with pick and shovel, and Grant

also says that there was no hour during the day when he doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy.

In the first day's battle the forces on each side were about equal. Grant says that up to Shiloh he believed the Rebellion would collapse suddenly as soon as a decisive victory could be gained, and after such victories as the capture of Donelson, the fall of Bowling Green, Nashville (with its immense amount of stores). Columbia, Hickman, opening the Tennessee and Cumberland from the mouth to head, he believed peace would come. After this, when Confederate armies collected, and new lines of defenses from Chattanooga to Corinth and Knoxville, and on to the Atlantic, were formed, and they took the offensive, he gave up all idea of saving the Union except by complete conquest. Up to this time he had protected property and citizens. After this he pursued the plan of consuming and destroying everything that could be used to support and supply armies, and this policy he pursued to the end of the war.

Grant never made a report of the Battle of Shiloh, as Buel, who commanded the Army of the Ohio, refused to make reports to him. A few days after the battle General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing and assumed command, Grant being placed as second in command, and ignored. Halleck had three armies—the Ohio, Buel commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee, Grant's old command, to which General George H. Thomas was assigned to the command. There was no time after the Battle of Shiloh but what the enemy would have retreated from Corinth had a movement been made against it. Beauregard had about 50,000 men in Corinth, while against him were 120,000, and any of the three armies could have planted itself on his communications and forced him to fight in the open or retreat. Grant suggested to Halleck such a move by the left, but says he was silenced so quickly that he thought possibly he had suggested an unmilitary movement. Logan, who com-

manded a Brigade on the extreme left, on the 28th of May told Grant the enemy had been evacuating several days, and if they would let him he could go into Corinth with his Brigade. Beauregard published his orders and evacuated on the 26th of May and our army entered on the 30th, the enemy not leaving a thing, not even a sick or wounded soldier. Even after they had left, Halleck issued orders on the 30th of May for a battle, and had his whole army drawn up in line to meet the enemy. The army was greatly disappointed at the result. Grant says he was satisfied that Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign made immediately after Shiloh, without any additional reinforcements, and that after Corinth they had a movable force of 80,000 men, besides sufficient force for holding all territory acquired in any campaign. New Orleans and Baton Rouge were ours, and the enemy had only a single line of railroad from Vicksburg to Richmond, and in one move we had the opportunity to occupy Vicksburg and Atlanta without much opposition. But we continued to pursue the policy of distributing this great army, and for nearly a year accomplished no great results from it, giving up the territory back to Nashville, holding only the line from the Tennessee River to Memphis.

General Grant's position at Corinth, with a nominal command, became so unbearable that he asked permission of Halleck to move his headquarters to Memphis. He had repeatedly asked to be relieved from command under Halleck, but Sherman prevailed on him to remain. On June 21, 1862, he moved to Memphis. On July 11th, Halleck was placed in command of all the armies at Washington, and Grant returned to Corinth, and in July, 1862, was given only the command of the District of the West Tennessee, which embraced West Tennessee and Kentucky west of the Cumberland.

As one reads the reports and makes comparisons—first, Grant fighting at every opportunity, winning every battle,

pleading to move on the enemy after every battle, but stopped, humiliated after each campaign, and finally when given a command only allowed a district, while on the other hand Halleck, who had not fought a battle, who took fifty-five days or more, with three men to the enemy's one, to make twenty miles, which, by a simple flank movement, could have been accomplished in two days, with one of the best opportunities of the war to capture or destroy an army of 50,000 men, who prevented Grant from reaping the full benefit of every battle he fought, was brought to Washington and given full command of all the armies, while Grant was not even allowed to resume command of the department Halleck vacated—the record is most astonishing. Halleck had no confidence in Grant. The officers in the field looked on in amazement, and wondered what the powers in Washington could be thinking of. Grant accepted whatever was given him, never making a word of protest or complaint. He was now again in position to commence moving on the enemy, and although Halleck's great army had been distributed, Grant had left in his command 50,000 troops, and commenced preparing for another movement, not even suggesting that more force be sent him. There was facing him an army of about 40,000 men under Van Dorn, and Grant, with his numerous posts and large territory, could not muster more than 20,000 men for an aggressive army. He says that his most anxious period during the war was the time that he was guarding all this territory until he was reinforced and took the aggressive.

On August 2d, 1862, Grant was ordered to live upon the country, upon the resources of citizens hostile to the Government; to handle rebels within our lines without gloves, impoverish them, and expel them from our lines. Grant did not see the necessity of this, and says he does not recollect having arrested or imprisoned a citizen during the entire Rebellion.

During this time, with his inferior force, Grant sent two Divisions to Buel and one to Rosecrans at Corinth.

IUKA AND CORINTH

Van Dorn, who commanded the rebel army in Grant's front, soon saw how small a force Grant had, and decided to attack him. He brought Price's army across the Mississippi River, and both combined and moved on Grant's lines. Grant moved to Jackson himself so he could be in close touch with his force, and where, by the railway from Jackson to Grand Junction and Jackson to Corinth, he could reinforce the point attacked more readily. Price immediately moved on Iuka, and Grant saw a chance to defeat and capture him, and went himself immediately to Glendale, sending Rosecrans' force from Corinth to the rear of Price, and General Ord to head him off. A portion of Rosecrans' force fought Price near Iuka, but General Ord did not know or hear of the battle, although the order was, if either force was attacked, to notify the other. There were two roads leading out of Iuka to the South, and Rosecrans was ordered to take possession of both, but failed to occupy the easterly one, and during the night Price retreated on this road, avoiding both Rosecrans and Ord. Van Dorn and Price combined their forces southwest of Corinth, and moved immediately on that place. As soon as Grant ascertained this, he ordered Hurlbut with all the force he had to move from Memphis and get in Van Dorn's rear, and started McPherson with a Division from Jackson to reinforce Rosecrans. Van Dorn commenced his attack on Corinth on October 2d. Rosecrans had pushed his second Division out nearly three miles from Corinth, and allowed the attack to fall upon this Division, which was steadily pushed back during the day until it finally reached the inside works at Corinth, fighting very gallantly at every line of defense. On the second day, Van Dorn and Price had Corinth partially invested, and a very

severe battle ensued, both sides fighting with great gallantry and great loss. Price and Van Dorn were completely defeated, and their army retreated greatly demoralized, and should have been relentlessly followed and their trains and artillery captured, and although Grant urged this in a dispatch, for some reason there were delays, and when the troops did follow they took the wrong road, which enabled the enemy to escape, although Hurlbut's and Ord's forces captured portions of their trains and artillery.

Grant criticises Rosecrans severely for his movements in these battles, and censures him for failing to capture Price at Iuka, and to follow Van Dorn after Corinth. There were many protests from Generals McPherson, Hurlbut, and other officers, who were ordered to aid Rosecrans in these battles, and these protests especially related to his reports. Rosecrans denounced the action of the second Division, which held the center at Corinth, as cowardly. It was the Division Grant had organized at Cairo, that fought at Belmont and carried the lines at Donelson, and they showed themselves veterans at Corinth, because when they were broken through they rallied and retook the line.

Mrs. Grant, who was present with General Grant at Jackson, stated that these officers appealed to her in the matter, and in her talk with General Grant he was disinclined to relieve Rosecrans. While the matter was under discussion, on the 23d of October, 1862, the War Department assigned Rosecrans to the command of the Army of the Cumberland. Mrs. Grant says that when Grant received the dispatch he came out of his tent holding it in his hands, and declaring that his greatest trouble had been solved. Grant says in relation to Rosecrans that as a subordinate he found he could not make him do as he wished, and had finally determined to relieve him from duty if he had not received this assignment, and that he was greatly pleased at his being assigned to the command of the

Army of the Cumberland, believing that perhaps in such a position he would be more efficient and useful than he was as a subordinate.

Grant, up to this time, had only been commanding the District of the Tennessee, but had in his command 50,000 men. The authorities in Washington still seemed disinclined to give him the command he was entitled to, but on the 25th of October, 1862, he was placed in command of the Army and Department of the Tennessee.

At the time of the Battle of Corinth I was in command of the Fourth Division, District of West Tennessee, and was rebuilding the railway from Columbus to Corinth. I had just made the connection at Humboldt, and had been several days at the front giving personal attention to the work. I received a dispatch from General Quimby, my commanding officer, directing me to report immediately at Corinth for orders. I was away from my own headquarters in a working (undress) suit; had nothing with me, and hesitated about going as I was, but I concluded it was best to report, so took the train, and at Jackson, Tennessee, Colonel John A. Rawlins, whom I had never seen, came onto the train and asked if I was on board. I made myself known to him, and he informed me that General Grant was out on the platform and desired to see me. I apologized to Colonel Rawlins, stating that I was not in proper dress for presenting myself to the commanding officer. He saw my predicament and said: "Oh, we know all about you, don't mind that." I stepped out on the platform. General Grant met me, shook my hand cordially, and spoke very approvingly of what I had done, and I then saw that he was no better dressed than I was, which greatly relieved me. In a few words General Grant informed me that he had assigned me to the command of the Second Division of the Army of the Tennessee at Corinth, and quietly but with a determination that struck me so forcibly that I could make no answer,

said: "And I want you to understand you are not going to command a Division of cowards."

I stammered out something, I know not what, and tried to thank him, but had no comprehension of what he meant, as I had heard nothing against the Division; but when I arrived at Corinth and assumed command, relieving General Davies, I found that in the Battle of Corinth, on the second day, the Division had been formed on the north side of the town, and that a Brigade and a Battery to the east of them had been seized with panic, breaking through their ranks and carrying a portion of one Brigade into the town. The Division, however, held its organization intact, and regained all lost ground, really saving the day.

General Rosecrans, in his official report of the Battle of Corinth, had branded the men as cowards, and General Grant had disapproved his actions and comments. The Division won imperishable renown. Upon their banner was inscribed, "First at Donelson," and from that time until after the Atlanta Campaign they served directly under me. From Corinth to the end of the war they took no step backward. Their great battle of Atlanta, where they helped to hold a whole Corps of Hood's army, and afterwards Altoona, when, under General Corse they held that strategic point against the terrific onslaughts of four times their numbers, gave me cause to always remember the words of General Grant—that I was not assigned to command a Division of cowards. The correspondence which follows shows how unjust Rosecrans's charges were.

Hdqrs. Second Div., Army of West Tennessee,
Corinth, Miss., Oct. 23, 1862.

Major-General Rosecrans:

Sir:—On the afternoon of October 4th, after the victories of that day and of the 3d, you said upon the battlefield, among the piles of the dead and groans of the wounded slain by the Second Division, Army of the West Tennessee, that they were a set of cowards: that they never should have any military

standing in your army till they had won it on the field of battle; that they had disgraced themselves, and no wonder the rebel army had thrown its whole force upon it during the two days' engagement.

My report is now before you. The effect of the official announcement which you have made is having a very demoralizing effect upon the brave men and working injury to them throughout the country. It has been the basis of newspaper articles and of strictures upon the military conduct of the Division. I would most respectfully ask, for the benefit of the service, and for the honor of the Division, that if you have changed your opinions you would publicly give a refutation to these charges.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
THOMAS A. DAVIES.

Hdqrs. Army of the Miss.,
Third Division, Dist. West Tennessee.

General Davies:

General:—In reply to your note, just received, I would say that having read your very clear and creditable report of the operations of your Division, I am satisfied they fought very nobly on the first day, and so much so that I shall overlook the cowardly stampeding of those under my immediate observation on the second day, which gave rise to the public indignation I expressed in your presence and in theirs. Assure the brave officers and men of your Division that I will endeavor to do them public and ample justice, which will be more than all the newspaper talk to their disparagement. You will oblige me by making this letter known to the command, and you may use it publicly if you wish while waiting my official report.

W. S. ROSECRANS, Major-General.

When General Grant, in the winter of 1862-63, obtained permission to make his first move on Vicksburg and Pemberton's army, he notified me that General Wallace would relieve me and I would be given a command in his army, but the defeat of this first movement changed the entire plan.

VICKSBURG.

Grant's first campaign against Vicksburg was for Sherman, with thirty thousand men, to go down the Mississippi River by boat and attack Vicksburg from the Yazoo side, while he

(Grant) attacked Pemberton and his army, then at Granada, and if Pemberton retreated, follow him to the gates of Vicksburg. General J. E. Johnston soon saw the danger of this combined attack of Grant and Sherman on Vicksburg, and immediately ordered a movement of General Van Dorn and all his cavalry, together with the forces of Generals Jackson and Forest from Middle Tennessee, upon Grant's communications, to force the abandonment of Grant's advance.

At the same time the force I commanded at Corinth was to move down the Mobile & Ohio Railroad towards Meridian for the purpose of protecting that flank and hold what force I could in my front. On December 9th Grant wired me that Jackson's cavalry, some 3,000 men he thought, was starting to my rear; and again on December 18th, to take such force as could be spared and with troops at Jackson and in the field attack Forest and drive him across the Tennessee River. This I did, and by January 7th Forest had been driven across the Tennessee, and Jackson had been driven south of the Tallehatchie, and I reported by the following dispatch:

Corinth, Jan. 7, 1862.

Had gun-boats come up the river at the time I sent for them, or had General Davis been allowed to come with even a transport and a piece or two of artillery and destroyed the flats, we should have captured the rebel force (Forest's) on this side of the river. As it was they had several hard knocks before they escaped. Captured four cannon and six hundred prisoners.

Van Dorn attacked Holly Springs on the 20th of December, where were stored all of Grant's supplies. Colonel Murphay, who commanded this point, and had plenty of troops to defend it, surrendered without firing a gun. This combination of Johnston's, and the surrender of Holly Springs forced Grant to retreat to the line of the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and allowed Pemberton to move to Vicksburg and defeat Sherman's attack upon that point.

This is the first, and, I believe, only case where a campaign was defeated and two separate armies forced to retreat by a cavalry raid, one going down the Mississippi to Vicksburg, and the other towards Vicksburg by land, by way of Granada, and was the first time Grant abandoned a campaign. As he fell back he lived off the country, and finding his army was so easily fed he said that if he had had the experience before he would have let his base of supplies go, and push on to Vicksburg, living off the country, holding or defeating Pemberton, and preventing him from reaching Vicksburg before Sherman could have taken it. After this time Grant and all the armies he commanded followed this policy, obtaining their rations by living off the country when necessary. Especially was this the case in his campaign in the rear of Vicksburg, which immediately followed after the defeat at Holly Springs.

After the defeat of Sherman and the loss of Holly Springs, Grant determined to move his whole army down the Mississippi River, leaving me in command at Corinth to cover his left flank, and preventing any portion of Bragg's army from reaching the Mississippi River, or, in fact, making a lodgment west of the Tennessee River. This virtually left me with the east and south, facing the Confederate forces.

Soon after I took command at Corinth, I received a letter from Senator James W. Grimes of my own state, inquiring particularly as to the condition of our Army, and also about General Grant, and I wrote the Senator a very long letter, going into detail about the condition and giving him the army's view of General Grant, which was unanimously in favor of him. They considered him the best commander they had ever been under, and I complained of the treatment General Grant was receiving from the War Department. He had been placed in command of the District of West Tennessee with about 50,000 men to take care of that country, while with General Halleck it was considered necessary to have over 100,000 men.

And with this small force General Grant had maintained his line of communication, had fought and won the battles of Corinth and Iuka, and was at that time moving against Price and Pemberton, who were known to be superior in force to General Grant. General Grant told me that this was the most anxious time of his service.

When Senator Grimes received this letter he was so pleased with it that he immediately gave it to Mr. Fourney, the editor of the Philadelphia Press, who printed it, and it received considerable comment.

From the beginning of the war I had made considerable use of spies and scouts within the enemy's lines, and had obtained a very reliable force, mostly Southern men living in Northern Alabama and Mississippi. They had relatives enlisted in the First Alabama Cavalry, a regiment I raised while in command at Corinth. These scouts were instructed how to obtain the number of troops in any command, company, regiment, brigade, division or corps, and I placed them at Chattanooga, Atlanta, Selma, Montgomery, Mobile, Meridian, Jackson and Vicksburg, for the purpose of watching the movements of the enemy, and especially to report any force that should move towards Vicksburg, and, after Vicksburg was invested, to report the force sent to Johnston, who was moving an army to relieve Vicksburg. It is a singular fact that from their reports Grant was notified of every movement in his rear, and he ordered reinforcements from the North, of as many men as were sent to Johnston, and placed them under Sherman on the Big Black, ready to meet Johnston.

These secret-service men never gave a larger force than 30,000 men with Johnston, which was about the size of Johnston's army. These spies never left their stations. They communicated with me through their relatives, often through their wives, who would come into Corinth to see their relatives in the Alabama Cavalry, and thus throw off suspicion. In one or two cases of emergency they reported directly to Grant.

General Frederick D. Grant tells of one who reported to General Grant on the morning of the Battle of Champion Hill, giving General Grant, General Johnston's position and force, and General Grant said he could attack and defeat Pemberton and reach Vicksburg before General Johnston could aid or reinforce Pemberton. General Grant acted on their information, and speaks of it in his dispatches and Memoirs, and as I take the Rebellion Records and read my dispatches to Hurlbut at Memphis, who sent them by boat to Grant, I am surprised at the accuracy of the reports of these scouts. Of course they were often detected and lost their lives, but there were always others ready to take their places.

I was furnished, by order of Grant, with all the money I needed, and I noticed one case where I had used \$22,000 that was turned over to me by a Quartermaster. He demanded original vouchers which it was impossible for me to give, as the scouts would not sign any voucher, and he would not take a simple statement that I had expended the money for the service. I explained this to General Grant, and he sent me this order:

Vicksburg, Feb. 26, 1863.

General Dodge:—The Provost Marshals in your district will turn over to you all moneys collected by them under existing orders, taking your receipt therefor, which they will forward to the Provost Marshal General in settlement of their account in lieu of money, and which you will account for as secret-service funds. Any additional funds you may require can be obtained by requisition on the Provost Marshal General. All sales of cotton confiscated should be made by Captain Eddy, at Memphis, Tennessee, and properly accounted for by him.

Some of these scouts are still alive, and I often hear from them. Wherever I was in command you will find the records full of dispatches from me giving information to my superior officers that the scouts brought or sent to me. When these scouts were captured it was our endeavor to have them treated as prisoners of war, and the same was the case with the Con-

federates, but whenever we captured one of theirs they would make a demand which, if not complied with, was usually followed by a threat. Our method of treating such occurrences is indicated by the following communication which I sent Colonel Wood:

Corinth, Apr. 3, 1863.

Colonel Wood:

Your communication of April 1st, by flag of truce, arrived at my lines today, and in answer, I have to say that James Neill is held by us as a prisoner of war, and treated as such. How you obtained such information, I am unable to surmise, as there is no foundation in fact for it. Your threat to hang two men for one is given its proper weight. Our Government never hangs men without good and sufficient cause (I wish I could say the same of yours), and when it decides upon hanging men the threats of Confederate officers count nothing. We have no fears of the old story of retaliation.

THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

As soon as Grant moved down the Mississippi, and placed his army on the levees, he had determined in his own mind that bold campaign to the south and rear of Vicksburg. Knowing he could not make it until the waters fell in April and May, he utilized the time and kept his troops busy in several plans for passing Vicksburg, or by using the Yazoo tributaries to make a landing to the north and east of Vicksburg. He had very little faith in these projects, although they tended to confuse the enemy and mislead them as to his real plan of campaign. He kept his own counsel as to his plan, knowing it would receive no support in Washington, but probably draw forth an order prohibiting it, and also receive criticism from all military sources, as the plan was an absolute violation of all the rules and practices of war, as it virtually placed his entire command at the mercy of the enemy, cutting loose from all the bases of support and supply, and that he must take with him all the rations and ammunition he would use in the campaign. Nevertheless, he never hesitated, though urged to

abandon it by Sherman, and all of his ablest Generals. Grant says he was induced to adopt the plan first, on account of the political situation, which was threatening, the anti-war element hoping to carry the elections, and the Confederates were forcing our troops as far or further north than they were when the war commenced; that to abandon his campaign and return to Memphis, the nearest point from which he could make the campaign by land and have a base and railroad from it, would be very disheartening to the Government and the people.

Grant ran the batteries and landed his forces on the east side of the Mississippi, and faced the enemy with less men than they had, and in the entire campaign, when he planted himself in the rear of Vicksburg, had only 43,000 men while the enemy had 60,000. In comparison as to boldness, the total ignoring of all former practices of warfare, the accepting of the probability of nine chances of failure to one of success, this campaign has never been approached in its originality and the wonderful grasp of its possibilities and great fighting success. Viewing it from this standpoint, it cannot be compared to any other known campaign. After Vicksburg the Confederacy was doomed, and Gettysburg coming at the same time, lifted the nation from the slough of despondency to the highest point of hope, enthusiasm, and certainty of success.

As soon as this campaign was over Grant wished to move immediately on Mobile, but that fatal policy that had formerly scattered a great army and relieved Grant of his command, was renewed here. He lay quiet, his great abilities unutilized, until the disaster at Chicamauga forced the Government to again use him to retrieve our misfortunes, and again snatch victory out of a threatening great disaster.

I will give you an object lesson which shows Grant's idea of duty. While I was stationed at Corinth, looking after that flank of the army, Grant hammering away at Vicksburg, and Rosecrans pounding Bragg in Tennessee, it was necessary for

me to be awake. I was in a dangerous position, and the enemy could have destroyed either campaign by establishing themselves in my position. I wrote Grant at Vicksburg that I thought with 12,000 men I had I could penetrate, by the Tennessee Valley, to the rear of Bragg and destroy his communications and supplies concentrated in that valley, and force him to retreat. I received no answer to my letter, and began to think I had made a fool of myself, and swore inwardly that it was the first and last time I would ever be caught in such a boat. A long time (to me) after the suggestion, General Oglesby, who was commanding that district, received a dispatch from General Grant instructing him to have Dodge carry out the movement suggested in his last letter, and that was all the order I received. I marched up the Tennessee Valley, destroying the railways and stores, which the Confederate Government estimated to be in value not less than \$20,000,000. Of course Bragg threw before and behind me such forces as he could spare, so that the rumors which reached Corinth were generally that I was captured, whipped, etc. These reports were all fired into General Grant, and no doubt he became disgusted at them; but he finally wired in answer to them that: "If Dodge has accomplished what he started out to do we can afford to lose him." That settled the question; they sent Grant no more rumors. The enemy was distracted by the moving out from my column of General Straight and his mounted force, who had been sent out upon his celebrated raid by General Rosecrans. Grant, in commenting on it afterwards, said to me that he knew the troops I had, and he had no doubt they would be heard from before they were captured or destroyed. I did not start out to fight, but to destroy, and he thought the distraction of the movement of Straight would puzzle the enemy so much that I would be able to get out of harm's way before they could concentrate any force on me which I could not whip.

General Grant, on July 27, 1863, at Vicksburg, wrote a letter to the War Department, asking for the promotion of four Brigadier-Generals to Major-Generals, and nine Colonels to Brigadier-Generals, as a reward for this campaign, stating they had all rendered valuable service in the field, and would fill the places for which they were recommended well. Although I was not directly before Vicksburg, but had an independent command upon General Grant's flank, he placed me at the head of the list. One would suppose that after such a great victory, such a recommendation would have received immediate attention, but it did not, and only one officer, Colonel John A. Rawlins, Grant's Chief of Staff, received any promotion—he was made a Brigadier-General. And not for a long time—not until Generals Grant and Sherman made additional and urgent requests, were any promotions made. In my case, General Grant, when he was called to Washington by President Lincoln, made it a personal matter. Right after the Battle of the Wilderness he urged it again, but it was not until June, 1864, during the Atlanta campaign, that I received the promotion, when Lincoln wired Sherman that he had appointed me and relieved him from his trouble. I was a Brigadier General with a Corps command in the Atlanta campaign, which was very embarrassing, as there were Major-Generals in the same army commanding Divisions. President Lincoln, when he promoted me, paid me this very high compliment: "General Dodge has been more strongly recommended, and his promotion more persistently urged by his superior officers than any other man I have made a Major-General."

The organization of the Sixteenth Army Corps, of which Major-General Stephen A. Hurlbut was commander, was two wings, the right commanded by Brigadier-General A. J. Smith, which was in the field in the Meridian campaign, and in Bank's campaign, and which so completely defeated Forest and his command; and the left wing which was commanded

by Dodge, which was in the field with the Army of the Tennessee. Hurlbut's headquarters were at Memphis, and his Corps command included a large territory to which he gave his attention. Grant was dissatisfied with Hurlbut's administration of this territory and relieved him, assigning General C. C. Washburn to the command of that District, and ordered Hurlbut to Cairo, but didn't relieve him from the command of the Corps. Hurlbut immediately demanded of Sherman to take command of the Corps in the field. Sherman acknowledged his right to this, but Grant did not approve of it, and ordered that Hurlbut should be stationed at Cairo, and that Dodge should command that portion of the Corps which was in the Atlanta campaign. Grant, McPherson (who commanded the Army of the Tennessee), and Sherman (who commanded the Military Division), all urged that I be promoted to a rank fitting my command, and this is the explanation of Lincoln's dispatch. The fact is that after three years of war the western army got very few promotions for its splendid work, and not until Grant was made Commander-in-Chief was he able to give to his subordinate commanders in that army the rank he said they were entitled to.

During 1863 General Lorenzo Thomas, the Adjutant-General, had visited the western armies and given officers authority to raise negro regiments at Corinth. I had officered and mustered in two regiments. Grant had not made known his views, although he gave every facility to officers recruiting these regiments, but on August 9th, 1863, General Grant wired President Lincoln from Vicksburg as follows:

General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi Valley with a view of raising colored troops. I have no reason to doubt you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it is a source which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this conflict. It works double—in weakening the enemy and strengthening us. We were not fully ready for it until the river was open; now I think at least

100,000 men ought to be placed along its shores, relieving all white troops to serve elsewhere.

Right after the Vicksburg campaign General Grant proposed occupying the Rio Grande frontier, because the French had entered Mexico, and to use immediately the rest of his army to capture Mobile and move on Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, and perhaps Atlanta, Georgia, using the Alabama River from Mobile to supply his column; but again his great victorious army was scattered. Parke, with the Ninth Corps, was returned to East Tennessee, and Sherman, with the Fifteenth Corps, was started from Memphis to march along the Memphis & Charleston Railway to the Tennessee River, and up that river slowly, evidently for the purpose of being in position to aid Rosecrans in his campaign against Bragg.

CHATTANOOGA.

Right after the Battle of Chicamaugua and the concentration of the Army of the Cumberland in Chattanooga, the dispatches of the Assistant Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana, who was in Chattanooga, greatly alarmed the authorities in Washington, and at a conference it was decided to at once place that army in General Grant's command, and the Military Division of the Mississippi was organized, which virtually included all the territory west of the Alleghanies. General Grant was placed in command of it, and proceeded immediately to Chattanooga. In ten days he placed a starving army on a safe basis, had opened its cracker line and was forming his plans to attack Bragg. Sherman, who was marching from the Mississippi east, was ordered to drop everything and march to Chattanooga. Sherman had commanded the Fifteenth Army Corps, but now took Grant's command of the Army of the Tennessee, and moved rapidly east with the Fifteenth Army Corps, then commanded by Frank P. Blair, and the left wing of the Sixteenth Corps commanded by Dodge. On November

5th Grant ordered Sherman to leave Dodge's command at Athens, Alabama, to rebuild the Nashville & Decatur Railroad, which he said was necessary for him to have to feed his army. He said in his letter :

It is not my intention to leave any part of your army to guard roads, and particularly not Dodge, who has been kept continuously on such work.

There was a combination of conditions at Chattanooga that rendered it necessary for Grant to fight at once. As Longstreet had left Bragg's front for the purpose of whipping Burnside at Knoxville, the authorities in Washington were greatly disturbed at the fear of losing East Tennessee, which was almost unanimously Union in its sentiment, and dispatches were continuously coming to Grant from Washington to go to the aid of Burnside. Grant's answer was that he would fight as soon as Sherman got up, and that that in effect would relieve Burnside. On November 21st Grant wired to Halleck :

I have never felt such restlessness before as I have at the condition of the Army of the Cumberland.

Sherman, himself, reached Chattanooga on November 17th, his force arrived on November 26th, and the battle was immediately fought. Right in the midst of the battle Lincoln wired Grant not to forget Burnside. Grant wired: "I will start Granger this evening to Burnside's relief."

Grant followed the enemy to Ringgold, and stayed over night at Graysville with Sheridan, and returned to Chattanooga on the evening of the 28th. He says :

I found Granger had not got off, nor did he have the number of men I had directed. He moved with reluctance and complaint, and I therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two Divisions of Sherman's army had marched from Memphis and gone into battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command. Granger's order was to accompany him.

Sherman's troops were not fit to make this march to Knoxville. They were without clothes, shoes, blankets, or overcoats, and Grant wrote to him as follows:

Chattanooga, November 29th, 1863.

Major-General William T. Sherman:

News is received from Knoxville to the morning of the 27th. At that time the place was invested, but the attack on it was not vigorous—Longstreet evidently having determined to starve the garrison out. Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, that I shall have to send you.

Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiwassee and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his Corps with him, from which you will select in conjunction with the forces you now have with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga.

Granger has a boat loaded with provisions, which you can issue and return the boat. I will have another loaded to follow you. Subsist off the country all you can, and use the rations, of course, but as sparingly as possible.

It is expected that Foster is moving by this time from Cumberland Gap on Knoxville. I do not know what force he has with him, but presume it will range from 4,500 to 5,000. I leave this matter to you, knowing that you will do better acting upon your discretion than you could trammelled with instructions. I will only add that the last advices from Burnside, himself, indicated his ability to hold out rations only to about the 3d of December.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

Sherman's movement with Granger's Corps of the Army of the Cumberland saved Knoxville, as Longstreet had it invested. Sherman proposed to Burnside that Longstreet be driven out of Tennessee, but Burnside thought that he could do it without using Sherman's force. He thought that Longstreet would either get out of East Tennessee or return to Bragg's army, but was mistaken, and this mistake caused a great deal of trouble, and was one of the main reasons that prevented

Grant's comprehensive campaign for the winter of 1864. Longstreet remained in East Tennessee until spring, and was the cause of continual anxiety in Washington and at Knoxville. Grant said that it was a great mistake, and greatly regretted that he did not insist upon their fighting Longstreet, and forcing him to retreat from East Tennessee when the movement was first made.

During this time my forces were stretched from near Nashville to Decatur, Alabama, guarding and rebuilding the railroad, and holding the north side of the Tennessee River from Eastport to Decatur, over one hundred miles, and the only possible way to protect my line and continue the work was to assume the offensive against the enemy and keep them busy, which I did by mounting regiments of Infantry, and using what Cavalry Grant could send me. The record of the winter's work is full of remarkable fights of this force on both sides of the river. Grant was in continual communication with me, as Sherman had gone on the Meridian campaign, and often asked me if I could maintain my position, knowing that most of my Corps veteranized and had gone on furlough—stating that if I needed it, he would order the Army of the Cumberland to aid me. I kept my scouts and spies behind the enemy's lines and in that way kept posted as to their movements, and they never got to my lines except once or twice while my mounted force was in this territory. General Grant, in his *Memoirs*, describes this situation far better than I can, and I copy this extract from them:

General Dodge, beside being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with, except those of the pioneers—axes, picks, and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider, after protecting his men, was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and his teams bring in all the grain

they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When these were not near enough for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axmen were put to work getting out timber for bridges, and cutting fuel for locomotives, when the road should be repaired. Car builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer, except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had working to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the Memphis & Charleston to Nashville. The military manager of railroads was also directed to furnish more rolling stock, and as far as he could, bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms. The length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles."

During this winter my command was in the Department of the Cumberland, but not reporting to or under the command of any officer of that Department. As General Grant states, I lived off the country, and brought upon myself and my command the complaints of every rebel from whom I took forage or provisions. The charges against the command when they reached me were appalling. An officer of the Army of the Cumberland wrote:

Such disgraceful conduct has never been known in this section by Federal or Confederate troops. Men have run

wild. The very subsistence has been taken from families. I doubt if there has been a smokehouse that has not been robbed; protection papers are ignored, negroes taken and forced into the army, horses, mules, wagons, in fact everything a soldier could lay his hands on, have been taken.

Grant's answer would paralyze an anti-imperialist of today. He ordered the arrest of the officer making the charge, and placed this endorsement on the papers:

Colonel:

Your dispatch of the 11th of December, 1863, to Captain T. C. Williams, and one of January 16th, 1864, to Captain Polk, together with Brigadier-General G. M. Dodge's explanation and remarks thereon, have reached these headquarters. Your wholesale attack upon General Dodge, a gallant and superior officer, is uncalled for and improper. The authority you usurped to yourself in arresting officers acting under his orders was unmilitary and in bad taste. The whole tenor of your dispatches show bad temper and is calculated to create hostility of feeling between troops expected to co-operate with each other. Enclosed you will find copy of General Dodge's explanation.

I answered these complaints by referring them to General Grant on February 4th, 1864, saying:

It is galling to any officer to have his command designated as mobs, thieves and banditti, and have these sweeping charges go up through Departments where he and his command are entire strangers. I do not know that I am a bandit when I forage, subsist, and mount my command out of a country, and when I press negroes to rebuild railroads. My orders are to do this, and I consider it not only right but that my orders and duty require it. This entire country was full of everything when I came here, and that was the only inducement to Bragg or any other rebel General to secure possession of it again, and you can depend upon it, he will never turn his army towards Middle Tennessee after I am through with it. Subsisting my force off the country was a military necessity. I have simply obeyed orders and feel that I should be protected, and request that you send an officer of your staff here to investigate.

As soon as the Chattanooga and Knoxville campaigns were completed, General Grant wrote Halleck that they could not

make a winter campaign south of Chattanooga on account of the difficulty of the mountain region, and the rainy season, and to utilize his large force he proposed to gather up a sufficient force and move by the Mississippi River to New Orleans, and then to Mobile, and attack or invest that place, capture it, and then move into Alabama, and perhaps Georgia—a very feasible operation, as he could have water communication to Selma and Montgomery. Sherman was to march from Vicksburg with 5,000 men from Hurlbut's command and McPherson's Seventeenth Corps, then stationed at or near Vicksburg, east to Meridian, destroying the railroads, and gathering all stock and supplies that the enemy could use, and join Grant at Mobile.

On December 21st, 1863, I was called to Nashville to meet Generals Grant and Sherman in relation to the part my command was to take in this combined movement. I was to take my Corps, the troops at Eastport, and in connection with General W. S. Smith's command of 10,000 cavalry, sweep the Tennessee Valley; then to the Tombigbee Valley in Mississippi, destroying all railroads there, attacking any force of the enemy in that country, then to Corinth, and then return to Decatur, Alabama. All stock and supplies were to be taken that could be utilized by the enemy, the intention being that the commands of Sherman and myself should destroy the railroads and take the products of the country so that no considerable force of the enemy could remain long in West and Middle Tennessee, and Mississippi.

The fear of Lincoln and Halleck that Bragg might recover and retake Chattanooga if any larger portion of Grant's army was moved from there, and the anxiety of Lincoln and Stanton for East Tennessee while Longstreet remained there, though General Foster, who commanded East Tennessee, had more troops than Longstreet, caused the abandonment of all this campaign except Sherman's movement from Vicksburg to

Meridian. On December 27th Grant started for Knoxville, telegraphing Washington he would force a battle in East Tennessee as soon as he arrived. Thus for the fourth time magnificent armies, competent to go anywhere under the most competent commander, were dispersed and scattered, and during the whole winter virtually accomplished nothing.

On December 20, 1863, Grant moved his headquarters to Nashville, and prepared his forces for the spring campaign. He expected to make the campaign to Atlanta himself, and then to Mobile or Savannah. There is no doubt Grant had this in his plans for his spring campaign which he expected to make in 1864. Whether he indicated it to anyone I do not know. However, Sherman evidently had it in his mind, for as soon as that army fell under his command he commenced preparing for the Atlanta campaign; and probably both of them considered it a proper campaign to make, and Sherman made it, with Grant's approval.

From early in the Rebellion Grant had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season or weather, was the proper course to pursue. The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication to reinforce the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough a large number during the season of inactivity to go to their homes and work at putting in crops to be used for the support of their armies. Grant says that he therefore determined as soon as he was in command of all the armies—first, to concentrate the greatest number of troops possible against each of the armed forces of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different times against any one of our armies, and to continually fight the enemy and destroy his resources until there should be nothing left of him.

As soon as Grant assumed command of all the armies, he commenced concentrating forces for the two great armies, one the Army of the Potomac, which he was to accompany in person, and the other, Sherman's, at Chattanooga. In addition, he proposed to move smaller armies, such as Butler's at Fort Monroe, Sigel in the Valley, Crook in West Virginia, and Banks against Mobile. All to move on May 1st, except Banks, whose defeat on the Red River held his force there, together with two Divisions of Sherman's army under General A. J. Smith. This was the first time that any concerted movement of all our armies in the field was attempted, and it prevented the enemy from concentrating upon any one without giving us some strategic advantage. As a whole, it was a great success, although not equal to Grant's expectations, except in the movement of Sherman and the Army of the Potomac.

Before Grant took command of all the armies, there was promulgated by Halleck a maxim of war that two battles by two different armies should not be fought at the same time. An officer of the highest rank and largest command, in commenting on this, said that if our Western armies engaged all their forces at the same time it would leave them without a single reserve to stem the tide of possible disaster. This policy, of course, allowed to the enemy, holding the interior lines, the opportunity to reinforce any one of its armies and at all times bring an equal or superior force against any one of our armies. Grant's plans were the reverse of this, and his orders to all our armies were to move on the enemy at the same time and keep them busy, and prevent any one of the rebel armies from reinforcing the other, and it was this policy that so depleted the enemy's forces that within a year they were defeated, and could not muster force enough to stop the movement of any one of our armies, and brought peace.

Grant's four years' experience at West Point, and the ac-

quaintances there formed, and in the Mexican war, gave him a knowledge of the officers on both sides in the Civil War, and while many people clothed Lee and Johnston with almost superhuman ability, Grant says he knew they were mortal, and that it was just as well that he felt this. In the beginning of the Civil War he believed, with many others, that the war would be over in ninety days, until after the Battle of Shiloh. He has often said that there should have been no more battles in the West after the capture of Donelson, if all troops in that region had been under a single commander who could have followed up that victory. They could have occupied Nashville, Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Vicksburg, and other Southern points, prohibiting the enemy from concentrating, and virtually capturing and occupying the entire West.

In the general combination that Grant formed for the movement of all armies on May 1st, 1864, he did not make any provision for the troops in the country west of the Mississippi, on account of Banks' failure in the campaign up the Red River, which eliminated 40,000 men. There had been a great deal of friction there because there were three parts of three departments, and no concerted action, which was a source of great annoyance to Sherman. There was also a lack of concert of action with the troops on the east side of the Mississippi in defending that river. On March 28th, 1864, Grant recommended that all the country embraced in the departments of Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas, and the Gulf, should be formed into a Military Division, and of the four commanders west of the river he considered Steele would be far the best to assume this command, but he said: "The best suggestion I could make would be to promote Dodge for Steele's command."

I was fully aware of the situation west of the Mississippi River, as I had commanded in Mississippi, but knew nothing of Grant's suggestion until I saw it long afterwards in the records. No action was taken at that time, but later on these departments were placed under Canby, Steele, and Dodge.

In March, 1864, General Grant was called to Washington by President Lincoln to receive his commission as Lieutenant General, and his assignment to the command of all the armies. Mr. J. P. Usher, Secretary of the Interior, gives this account of what occurred:

President Lincoln called his Cabinet together without giving them notice of what they were called together for. They assembled in the Cabinet Room, and there were present, Mr. Seward, Secretary of State; Mr. Chase, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War; Mr. Wells, Secretary of the Navy; Mr. Blair, Postmaster General; Mr. Bates, Attorney General; and Mr. Usher, Secretary of the Interior.

Upon entering the room of the President, all his Cabinet were present with the exception of Mr. Stanton. Soon after the arrival of Secretary Stanton, General Halleck and General Grant entered the room without accosting the President, or any one present, but moved rapidly to the far side of the table, and stopped, facing the table, with General Grant between General Halleck and Mr. Stanton. The President was on the opposite side of the table.

He arose, then took from the table a scroll, turned it carefully, then opened it and took out the Parchment Commission. He then took from the table what soon proved to be his address to General Grant, which he read to General Grant.

Then upon his conclusion, General Grant took from his vest pocket a paper containing his response to the President. Grant held the paper in his right hand, and commenced reading, having read probably half of it when his voice gave out. Evidently he had not contemplated the effort of reading, and had commenced without inflating his lungs. When General Grant commenced reading he was standing awkwardly, what would commonly be called "hipshot." When his voice failed, he straightened himself up to his fullest and best form, threw back his shoulders, took the paper in both hands—one at each end—and drew the paper up to proper reading distance and commenced again at the beginning, and read it through in a full, strong voice.

Colonel Fred Grant, who was with his father, says: "The papers were prepared the evening before by both the President and General Grant."

After it was read the members of the Cabinet were introduced to General Grant. None of the members of the Cabinet

had met him before. Mr. Lincoln said to General Grant: "I have never met you before."

General Grant replied: "Yes, you have. I heard you in your debate with Douglass at Freeport, and was then introduced to you. Of course, I could not forget you, neither could I expect you to remember me, because multitudes were introduced to you on that occasion."

President Lincoln said: "That is so, and I don't think I could be expected to remember all."

Mr. Usher said:

Up to that time none of us had had any personal acquaintance with General Grant. We had heard of him from the Battle of Pittsburg Landing to the Battle of Iuka and Corinth. The reports were as often disparaging as they were favorable.

General Grant never sent anyone to propitiate or make favor with the President. After the Battle of Corinth, Judge Dicky, Judge of the Southern Court of Alabama, and a personal friend of Mr. Lincoln, came to Washington from Grant's camp, and gave such favorable account of him as gained Mr. Lincoln's fullest confidence in Grant's abilities and his confidence was never broken, nor in the least abated.

Secretary Usher says: "I heard Mr. Lincoln on one occasion say: 'Grant is the most extraordinary man in command that I know of. I heard nothing direct from him and wrote him to know why, and whether I could do anything to promote his success, and Grant replied that he had tried to do the best he could with what he had, that he believed that if he had more men and arms he could use them to good advantage, and do more than he had done; but he supposed I had done and was doing all I could, and if I could do more he felt that I would do it.'"

Lincoln said that Grant's conduct was so different from most Generals in common, that he could scarcely comprehend it.

Secretary Wells, Secretary of the Navy, in his diary, expresses his opinion of Grant, as making no impression in his visit, and expressed his doubt as to whether he would be successful at the head of the army, notwithstanding all of their experience with him and his success.

When General Grant received the appointment of Lieutenant General and command of all the armies, he wrote this letter to General Sherman:

Dear Sherman: Nashville, Tenn., March 4th, 1864.

Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one knows more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill of those whom it had been my good fortune to have occupying the subordinate positions under me.

There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want, is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success.

How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I.

I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

The word "you" I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write him, and will some day, but starting in the morning, I do not know that I will have time just now.

Your Friend,

U. S. GRANT, Major-General.

General Grant, after his return from Washington, where he received his commission as Lieutenant General, and the command of all the armies, from President Lincoln, called the Army and Corps commanders in the West to meet him in Nashville, and Sherman, Sheridan, Rawlins, General Granger (commanding post of Nashville), and myself met him. Generals McPherson, Logan and Blair were on leave. Why Thomas was not there I do not remember. Grant told us of his visit

to Washington, the conditions upon which he accepted the command of all the armies—that there should be no interference with him, and that the staff departments should be subject to his orders. President Lincoln told him that he could not transfer that authority, but that there was no one who could interfere with his orders but him (Lincoln), and he could rest assured he would not.

General Grant also told us of his visit to the Army of the Potomac, and what a splendid Army it was—how finely equipped and provisioned as compared to our armies. General Sherman naturally asked him in relation to some of the officers of that army whom they mutually knew, and General Grant said in answer to him, that they had said to him (Grant), “You have not yet met Bobby Lee,” intimating to him their doubts as to his ability to win the same victories there as he had won in the West.

He also laid down his own plans for the coming campaign, that is, that every armed force on the Union side should meet the armed force on the enemy’s side and all move against them on the first day of May, and stay with them until one or the other was completely destroyed, in order that the enemy could not do as they had heretofore been doing—while one part of our army was engaged, the enemy having the interior lines could reinforce their army engaged, with forces from their armies lying idle.

General Grant said to General Sherman:

I expect you to move against Johnston, and keep him busy and keep him from sending any of his army to aid Lee, and if Lee sends any of his force to aid Johnston, I will send you two men to his one.

General Grant was also anxious to take with him some of the principal officers in the Western Armies, who had served under him, but General Sherman objected so strenuously that Grant only took Sheridan with him. Grant left that afternoon





MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEAD
Commander Army of the Potomac, 1864

for the East, Sherman accompanied him as far as Cincinnati, Ohio. Later at a meeting of the Army of the Tennessee in Cincinnati, Sherman pointed out to me the room in the Burnett House where they spent the night, going over the maps and their proposed campaigns.

We all returned to our commands to prepare for the movement on the 1st of May, while Grant took up his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, and moved on May 4, 1864, across the Rappahannock; and the Battle of the Wilderness was the result.

The fighting was so desperate on the morning of May 6th, when Hancock attacked, and the enemy broke up in such confusion that had the country been such that Hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic of the enemy, Grant believed that he would have immediately taken advantage of it so effectively that Lee could not have made another stand outside his Richmond defenses.

Warren, in his attack here, went in by Divisions and, of course, failed. Grant says:

Up to this time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade, should anything ever happen to take that gallant soldier from the field.

After two days' fighting at the Wilderness, Lee fell back into his intrenchments, which convinced Grant that Lee was unable to further continue conflict in open field, and he therefore determined to place his army between Lee and Richmond.

SPOTTSYLVANIA

Sheridan secured Spottsylvania and the bridge over the Poe, which Lee's force would have to cross to get there. Meade unfortunately moved Merritt's force holding the bridge, which enabled Anderson's Division, driven out of the woods by fire, and which had been ordered by Lee to move in the morning, to move long before and cross the bridge, which Merritt would

have prevented, had he been allowed to carry out his orders. As soon as Anderson arrived on the ground he intrenched himself and thus prevented Grant from planting his army between Lee and Richmond, which was the object of his move.

Hancock, in his attack, carried a salient point of the enemy's works, and captured Johnston's Division of 2,000 men and twenty pieces of artillery, but nevertheless, the enemy's resistance was so effective that no permanent good was obtained.

Grant's next move was North Anna, and Lee, having the inside line, got there first and intrenched on the north side of the stream.

After the Battles of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania Court House, May 13th, 1864, Grant recommended Wright and Gibbon for Major-Generals; Carrol, Upton and McCandless for Brigadier-Generals; Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army, and Meade and Sherman for Major-Generals in the regular army.

General Grant wrote:

In making these recommendations, I do not wish the claim of General G. M. Dodge for promotion overlooked, and recommend that his promotion be sent in at same time.

COLD HARBOR

Grant's finding the enemy on the North Anna, moved to Hanover Court House, and Sheridan with the Sixth Corps, pushed on and captured Cold Harbor. As soon as the rest of the army arrived they attacked the enemy and drove them back, capturing their first line of works. The enemy made several attacks to retake these works, but failed, and suffered great loss. On June 3d the great attack on the enemy's works was made by order of General Grant, with great loss, while the enemy's loss was comparatively small, the only battle in the campaign in which Grant says we did not inflict as great loss upon the enemy as our own. Grant regretted this attack. He was not satisfied in his own mind whether it was a proper one to make or not; but the war records show that it was

this attack more than any other that disturbed the enemy, and if he had persisted in a second attack it would have been a great success, as the enemy had no reserve and was greatly demoralized. The campaign up to this point, where the march was taken to cross the James, had been a wonderful one of forty-three days' fighting, showing remarkable endurance on the part of the Army of the Potomac. During three long years the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other and had fought many desperate battles—more than it had ever before fallen to the lot of two armies to fight—without materially changing the vantage ground of either.

In connection with this short campaign Grant speaks highly of Sheridan, and the wonderful fighting of his cavalry.

Siegel, in the Valley, had moved on time, but Grant's first dispatch from Halleck stated that he was in full retreat. It also said he never did anything but run. Crook did better. He performed his task, destroyed the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad, and burned the bridge over New River. Butler lost his opportunity when he failed to plant himself on the Richmond & Petersburg Railway. Butler's first move was a success, but he waited six days before moving on Petersburg, which enabled Beauregard to collect a force in North and South Carolina, and entrench them in his front at Bermuda Hundred, and, as Colonel Comstock expressed it, "bottled him up."

PETERSBURG

As soon as Grant determined to cross the James he visited General Butler and ordered General W. F. Smith's Corps to take Petersburg. Smith confronted the enemy's pickets in front of Petersburg before daylight, but for some reason did not attack until late in the day, about 7 P. M., when he carried the enemy's outworks, driving them two and one-half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. There were no other works of the enemy between him and Petersburg, and nothing to keep him from marching in and occupying the town. Hancock's Corps had arrived to

support him, having been ordered to do so. Hancock came up in the evening and offered him any force he desired, not assuming command himself, as he did not know the situation. Smith only took one Division from him, and that was to relieve his own troops. It was a clear moonlight night, and Grant felt, and always said, that Petersburg should have been taken then and there.

Grant arrived there the next morning, but during the night the enemy had brought reinforcement to Petersburg, and were in intrenchments facing Smith's forces. The army remained quiet and resting until the attack upon and explosion of the mine at Petersburg. Burnside's failure to clear his front, as ordered, and failure to select a proper Division Commander to push through the crater and occupy the ground beyond, caused the mine disaster. The two adjoining Corps had cleared their fronts and were ready to charge. Grant had great hopes of making a permanent break in the enemy's lines, and was greatly annoyed that it should fail from lack of proper management.

General Crook, in West Virginia, was successful. He marched south, and his cavalry destroyed the New River bridge, and joined the infantry at Union. Sigel, with 7,000 troops, marched up the Shenandoah Valley to New Market. He was defeated and retreated to Cedar Creek, and Grant relieved him, placing General Hunter in command. Hunter and Crook unitedly moved to Staunton and Lynchburg. Had they been able to capture Lynchburg it would have been a very damaging blow to Lee. Hunter fought and defeated the enemy at Piedmont, but retreated from Lynchburg after partially investing it, for want of ammunition. His movement was a success.

Soon afterwards Early defeated our forces in the Shenandoah Valley. Grant wanted to send Sheridan there, but there was great opposition to that at Washington. He finally sent this dispatch to General Halleck:

I want Sheridan put in command of all troops in the field in the valley, with instructions to put himself south of the

enemy and to follow him to the death; wherever the enemy goes see that our troops go also.

This was disregarding the timidity that kept a large force dodging to the right and left in front of Washington, for fear that the enemy might otherwise slip up and capture the city. President Lincoln got hold of this dispatch some way, and sent this characteristic dispatch to General Grant. This is a very important dispatch because it shows that Lincoln had absolutely lost all faith in everybody around him in Washington. He telegraphed:

You are exactly right, but please look over any dispatch you may have received from there since you made the order and discover, if you can, if there is any idea in the head of anyone here of putting our army south of the enemy or of following him to the death in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every hour and day, and enforce it.

Think of that coming from the President of the United States—with everybody subordinate to him, telling General Grant unless he goes there in person and sees that his orders are carried out it won't be done.

The trouble was the dispatches went through Washington where they had a semi-control over movements in the Valley. On receipt of these dispatches, Grant went immediately to Washington and to the Valley, and, after an interview with Hunter, who told him how the uncertainty and conflict of orders rendered it impossible for any commander to accomplish anything, determined on Hunter's request, to send Sheridan to the Shenandoah, with orders that he should get south of the enemy and follow him to the death, and to sweep the Valley of the Confederate forces. Stanton and Halleck objected to his placing Sheridan in command, stating that he was too young; they seemed to be governed by age instead of results, but Grant insisted and Sheridan cleaned up the Valley for all time.

Sherman, with his three armies—the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Cumberland—over 100,000 strong, moved the same day the Army of the Potomac did, and made that wonderful campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta where, during the entire time from May 5th until the capture of Atlanta, the forces were not a musket-shot apart. Grant's letters and dispatches show his confidence in and admiration for Sherman and his army, also of the short but wonderful and successful campaign of Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. In October all armies were taking a rest for the second and last movement.

In October, 1864, while I had not entirely recovered from my wound, received at Atlanta, and consequently was unable to enter at once upon active duty, Brigadier-General Rawlins, Chief of Staff, invited me to make a visit to General Grant's headquarters with the Army of the Potomac, then at City Point, with a view of consulting as to a new command. In response to the invitation I made a visit there as soon as I was able, and remained several days, making myself familiar with that army. I made known my preference for the West, and so informed General Grant, although the command they had in view was a very high one.

While at City Point I lived at headquarters, and for the first time came in continual contact with General Grant and General Rawlins, but I had yet to learn what personal friends they had been, and how many kind things they had said of me.

It was their custom to sit out in front of the tents around the camp-fire of evenings until late in the night, and a free discussion of the battles and movements was held, which gave a better insight into the operations of the army than could possibly be obtained in any other way.

At General Grant's suggestion I visited the headquarters of the various Corps, and was very cordially received, but I discovered a feeling there that was a stranger to us in the West—a feeling, the existence of which seemed to me to bode no good. I heard officers criticise others, and make comments upon Grant's strategy that sounded harsh to my ears, for I had never thought of criticising an order or an officer. I had been serving in an army where, if the command to my right or

left was in trouble, and I had a man out of the fight, I was in the habit of sending him to aid, and every other commander would do the same by me, seldom if ever thinking of waiting for the order of the army commander. McPherson had said to us the night before the attack on Kenesaw, when Logan criticised the order as leading us to destruction, "So much the more reason that we should put our energies and hearts into carrying it out, so that it shall not fail on account of our disapproval," that being the only time I ever heard an order even criticised. But I must say I heard it in the Army of the Potomac, and anything but kindly comments by one commander upon another, and, as this was in the dark days of the war, I had many misgivings about what I heard. Rawlins had won my confidence, and on my return to camp in the evening I used to tell him what I had heard, and he would laugh and say, "General, this is not the old Army of the Tennessee."


General Grant talked to me freely, told me of his attacks, his partial failures at the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, Bermuda Hundred, and Petersburg, and what he had expected, and without saying so, led me to think that someone in each instance had been to blame. Finally I innocently asked him who was at fault, saying that with us out West someone would have lost his head under such circumstances. But he quietly answered, without showing any disturbance, that "That had not yet been determined." General Grant questioned me very minutely about our movements; also about the relieving of General Logan and putting Howard in command in his place in the Army of the Tennessee, after McPherson was killed. While I had no feeling against Howard, I think I expressed the belief that the Army of the Tennessee expected that Logan would be continued in command, and while I think General Grant agreed with me, he did not by hint or word show me that he disapproved of the action taken. I remember saying that I thought the little army that he, Sherman and McPherson had grown up from, and which had on the 22d of July fought its battle without an order or the presence of a super-

ior officer until the day's fight was nearly over, certainly had material sufficient within it to command it, and Logan being its senior officer, seemed to us the proper man to take it. His answer was a compliment to Logan, but he said that "Sherman knew best." General Rawlins was decided in his disapproval of the change.

I did not know at that time that General Grant had recommended me for the first vacancy in the grade of Major-General immediately after the fall of Vicksburg, nor was I then aware that it was at Grant's suggestion I was given command of the Sixteenth Army Corps in the field, although only a Brigadier-General in the rank with Major-Generals all around me commanding Divisions; nor did I know that he had recommended me for the command west of the Mississippi River, and the Department of Kentucky.

I was informed that General Butler was to make a demonstration against the enemy north of the James River, and it was suggested to me that I should go up there and witness the attack and look at that army.

Accordingly the next morning I took General Grant's boat and went to Butler's front, and witnessed the attack until I concluded it was a failure, and noted that he made no impression on the enemy, and that the troops seemed to go in a half-hearted way against the works at their front. I returned to the boat, supposing the fight was over, and went back to City Point. General Grant met me and inquired very earnestly about the fight, and I naturally said that it was a failure. I saw the General was surprised, and as it was about 9 P. M. I sat down by the camp fire, and he then told me his dispatches indicated a great success. I said to myself, "I guess I will hold my tongue," and felt that I had evidently not seen the best part of the fighting; but I saw that what I had said to the General was worrying him and he wired for full particulars. The next dispatch that came was an evasive one, and was intended to pave the way for receiving the dispatches which came pouring in rapidly from one commander and another, until at last the General spoke up to me and said: "You





MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. RAWLINS, 1865

are right, General, it is a defeat instead of a victory," and we turned in for the night.

The following letters from Gen. John A. Rawlins speaks of my visit to Gen. Grant and this attack of Gen. Butler on the enemies' entrenched line:

City Point, October 12th, 1864. General Dodge of the Western Army is here. It does one's heart good to meet one from the army that has made such a bright record for its country's honor and its own fame. I can shake the hands of these veterans and heroes with something of the thrill of joy and pride that pervades my being when I take hold of the hand of my own dear wife after months of absence.

General Quimby, formerly of the old Army, is also here. He is, however, not in the service, having long since resigned. Major-General Doyle of the English service is here. He is the least English and most American of any Englishman I have ever met. He sympathizes with us in our struggle to maintain our governmental authority, and furthermore he believes we will succeed.

City Point, October 17th, 1864. General Butler, although acting under positive orders not to attack the enemy in fortified positions, did so attack, and lost for us fully 1,000 men, killed, wounded and prisoners, without any corresponding damage, if damage at all, to the enemy. I am free to say I fear the continuance of General Butler in command will some day work disaster of a serious character to our arms. But General Grant has had to deal with such men from the beginning and has succeeded. I therefore have hopes he will succeed with this one.

As I was about to return to my Command at Atlanta, General Grant suggested to me to go by way of Washington, and call on President Lincoln. Of course I acceded, but did not then clearly understand the reason, nor could I easily see what I was to call on the President for. While I was at City Point was evidently the most anxious days for Grant, although he had no doubt that his next campaign would end the war. The troops coming to him were drafted men. I was told that desertions were very heavy; that as high as 1,400 had left in a week. Hancock and other officers were becoming discouraged. Some commanders were on leave of absence, and it was so blue around there that one evening I suggested to Rawlins

that it looked to me like the rats deserting a sinking ship. I could not appreciate the feeling, for the Army of the Potomac was the finest, best equipped and best appointed army I had ever seen. General Ingall's single sample depot at City Point would have been a supply to one of our Western Corps.

On leaving City Point, Major-General Boyle of the British Army, accompanied me to Washington. He had been down on a visit to General Grant's headquarters. His rank in the British army was about equal to that of a Colonel in ours. He was a fine, soldierly-looking man, over 60 years old. He questioned me very closely all the way to Washington as to my service in the army. So young a Major-General commanding a Corps seemed to him extraordinary, and he made comparison very pointedly at the table on the boat, very much to my embarrassment.

It was morning when we arrived in Washington. I went to the White House after breakfast, really not knowing what I was going there for. In the ante-room I met Senator Harlan of my state, who took me in with him to see Mr. Lincoln. The President greeted me very cordially, and I said to him that I had merely called to pay my respects on my way to join my command; that I had been down to General Grant's headquarters for a week or two, and got up to leave, when the President asked me if I had any appointment to meet, and said he would like me to remain, as he wanted to talk with me. Accordingly I sat in his room while he disposed of the crowd in a kindly way and, after the door was shut, he saw I was embarrassed and instead of talking to me he took down a book, saying he wanted to read to me some good things. I believe the book was called the "Gospel of Peace," or something of that kind.

Many years afterwards, after a conversation with General Grant, I sent him this letter relating to my visit to the President:

New York, Dec. 19th, 1884.

My Dear General:

I was not aware until my visit to you on Sunday that you were writing a history of the "War of the Rebellion." I know

of the articles to be published in the Century Magazine. During my visit to you at City Point, I met with an incident that may be news or of interest to you. You will doubtless remember that while I was recovering from my wound, received at Atlanta, I visited City Point and was a guest at your headquarters a week or ten days, and saw the Army of the Potomac; was up to see the battle fought on the north side of the James, and brought news of what I thought was a defeat, but which your dispatches made a victory. When I was ready to return to my command at Atlanta, I met orders from General Sherman which stopped me at Nashville and ordered me to Vicksburg, and before I reached that command you ordered me to relieve General Rosecrans in command of the Department of the Missouri, with a view of taking my troops to Thomas at Nashville.

If you remember, when I left City Point, you suggested I should return by Washington, and call upon the President, and sent me in your boat. General Rufus Ingalls, your chief quartermaster, and Major-General Cyrus Boyle, of the British army, I think at that time in command in Canada, was with me.

I was a very young officer, inexperienced in meeting the world, and with a great reverence for position and authority, hence I hardly knew how to reach President Lincoln nor what to say to him when I saw him. I had only a few hours to spend in Washington, and after breakfast I went directly to the White House where, in the ante-room, I met Senator Harlan of my state, who took me to Mr. Lincoln. The President met me cordially, and asked me to wait until he had dismissed the crowd, when he took me into a room back of what I now know as the cabinet room, took down a book which, if I remember rightly, was called the "Gospel of Peace." It was a very funny book, and he read from it, and I laughed heartily, until he made me perfectly easy and at home. He took me down to lunch and pumped out of me everything I had seen at City Point, and what results were to be expected from the movements there. My answer to him was, briefly, I had no doubt as to their success. In detail, as I remember it, my answer was, "You know out West we believe in General Grant. We have no doubts. Give him time and he will succeed; in what way or how, I don't know, but you may depend upon it he will succeed."

Mr. Lincoln jumped up from his chair, took both my hands in his, and said: "I am thankful to you for saying so" I was a very much embarrassed person, but it made such an impression upon me that I never forgot it.

After the war when General Rawlins was with me on the

plains I related the circumstances to him, and he said that the pressure and complaints at that time at Washington was very great.

My confidence as to results around Richmond came from my faith—not from what I had seen there, and from the fact that all of us who had long before driven from our minds any doubts as to the final results. I well remember how confidently and enthusiastically I told President Lincoln what I felt, but could not give him a fact upon which to prove my belief. When I arose to leave, President Lincoln thanked me for calling and said, "If you have no objections you can take my good wishes and regards with you to your army." That night I left Washington more annoyed than otherwise that there should be so many doubts as to your success.

General Rawlins may have told you of this interview, or it may be new to you. I give it as I remember it.

Yours truly,

G. M. DODGE.

The purport of all this came to me in after years when I found the anxiety that existed about the Army of the Potomac, and the existence in some quarters of an intrigue against General Grant. My belief in him knew no doubts, and it never entered my head that the President wanted faith, and I think my earnest belief and faith carried me beyond proper bounds in expressing it before the President.

When I left General Grant, I knew that neither he or General Sherman considered me well enough to join Sherman in his march to the sea, but expected me to be sent to Vicksburg to take command of the troops of the 16th Army Corps, organized there—the two Divisions of the Sixteenth Corps with Sherman having been turned over, one Division to the Fifteenth Corps and one Division to the Seventeenth Corps, and the two Divisions of the Seventeenth Corps on the Mississippi River were to be turned into the Sixteenth Corps. This, with such other forces on the Mississippi River, were to be mobilized and the movement which I was to command was to be made against Mobile, in concert with the movement to be made from New Orleans by the United States Navy.

In the meantime General Howard had issued an order reorganizing the Sixteenth Corps, and placing Major-General N. J. T. Dana, who was a stranger in that department, to the command of it, whereas, Major-General A. J. Smith and myself had had command of the two wings of the Sixteenth Corps in the field almost ever since its organization, and General Howard's action caused a great deal of criticism and feeling.

When I arrived at Nashville on November 3d, I found an order from General Sherman for me to proceed to Vicksburg and report to Major-General N. J. T. Dana, commanding the Sixteenth Corps, as commander of the District of Vicksburg, and left wing of the Sixteenth Army Corps. General Howard wrote me a private letter, giving his reasons for assigning Dana to the head of the Sixteenth Corps, stating that he had three Major-Generals in his command—Dana, Smith and myself—for assignment, and that Dana being the ranking officer, he had given him the Corps, thus ignoring Smith and myself.

From Nashville I went immediately to St. Louis enroute to Vicksburg. At St. Louis I received a dispatch from General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's Chief of Staff, which indicated General Grant was not satisfied with my assignment, and on November 12th I received a dispatch from Colonel William F. Clark, Assistant Adjutant General of the Army of the Tennessee, ordering me not to go to Vicksburg, but to meet him at Louisville, Kentucky.

On November 15th I met Colonel Clark at Louisville, and he notified me that the order sending me to Vicksburg had been suspended at the request of General Grant, that he was not satisfied with General Howard's reorganization of the Sixteenth Army Corps, and objected to my assignment under Dana—that General Howard was greatly worried over it, and that by order of General Grant I had been ordered to St. Louis, and Colonel Clark handed me General Howard's order, which read as follows:

Major-General G. M. Dodge and Staff will proceed to St. Louis and there establish his headquarters for the purpose of making out reports of the campaign in Georgia.

I returned to St. Louis and on December 2, 1864, received the order of the Secretary of War, issued at the request of General Grant, assigning me to the command of the Department and Army of the Missouri, relieving Major-General Rosecrans.

In speaking of the campaign Sherman was to make from Atlanta, Grant says:

General G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army, and his two Divisions of the Sixteenth Corps were transferred to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps; Sherman, after detaching the Fourteenth Corps and Schofield's army to Thomas, had about 60,000 strong and hearty men, as good soldiers as ever trod the earth, better than any European soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine, but the machine thought.

As soon as Grant wired Sherman that he could start on his march to the sea, he naturally felt anxiety as to the movements of Hood. Grant felt that Thomas should concentrate all his forces except those occupying Chattanooga and Decatur, and attack Hood south of the Duck River, and when Hood moved and forced Schofield back to Franklin, Grant naturally became anxious. Schofield, himself, thought that a concentration should be made south of the Duck River, and when Schofield fought the great battle of Franklin so successfully, and Hood's army suffered such a great loss in officers and men, Grant thought that Thomas, with his 70,000 men, should reinforce Schofield from Nashville and that the battle with Hood should have been fought out there; but Thomas thought otherwise, and after this great victory Schofield was obliged to fall back within the intrenchments at Nashville. Grant then became more anxious than ever. He knew the dis-

position of Hood, and was fearful he would cross the Cumberland, flank Nashville and move to Louisville, which would drive our forces back to the Ohio River again. Grant's anxiety is shown in his dispatches to Washington and to Thomas, and he finally made up his mind to repair to Nashville himself. He sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War on December 8, 1864.

Please direct General Dodge to send all the troops he can spare to General Thomas. With such an order he can be relied upon to send all that can possibly go. They had better be sent to Louisville, for I fear either Hood or Breckenridge will get to the Ohio River. I will submit whether it is not advisable to call on Ohio, Indiana and Illinois for 60,000 men for thirty days. If Thomas has not struck yet he should be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to ever take the initiative.

On this order I sent to Thomas, with the two Divisions under General A. J. Smith which had already gone, 20,000 men. Grant says that Thomas had 70,000 men, and that he had enough to annihilate Hood in the open field.

On December 15th Logan was at City Point, and was given orders to proceed to Nashville. Grant himself also started for Nashville, and wired me he might want me to take command of the troops I had sent to Thomas. The day Logan arrived at Louisville, Thomas commenced his attack on Hood, and he proceeded no further. Thomas' complete victory over Hood relieved Grant's anxiety, and he immediately sent Thomas congratulatory dispatches.

Thomas, while a great soldier, was of an entirely different disposition from Grant, Sherman and Sheridan, whose great effort was to always be the attacking party. Grant held that this gave an advantage of twenty-five per cent. Thomas preferred to wait until he was certain, or to receive an attack on his own chosen ground, and in that way destroy the enemy. He was rightly named the "Rock of Chicamauga."

Sherman's march to the sea was a picnic for that old army of his. It caused rumors and speculations and great anxiety among the people. The rebel papers were full of mis-statements, saying Sherman's army was starving, demoralized and wandering without objective point, endeavoring only to reach the sea; and these statements alarmed the people of the north, who appealed to Lincoln, who in turn appealed to Grant, and on his (Grant's) answer, Lincoln in response to these appeals, said:

Grant says they are safe with such a General, and if they cannot get out where they want to they can crawl back by the hole they went in at.

No one can read the reports of the final movement in February, 1865, and the comprehensive plans that first destroyed all the railroads surrounding Petersburg and Richmond, the combination of Terry and Schofield at Wilmington, the attack of Canby on Mobile, Wilson on Montgomery and Selma, Stoneman from East Tennessee towards Lynchburg, while Sherman moved on Johnston, Sheridan on Five Forks, and Meade on Lee, without perceiving that the story reads like a romance rather than the last grapple of giants. Every move was a success, and by April 15th the war was ended. Grant says:

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both East and West fight battles, and from what I have seen there is no difference in their fighting qualities.

As to the surrender at Appomattox, and of Johnston to Sherman, Grant tells the story in the simplest words, that thoroughly describe the man as I knew him from 1862 until his death. He said:

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know, as he was a man of much dignity with an impassible face. It was impossible to see whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result: he was too manly

to show it. Whatever his feelings were they were entirely concealed from my observation, but my own feelings, which had been jubilant at receiving his letter, were sad and depressed. I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause I believed one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least cause. I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.

General Lee was dressed in full uniform, which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the one which had been presented to him by the State of Virginia. In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a Lieutenant General, I must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high, and of faultless form; but this was not a matter I thought of until afterwards.

When the news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of one hundred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent word to have it stopped; the Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

As soon as the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia was completed, General Grant went immediately to Washington. He sent Sherman the terms on which Lee had surrendered, and authorized him to offer the same terms to Johnston, but Sherman added other conditions—political—but, knowing he was going beyond Grant's terms, he made them conditional until they could be ratified at Washington. Grant says that Sherman, then being one of the most popular Generals in the land, was later denounced by President Johnson and Secretary Stanton in most bitter terms. A message was sent out directing troops in the South not to obey Sherman, and to all commanders in the country not to recognize his orders or paroles.

Grant was ordered to immediately proceed to North Carolina and take charge. Of course Grant was greatly annoyed at this uncalled for denunciation of Sherman, but started immediately for Raleigh as quietly as possible, in hopes of seeing

Sherman without his army knowing of his presence. He met Sherman, gave him his orders, and left Sherman to communicate them to Johnston, and left immediately for Washington, leaving Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, free and untrammelled, and without the enemy knowing that he (Grant) had been anywhere near the field. Grant says that as he returned he met the mail with newspapers and found in them news of the great excitement in the North over the terms Sherman gave Johnston, and the harsh orders promulgated by the President and Secretary of War. and says:

I fully understood what great indignation this would cause Sherman, though I do not think his feelings could have been more excited than mine.

Where is there in all history a story of such magnanimity, not only to the enemy, but to his own devoted comrade? These two incidents were quoted to me in Europe as fixing the status of General Grant as a great, humane soldier, and as indicating the elements that afterwards created a great statesman.

In the campaign from May 5th, 1864, to Appomattox, the Armies of the Potomac and James lost over 60,000 men, killed and wounded, and in prisoners and missing over 20,000—a total of over 82,000. This indicates the desperate fighting and appalling results. Under any other commander it would have brought about a halt and discouragement, but under Grant it simply meant more determined efforts. He knew that the enemy's losses were as great as his, and if he continued on the aggressive sooner or later he would win.

His determination, after Appomattox, that Lee's and all other armies should be protected in their paroles, is illustrated by his visit to President Johnson when Judge Underwood of Norfolk proposed to punish some of the leaders of the rebellion, notwithstanding their paroles. Grant demanded that an

order should be issued prohibiting such an act. President Johnson was obstinate until Grant declared that if it was done he would hand in his resignation. That settled it, and brought quiet and peace to all the rebel forces. This action of General Grant's has been greatly misrepresented, for on Memorial day, May 30, 1906, accompanied by General F. D. Grant, his wife, and others, I attended memorial services at Grant's Tomb in New York City. The address there was made by Judge Stafford of the United States District Court of Washington, in which he made the following statement:

Not long after the death of Lincoln, Johnson summoned Grant to the White House. When they were alone he said: "I intend to fix it forever in the minds of the American people that secession is a crime. I intend to have all Confederate officers and officials put to a public death." Grant made no reply when Johnson had finished his harangue, but rose in silence to take his leave. "What do you mean to do?" asked Johnson. Then Grant said. "I am going to the camp; I shall move my army upon Washington, I shall proclaim martial law and take command. My reason for doing so is this: I received the surrender of General Lee, which ended the war. That surrender put into my hands the lives and safety of every officer and official on the Confederate side, and I hold myself in duty and honor bound to see that they are protected according to the rules of war and common right." Grant returned to his camp, issued the necessary orders, and waited for the proclamation to be made. Then he received the word that Johnson had changed his mind.

This was such a remarkable statement in which there was absolutely not a word of truth that it astonished both General Grant and myself, and as soon as the oration was delivered, I went to the speaker and absolutely denied that there was any truth in his statement.

He said he obtained the information from Admiral Dahlgren. I was in hopes no notice would be taken of it, and therefore said nothing more about it. But the Press got hold of it and, of course, commenced to handle it, and for the purpose of showing the absurdity of it, at a meeting of the Society of

the Army of the Tennessee at Council Bluffs, Iowa, on November 8th, 1906, General John C. Black called the attention of that Society to this statement, and as General Grant had been a prominent member of the Society, asked that a committee be appointed to take the matter up and make report, which was unanimously adopted, and as President of the Society I appointed as members of that committee, General John C. Black, General O. O. Howard, Major V. Warner and Mrs. John A. Logan.

. That committee reported on November 9th as follows:

GENERAL BLACK'S REPORT.

Council Bluffs, Iowa, November 9th, 1906.

To the Society of the Army of the Tennessee:

Your committee to whom you referred a motion made at the business session of the morning of November 8th, that a committee of three or more be appointed to whom should be referred the accusation made at the Tomb of Grant on the 30th of May last, and all the proof accessible and bearing upon said accusation, and to make report of their conclusions, beg leave to report that they have examined the matters referred to in said motion and find that during an address delivered on Memorial Day, 1906, at the Tomb of General U. S. Grant, a former member of the Society, former commander-in-chief of the army of the United States, and former President, the following statement was made, in substance:

Not long after the death of Lincoln, Johnson summoned Grant to the White House. When they were alone he said: "I intend to fix it forever in the minds of the American people that secession is a crime. I intend to have all Confederate officers and officials put to a public death." Grant made no reply when Johnson had finished his harangue, but rose in silence to take his leave. "What do you mean to do?" asked Johnson. Then Grant said: "I am going back to the camp; I shall move my army upon Washington; I shall proclaim martial law and take command. My reason for so doing is this: I received the surrender of General Lee, which ended the war. That surrender put into my hands the lives and safety of every officer and official on the Confederate side, and I hold myself in duty and honor bound to see that they are protected according to the rules of war and common right. You can communicate with me at my headquarters." Grant returned to his camp, issued the necessary orders, and waited

for the proclamation to be made. Then he received word that Johnson had changed his mind.

Your committee further finds, as a matter of history, that the interview alleged to have been had between the President and General Grant must have occurred, if at all, while the armies of the United States were in camp in the vicinity of Washington, prior to, or about the time of the Grand Review; that thereafter and from the 12th of August, 1867, to January 13th, 1868, General Grant was the Secretary of War, ad interim, acting on the appointment of President Johnson; that in view of all the circumstances, as shown by the reports from the War Department and well established facts of history, it was impossible for such an interview to have taken place, or for such a declaration to have been made by General Grant, and especially that no such orders were ever issued by him looking to the overthrow of rightful authority and the placing of the capital of his country under martial law.

Whatever may be our individual views as to the character of the man who then was President of the United States, we know that the declaration by General Grant of such an intention and the issuing of orders by him as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United States, as alleged, would have been an act of flagrant treason, for war was then still the legal status in the United States. We are convinced by the evidence and our knowledge of the man that our great Commander never made any intimation, expression or orders, or did any act that might have been disastrous to the laws or destructive to the liberties of his country. On the other hand, we know that every act of his public life as a soldier and as a civilian showed unfaltering regard for the law and devotion to the liberties of the country, as well as a scrupulous regard for the preservation of our laws and the sanctity of the constitution. We have searched in vain for any record of any act of our great Comrade, in the midst of all the vicissitudes of his life, that could be construed into a treasonable attempt; and we present this report as the reply of the Army of the Tennessee, of which he was the first Commander, and to whom his fame now is and ever will be very dear, to every charge, from what source soever emanating, that would connect his name with an act treasonable to the country and destructive to its government.

Respectfully submitted,

OLIVER OTIS HOWARD.
MRS. JOHN A. LOGAN,
V. WARNER,
JOHN C. BLACK, Chairman.

They also submitted the following papers and documents:
From letter of General John C. Black, July 3d, 1906, to General Robert Shaw Oliver, Assistant Secretary of War:

I have the honor to request that you will kindly advise me whether there is or is not any proof in the records of the War Department of the foregoing statement, or any material part thereof. If there is such proof, I will thank you for an exhibition of it, or a reference to it, that I may examine it. If there is no such proof I hope that you will so state to me.

War Department, The Military Sect. Office,
Washington, July 5th, 1906.

(Respectfully returned to the Assistant Secretary of War.)

Nothing has been found of record in this office, either to prove or disprove the statement made within, or any material part thereof.

The only papers that have been found of record, and that appear to have even a remote bearing on the subject in question, are letters from General Lee to General Grant, and General Grant to General Lee, published in the official records of the Union and Confederate armies. Series 1, Vol. 46, Part III, Pages 1275 and 1286.

F. C. AINSWORTH,
Military Secretary.

War Department, July 6th, 1906.

So far as the records of the War Department are concerned, the statements submitted by you regarding General Grant's action are without any foundation whatever.

ROBERT SHAW OLIVER.
Assistant Secretary of War.

On the 8th of July, 1906, the following was written by Major-General Frederick D. Grant, United States Army:

Your letter enclosing an extract from the address delivered at my father's tomb on May 30th is received. With reference to the said statement, I can only say that I have heard my father speak of this interview with President Johnson, when the arrests of General R. E. Lee and other Confederate officers were contemplated by the President. The statement that father always made in my presence was that he (General Grant) had protested against such action being taken as the arrest of the Confederate officers, so long as they observed their parole, as they had surrendered to him (General Grant).

upon terms which he, as Commander of the United States army, had a legal right to grant or dictate, and if our government violated these terms agreed upon, it would discredit him as well as our government, and that in case of this arrest of these Confederates he would be obliged to resign his commission in the United States army.

In the above I am giving you almost father's exact words. I heard him make this statement frequently, and what is attributed to father in the incident as related does not at all harmonize with my father's character, and in my mind it is absolutely impossible. The speaker was of course misinformed.

FREDERICK D. GRANT.

Upon the report of this committee, I stated to the Society the actual facts in relation to what did occur at the time that President Johnson ordered the arrest and execution of General Lee and others, as stated by a member of President Johnson's cabinet, as follows:

After the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, the Cabinet met in the Treasury Department and passed a resolution to arrest and try by Military Commission, the leading men of the Confederacy, beginning with President Davis, General R. E. Lee, and others; meaning thereby to strike terror into the hearts of the southern people. They concluded to carry out this resolution, and General Grant must give the required orders.

General Grant at that time was seeking rest on the banks of the Delaware. He was telegraphed to come immediately to Washington. Mr. Garrett, the President of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, was at that moment in Washington, and was instructed by Sec. Stanton to go forthwith to Baltimore in a single express car, there to meet General Grant and bring him to Washington as quickly as possible. He was also told by Sec. Stanton to inform General Grant of the resolution passed, which he was expected to execute.

Mr. Garrett gives the following account of what General Grant said when the message was delivered to him in the car:

These gentlemen do not reflect that such an action would be a stain upon the escutcheon of the country, which never

could be wiped out. The assassination seems to have unsettled their wits, to think that such men as General Lee and President Davis had anything to do with the murder. These are gentlemen whom I have known and esteemed for years, and who are incapable of crime—as well suspect myself.

In response Mr. Garrett said, "Well General, the Cabinet are waiting only for you to give the orders, and you will go into that matter as soon as you get there. I hope when you do that you will speak to them just as you have now done to me." Then came the reply: "I shall go further, I shall tell them that they must first take my sword from me."

Mr. Garrett says upon their arrival, General Grant went directly into the Cabinet room, and he remained in the corridor. After some time the Postmaster General came out and approached him. Mr. Garrett said, "I don't wish to pry into the judges' confidence or secrets, but you know the message with which I was charged. When I delivered it to General Grant, he said that he would tell you gentlemen that you must first take his sword from him." The answer was, "He has done that very thing Mr. Garrett."

Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, also confirmed this to Mr. Garrett.

Grant considered the action of France in building a monarchy on the ruins of Mexico, during the Civil War, as an act of War against the United States, but the condition of the United States rendered it impossible for them to interfere, and it is a very remarkable fact that on the surrender of Vicksburg he was so thoughtful of the future, and displayed that remarkable statesmanship that in later years won the admiration of the world. Washington was asking for reinforcements for other armies, and again distributing his victorious armies, which he wished to use, Grant, in answer to a letter from Lincoln, wrote the President as follows:

Vicksburg, August 9th, 1863.

In view of present events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of re-establishing the National authority in Western Texas as soon as possible, and he said he was ready to send a portion of his command to occupy the Rio Grande River, facing Mexico.

It is now a matter of history that as soon as Lee surrendered, Grant immediately telegraphed to the Government that action should be taken to force the French out of Mexico; that Mexico was a friendly nation, and that they should be aided. Our Government acted, not by forcing the French out of that country, but by sending General Schofield to Europe, to make known to the French Government the feeling of our country and its determination to aid Mexico, if necessary, and, as is known Napoleon immediately telegraphed the French Army to evacuate, but Maximilian declined to go. He was made to believe he had a following in Mexico that would enable him to maintain his monarchy.

As soon as General Grant distributed the army, he placed Sheridan on the Rio Grande with a view of crossing, if necessary. I was in command of the Department of Missouri at that time, and received orders to prepare to go to New Mexico with a view of occupying Chihuahua and Sonora, if deemed expedient. Nothing ever came from these movements, but General Frederick D. Grant says that he found, in a private letter book of General Grant's, two confidential letters to Sheridan, telling him he must look out; that the administration was opposed to breaking neutrality, but if he believed that Santa Anna, who was on the border, was favorable to Jaurzez, then he could befriend him, and also said there were lots of arms left by soldiers on both sides, and if they fell into Jaurzez's hands he (Grant) did not care, and Sheridan could lose them; he also said that some five or six of our batteries and some 40,000 stands of arms were lost in that way. Grant also informed Sheridan that if any of these arms or artillery fell into the hands of Maximilian he would have to account for them, thus showing plainly his views in the matter, also those of the Government. Mexico, of course, was aware of the friendship on the part of Grant, and was always devoted to him. Its representative in Washington always attended the

yearly banquet in New York City on General Grant's birthday, and I heard Minister Romero, at a dinner given General Grant, give a detailed account of all the actions of General Grant in their behalf, things that had never been spoken before. General Grant was present and admitted that they were true.

After the war General Grant took a great interest in the development of Mexico. When President Diaz was here in 1883, he gave him a noted dinner at the Union League Club of New York, on April 4th, at which thirty-six of the most prominent people in New York were present. At that dinner President Diaz made known the great friendship of General Grant for his nation, and their appreciation of it. After General Grant returned to private life, he was interested in and was President of a railroad running from the City of Mexico to the Pacific Coast, through the State of Oaxaca, which was President Diaz's home. I was at that time building a road from Laredo to the City of Mexico, and General Grant induced me to become Vice President of his company and make surveys for that line, and he put forth his greatest efforts to complete it. The financial condition of the country became such that the work on both lines was suspended, and while the line to the City of Mexico has since been completed, the other is just reaching the Pacific.

In the winter of 1864-65 the Confederates, who controlled the Indian Territory, had sowed a great deal of dissension among the Indian tribes north of the Arkansas River, until they became very aggressive along the three lines of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific, the Arkansas, South Platte and North Platte, and the unfortunate attack of Colonel Chivington on a friendly band of Indians on the Big Sandy, near old Fort Lyon, on the Arkansas River, had aroused all the Sioux nation. These disturbances had stopped the mails, also pretty much all travel between the Territories, Cali-

foria, and the Missouri River, and there was a great outcry and demand that troops be sent into that country to open it. General Curtis, who commanded the Indian country at that time, did not think that a winter campaign could be made in that country, and so expressed himself to the War Department.

About January 1, 1865, General Grant wired me, asking if a winter campaign could be made on the plains. He knew I had had a great deal of experience on the plains during the ten years preceding the war. I answered that it could, if the troops were properly prepared, and immediately received an order from him to proceed to Fort Leavenworth, where I would receive orders. On arriving there I found that the Department of Kansas and Territories had been merged into my command—the Department of the Missouri—and its commanding officer relieved and also found a dispatch there telling me to open up the stage and telegraph lines through to California. This was a great surprise to me, and, of course, came from the dispatch I had sent General Grant. I knew there was no way to accomplish this except to take the field myself, which I immediately did, and by the first of March, 1864, had opened all the telegraph lines, had put the stages on again, and had communication through to California.

It was a very severe winter campaign—the worst winter I ever saw on the plains. In March we had the worst storm I ever saw, and a battalion of Pawnee scouts I had there nearly perished in the storm, losing all their stock.

As soon as I had finished this campaign, which was only a temporary one, I was immediately ordered to prepare a general campaign for that summer and fall, which would force peace with all the Indians from the Red River on the south to the British possessions on the north. This campaign was a long one, taking from July, 1865, until the spring of 1866. My troops marched from the Arkansas to the Yellowstone, and

fought many battles. Right after the battle of Tongue River, where General Conner's command fought the Northern Cheyennes and Arapahoes, and nearly wiped out these bands, including their women and some of their children, there was a great outcry throughout the country, as the battalion of Pawnee Indians that was in the fight did some promiscuous scalping. General Grant wired me to close up the campaign and bring the Indians to Laramie and make peace with them. I protested, and stated that if they would give me three months longer I would answer with my life for the settling all the Indian difficulties. General Grant's answer was that the President was so urgent in the matter, and that there was such a pressure upon him, that I must close the campaign and bring the Indians in. This was a fatal mistake, and gave the Indians the idea that they were the victors instead of ourselves, and the result was to bring, later on, a war with the Apaches and Comanches, the Sioux and the Sitting Bull war, in which General Custer lost his life and command in the campaign of General Terry.

Grant's disappointment at the sudden closing of this campaign was equal to my own, but, as his dispatches show, there was no consideration given to the judgment of the officers in the field or on the ground.

I had expected to leave the army early in 1865, but the Indian campaign kept me in the field until 1866. I resigned in March and was given a leave of absence in May, and bid farewell to the army in this letter.

Omaha, July 16th, 1866.

General U. S. Grant.

General:—I am now a citizen but still take great interest in the army, and shall always give it what aid there is in my power. I know that to your unfailing support and your confidence in me, I am greatly indebted for what little success I may have achieved, and I desire now to thank you. I hope I may be able some day to partly return it. Wherever fortune may hereafter place me, I shall never forget that all true

soldiers owe to you more than they can ever repay, and that the country can never reward your successful labor for it in the army. I grew up under your's, Sherman's and McPherson's orders and guidance, and I shall take into civil life my lesson that will be of lasting benefit to me. I trust if I can ever be of service to you in any way that you will not fail to command me, and that you will visit our section of the country in some of your travels. We are fast civilizing this western country, and I believe our railroad will do more towards taming the Indians than all else combined. General Sherman was here to see me a short time ago.

I am truly yours,
G. M. DODGE.

At the end of the war General Grant had a desire to reward a certain number of the Volunteer Generals that had served under him in the army, who had not gone into the regular army, and he proposed the passage of a bill appointing a certain number of Major-Generals and Brigadier-Generals in the regular army for life. On this list he placed me at the head to be a Major-General in the regular army. It would have been impossible for me to have accepted the position, as I was under contract at the time in building the Union Pacific Railway. General Grant greatly desired, at the end of the war, that I should remain in the army, and kept me in over a year after the volunteer forces were mustered out, but General Sherman, who knew my connection with the Union Pacific, took my view of the matter, and advised me not to remain in the army. His letter giving me leave of absence to take the position of Chief Engineer of the Union Pacific indicates his views on this question very clearly.

In November, 1866, I was elected to Congress from the State of Iowa, and took my seat in December, 1867. General Grant was then commander of the army, with headquarters in Washington, and we were together very often. I was a member of the Military Committee of the House, and the re-organization of the army was one of the important things before us. There was a great conflict as to what measure should be

passed between our Chairman, General James A. Garfield, and General B. F. Butler. It was a difficult problem to reduce the army to a minimum and take care of the large number of officers who had been appointed to the regular army, and were then under commission. The views of General Grant were not the views of the Committee, but when the conflict in the House became acute I offered a substitute for all the bills, which simply provided for the minimum strength of the army, and left it to the Commander-in-Chief, General Grant, to make the reduction in such manner as he considered would be to the best interests of the service. This substitute was passed, and I received credit, as a new member, of defeating two such old and prominent members as Garfield and Butler.

During this time also the conflict between President Andrew Johnson and General Grant occurred. There was living with me at that time the Honorable James F. Wilson of Iowa, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, having in charge the reconstruction measures. He was a prominent leader of the House, in whom Generals Grant and Rawlins had great confidence, and all the correspondence that passed between Grant and Johnson was brought to me by General Rawlins, and submitted by me to Representative Wilson, who thought Grant showed a grasp and insight of the question that was most surprising, and he had no reason to suggest any changes, but approved entirely General Grant's position and contentions in the matter.

Soon afterwards General Grant was nominated for the Presidency on the Republican ticket, and General Frank P. Blair for Vice President on the Democratic ticket. General Blair was at that time a United States Commissioner, accepting each section of twenty miles of the Union Pacific Railway as it was built, with headquarters at Fort Sanders, Wyoming. General Grant came to Omaha to go over the road with me, and General Blair happening to arrive at Omaha at

the same time, I took them both in my car to the end of the Union Pacific Railway. Blair had been a fine soldier, commanding a Brigade, Division and Corps under Grant, and Grant had referred to him in his reports in the highest terms. When they met they were as cordial and chatty as though they were political friends. Blair's contention was that if Grant was elected President it was one step towards placing the country under a monarchy, for he believed, with the faith the people had in him, his party would take the benefit and make him a permanent President, but one knowing Grant as I did knew he was the last person to think of such a result, much less be a party to it. The population along the line of the Union Pacific Railway, and the working parties were many of them rebels who had gone into the plains rather than go into the Confederate army, or be sent through our lines into the Confederate lines. There had also concentrated along the line and on the work a great many Confederate soldiers I had enlisted from among the Confederate prisoners of war to go on the plains and fight the Indian campaigns.

Naturally this population was for the democratic ticket. The presence of Grant and Blair on the line was known, and at every stopping place the people congregated and were all anxious to see Grant, and demanded that Blair, who was known as a fine speaker, should talk to them on the political question. Grant urged Blair to comply with their wishes, but Blair responded that the presence of Grant, for whom he had the highest admiration personally, made it impossible for him to talk to them on politics, and stating that he intended to be down the road again in a short time, and it would then give him pleasure to expound to them the principles of his party which, of course, satisfied them.

Soon after I left the service, I was sued for over thirty thousand dollars in the United States courts in Kansas for seizing, by order of Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, a

lot of horses and mules that had been driven into Kansas from the Indian Territory—the prosecutors claiming them as private property. When I appealed to the Government to defend the suit it developed that there was no way it could do so, and that there was no law protecting an officer for acts committed while in the service, no matter whose orders he obeyed, from civil suit, so judgment was given against me and all my property levied upon. You can imagine that I was greatly disturbed, as was General Grant, and he said, if he was elected President, one of his first acts would be to have laws passed protecting all officers for military acts committed while in the service, and one to relieve me. Blair said: “As I am certain to be elected, I will also see that it is done.”

And I felt at ease if I could keep off the execution until after election. Grant was elected, and the next Congress passed a law protecting officers who had been in the Government Service, and the Government also paid the judgment against me.

In the spring of 1868, during the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, the company gave the chief of construction, Mr. T. C. Durant, entire charge, not only of the building of the lines, but also of the surveys for the company. The desire of the construction company to make headway and meet the Central Pacific as far west as possible, caused them to change a portion of my lines west of the Black Hills. I entered a protest against this, and notified the Company that if my lines were changed without notifying me it would be necessary for me to resign. I was acting in a double capacity, as chief engineer for the railway, Generals Grant and Sherman also holding me accountable for carrying out the instructions of the Government. The Government heard of this action of the Company, and Generals Grant and Sherman, accompanied by Generals Kautz, Sheridan, Dent, Gibbon, Harney, Potter and Hunt, came to Fort Sanders, Wyoming Territory, to visit me, and consult with me in the matter. At that time I was in Salt



GENERAL GRANT AND PARTY VISIT GENERAL DODGE

From Left to Right:—Gen. August Kautz, Gen. Phillip H. Sheridan, Mrs. Potter, Gen. Frederick Dent, Mrs. Gibbon, Gen. John Gibbon, Master John Gibbon, Gen. U. S. Grant, Katie Gibbon, Mrs. Kilburn, Allie Potter, Gen. G. M. Dodge, Lieut.-Gen. Wm. T. Sherman, Gen. Wm. S. Harney, Dr. T. C. Durant, Gen. Adam Slemmer, Gen. Joseph C. Potter, Gen. Louis C. Hunt.

Lake City, but received a dispatch from T. C. Durant, chief of the construction force, to come to Fort Sanders to meet them, and at the same time requesting me to withdraw my resignation.

When I arrived at Fort Sanders, I found that Grant and Sherman had stated very emphatically, to the Union Pacific people, that my lines must be maintained or the Government would take action in the matter; that they knew me and had confidence in me, and there was no person whom they could make chief engineer to whom they would give the authority they had given me for calling upon the commanders for troops for escorts, and upon the posts for supplies, etc., that we might need.

Generals Grant and Sherman were all the time in communication with me, and both took as much interest in the building of the railway as I did. Their visit to the line was of great benefit, for it put an end to a great deal of friction that existed on the Union Pacific Railway, between the company and the contractors, and from that time on I never had any trouble; in fact the control of the construction of the road was virtually turned over to me.

General Grant in his first administration appointed A. G. Burlingame as Minister to China. He took a high position at the Chinese court, and returned to this country with authority to arrange for many innovations in China, among them great internal improvements, including railroads.

Minister Burlingame applied to General Grant for some one to take charge of the building of the railways contemplated by the Chinese Government, and General Grant recommended me. I had then completed the building of the Union Pacific Railway, and at Grant's urgent request accepted the position, and commenced arranging my affairs to accompany Minister Burlingame on his return to China. He went to Europe and while there died, and with him seems to have died all the modern views and efforts of the Chinese Government.

These efforts of Burlingame in China came through Grant's great influence there, for probably there is no nation he visited that was more impressed with Grant than the Chinese, and during his life and after his death they paid him great respect, and I have no doubt if Burlingame had lived and continued his efforts, with the support of General Grant, he would have been able to carry out many of the reforms that were contemplated.

It is a singular fact that the Chinese seem never to forget anything, for in 1883, when I was building railways in Texas, the Chinese Government again took this matter up, and remembering the recommendation of General Grant, they sent to me in Texas and renewed the request to visit China for the same purpose, but I was then unable to accept, and had to decline.

The Society of the Army of the Tennessee was organized at Raleigh, North Carolina, on April 14, 1865. General Grant took great interest in this Society, and at its first meeting he wrote this letter to the Society, and his tribute to his old army is the most sincere and the most complete of any I have ever seen:

Washington, D. C., November 11th, 1866.

Dear General:

It is with great disappointment that I have to announce, at the last moment, my inability to attend the meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, on the 14th inst. I find it will be impossible for me to be absent from the city, for the present, for so long a time as it would take me to go to Cincinnati and return.

I regret not being able to attend the first meeting of the Society, composed in whole of officers of the army which formed "my first command" in the terrible Rebellion, and with which I felt myself identified to the end of its service.

When my command was less than an "army" it was composed of troops which formed the nucleus of the "Army of the Tennessee" in its organization into an army.

It was the first army I had the honor to command, and to the end of the Rebellion it was an integral and important part of the force which I had the honor to direct, through the ablest and most distinguished officers of any service.

It is a proud record the Army of the Tennessee gained during the Rebellion. As an army it never sustained a defeat during the four years of war. No officer was ever assigned to the command of that army who had afterwards to be relieved from duty, or reduced to a less command. Such a history is not by accident nor wholly due to sagacity in the selection of commanders.

Again permit me to express through you to the Society of the Army of the Tennessee my deep regret at not being able to be with you on the interesting occasion of its first meeting.

I have the honor to be with great respect,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, General.

A speech that called attention to General Grant, and which was one of the most notable of his life, was made at the Reunion of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee at Des Moines, Iowa, September 29, 1875. Vigorous and vital in thought, sagacious and sublime in statesmanship, it stands in history as a most notable utterance.

General Grant said:

Comrades:—It always affords me much gratification to meet my old comrades-in-arms of ten to fourteen years ago, and to live over again the trials and hardships of those days—hardships imposed for the preservation and perpetuation of our free institutions. We believed then, and believe now, that we had a Government worth fighting for, and if need be, dying for. How many of our comrades of those days paid the latter price for our preserved Union. Let their heroism and sacrifices be ever green in our memory. Let not the results of their sacrifices be destroyed. The Union and the free institutions for which they fell, should be held more dear for their sacrifices. We will not deny to any of those who fought against us any privileges under the Government which we claim for ourselves. On the contrary, we welcome all such who come forward in good faith to help build up the waste places and to perpetuate our institutions against all enemies, as brothers in full interest with us in a common heritage. But we are not prepared to apologize for the part we took in the great struggle. It is to be hoped that like trials will never befall our country. In this sentiment no class of people can more heartily join than the soldiers who submitted to the dangers, trials and hardships of the camp and battlefield, on

whichever side he may have fought. No class of people is more interested in guarding against a recurrence of those days. Let us then begin by guarding against every enemy threatening the perpetuity of free republican institutions. I do not bring into this fair assemblage politics, certainly not partisan politics; but it is a fair subject for our deliberation, to consider what may be necessary to secure the prize for which they battled. In a republic like ours, where the citizen is the sovereign, and the official, servant—where no power is exercised except by the will of the people, it is important that the sovereign—the people—should possess intelligence. The free school is the promoter of that intelligence which is to preserve us as a free nation. If we are to have another contest, in the near future of our national existence, I predict that the dividing line will not be the Mason and Dixon's, but between patriotism and intelligence on the one side, and superstition, ambition and ignorance on the other. Now, in this centennial year of our national existence, I believe it a good time to begin the work of strengthening the foundation of the house commenced by our patriotic forefathers one hundred years ago at Concord and Lexington. Let us all labor to add all needful guarantees for the more perfect security of free thought, free speech and a free press; pure morals, unfettered religious sentiments, and of equal rights and privileges to all men, irrespective of nationality, color or religion.

Encourage free schools, and resolve that not one dollar of money appropriated to their support, no matter how raised, shall be appropriated to the support of any sectarian school. Resolve that either the State or Nation, or both combined, shall support institutions of learning sufficient to afford, to every child growing up in the land, the opportunity of a good, common school education, unmixed with sectarian, pagan or atheistical tenets. Leave the matter of religion to the family circle, the church, and the private school, supported entirely by private contribution. Keep the church and state forever separate. With these safeguards I believe the battle which created us, "The Army of the Tennessee," will not have been fought in vain.

In 1867, while I was building the Union Pacific Railway, General Grant suggested that I should take with me on some of my overland trips Brigadier-General John A. Rawlins, his Chief of Staff, who had been his ablest and most devoted friend and admirer, thinking the trip would benefit Rawlins, who was failing in health. The four months we were in



GENERAL G. M. DODGE AND PARTY, EXPLORING U. P. R. Y., 1867

Left, Standing:—Lieut. J. W. Wheelan, Col. J. K. Mizner, Dr. Henry R. Terry, of escort, John B. Corwith.
Sitting: D. Van Lennup, geologist; John R. Duft, Gen. G. M. Dodge, Gen. John A. Rawlins, Maj. J. W. McK Dunn, A. D. C.

camp together were delightful ones to me, for I listened to the story of Grant's campaign, and the many incidents that occurred that never got into the reports, with great benefit and satisfaction, as no one could describe them as Rawlins did. He explained to me many of the problems of the war that I did not fully understand; Grant's actions in great emergencies, meeting the great obstacles in his way; the almost unsurmountable difficulties he had to overcome, but in all the dark days he never for one moment lost heart or faith, or doubted the result. Rawlins became Grant's first Secretary of War. When he died in September, 1869, Grant desired to give me the place, but my duties with the Union Pacific Railway prevented it.

In 1877 General Grant started on his trip around the world. I was with him in Paris. I had a house on the Boulevard Houseman. The attention paid him in Paris, and the consideration he received, not only officially, but from the private citizens, occupied nearly all his time, and whenever he had an hour to himself he would come up to my house to sit and smoke his cigar, and have a complete rest. We were in the habit of going to the Champs Elysees and sit there watching the crowds. I had with me my youngest daughter, and General Grant would take her and go into the Punch and Judy shows and stay an hour or more with her, and seemed to enjoy it as fully as she did. He was more interested in the people, in what they did, and in the manufactures, etc., of the country, than anything else, and was absolutely opposed to parades and reviews, and never wanted to go near the army. He apparently took no interest in military matters of any kind. It was a singular trait of character that a man who had handled as many hundreds of thousands of men and fought as many battles as he had, should have such an aversion to looking on troops, or having them brought out in any demonstration for him. He had to attend in Paris three or four cere-

monies each day, and how he stood it and maintained his health as well as he did was beyond my conception, for it was impossible for me to stand any such strain. His visits to the Champs Elysees seemed to be of great relief to him, and apparently changed him from a great General and President to a simple boy.

During the time General Grant was writing his Memoirs I was in the habit of visiting him when I was in New York, and sitting some hours with him, and he would often read to me some portions of what he had written. Illustrating what an extraordinary memory he had, he read to me a portion of what he had written about me, and the rebuilding of the Nashville & Decatur Railway. As this work had not impressed itself upon my mind as it had upon his, as it was no unusual thing to me, I listened to what he read, and said that my recollection of it was not as he had written it, which seemed to surprise him, and he said if that was so he would have to change it. I said not to change it; that I would go to my office and look over my records, which I did. I had to sit down the next morning and write him a letter, telling him that his recollection of what I had done was absolutely correct, while my own was absolutely wrong, and the chapter stood as he had written it.

Mr. N. E. Dawson, the Secretary to whom he dictated the greater part of the second volume of his Memoirs, says the few corrections they had to make of dates and data of all kinds showed a wonderful accuracy in all his statements, that the work they had to do was to arrange the different subjects in chronological order, and I know from my own examination that his first volume, written in his own hand, has very few interlineations. The Secretary also said that General Grant seemed to maintain himself during the dictating of the last volume by a strong will to live until it was completed, and after he had written it all out and read

it to him, and it was virtually completed, that moment he immediately began to fail, and in ten days thereafter was dead.

On December 8th, 1884, I received this letter from General Grant, and Major-General Frederick D. Grant says this letter was the last letter General Grant wrote by his own hand.

New York, Dec. 8th, 1884.

My Dear General Dodge:

I am sorry to trouble you and would not but for the circumstances under which I am placed. Since my injury of nearly a year ago I have grown very weak. A sore throat of six months standing has given me much trouble. In addition to this I have been a sufferer from neuralgia. I think a visit to the Hot Springs of Arkansas would do me much good. Can you furnish me a special car out and back? If I go I would like to start sometime between the 15th and 20th of this month, to return soon after the beginning of the new year.

Very truly yours,

U. S. GRANT.

P. S.—Mrs. Grant will accompany me, and two servants—maid and a man servant.

I brought a private car to New York, and held it there for some time, but General Grant was not able to make the trip or use it.

On December 19th, 1884, I received this letter from General F. D. Grant:

No. 3 East 66th, Dec. 19th, 1884.

Dear General:

I will try and be at your office tomorrow morning. If I don't get there it will be because I will be detained with father at the doctor's.

Father has been very ill, but is a little better, and we are trying to get him well enough to go to the matinee to see Raymond run for Congress tomorrow morning and cheer him (father) up a little.

We would be glad to have you call at any time you can, particularly in the morning between 8 and 10 o'clock.

Respectfully & C.,

F. D. GRANT.

In compliance with this letter, on Sunday, December 21, 1884, I started up to see Colonel F. D. Grant. Stopped at the

Union League Club and found the Colonel there waiting for me. He took me to one side and said that he had just come from Dr. Fordyce Parker, who told him that his father could not live long; perhaps a month or two, perhaps not so long. He said that Governor Fish and Dr. Newman were the only ones that knew it, and he impressed on me the necessity of keeping it a secret so it could not reach his father. I was thunderstruck, for only the Sunday before I was at the house, and the General looked fairly well, though I knew he was much distressed. He told me that he had been working on his history, and writing of my opening the middle Tennessee by rapid construction of the Nashville & Decatur Railroad, and said that while I was an excellent soldier, I was also finely fitted for the construction of the railroad on account of my education and experience as a Civil Engineer.

After a long talk, I told Colonel Fred that General Sherman was in the city, and suggested going down and telling the General how sick his father was, and have him come up. We went to the Fifth Avenue Hotel; found the General with Wm. McCrory, of Minneapolis, formerly on his staff, also a staff officer who was examining some papers. The General said he was in good health; was troubled some with asthma, but was full of work and attending meetings, etc. Colonel Fred said to General Sherman:

I think my father's history tells more of what you did than your own Memoirs.

Sherman said:

Well, when Grant writes anything, we can all depend on getting the facts. When he writes and says himself what was done and what he saw, no soldiers need fear; but when others write what he does and says, it is not always so.

Colonel Fred said his father had been having considerable trouble with the publishers or editors of the magazine who were to publish the war articles—Shiloh, Vicksburg, Wilder-

ness and Appomattox—that they had made his father very angry—they wanted him to change the word “Rebel” in his article to “Confederate” and the word “Union” to “Federal.” He said that finally the General wrote a short letter, demanding that his articles be published as written. Fred further said that his father had written three articles but he did not believe that he would write any more.

Sherman said:

This trying to soften treason by expunging the words of the General was wrong, and that if it kept on, pretty soon the sons of Southern soldiers would consider it as much of an honor that their fathers fought under Lee, as the sons of Union soldiers, that their fathers fought under Grant; that the line of Union and Rebel, of loyalty and treason, should be kept always distinct.

I answered:

As long as our veterans live it will be; but the tendency all the time is, to wipe out history, to forget it, forgive, excuse and soften, and when all the soldiers pass from this age it will be easy to slip into the idea, that one side was as good as the other.

Sherman said:

It was a conspiracy until Sumpter was fired upon; after that, a Rebellion.

Governor Woodford came in and Sherman related to him what Fred Grant had said but he made no response. Fred also said his father had written his life from boyhood to Donelson; had written Shiloh, Vicksburg, Granada, Chattanooga, and the march of Sherman from Memphis to Chattanooga and the Wilderness. He said his father had omitted writing for four days, but asked me to come up and see him evenings.

When you compare the sentiment existing then with that existing today, you can see what a marked change has come in this country. Virginia has placed, in the rotunda of the

capitol in Washington, a statute of General Lee in a confederate uniform, without any protest from our country, its citizens, and only occasionally one from the veterans. A distinguished veteran in commenting upon this said that he visited the capitol with a view of looking at Lee to see how he was dressed, but he said when he got there, it was a bronze statue and the only indication that he was a confederate came from the insignia on the Bronze, but he said he did not feel like some veterans did. He thought if Virginia was anxious to place Lee in the capitol alongside of Grant, who was already there, it was a good object lesson for all the people who came to visit it, for when they looked at Lee, they would at the same time look at General Grant, who received Lee's surrender and saved the Union, and that the comparison would be favorable in every case to the Union.

Right after our interview, General Sherman went up to see General Grant, and that evening I saw him again. He seemed pleased with his visit; thought General Grant was looking well, and as Colonel Fred Grant had requested me not to tell anyone the condition his father was in for fear he might see it, I said nothing to General Sherman. As far as I know, and while the fact that General Grant's disease was a fatal one, it was kept from him by the doctors; also by the family, but I believe Grant knew it because from that time on, he made great efforts to finish his Memoirs, and the fact that as soon as he completed his Memoirs he commenced failing rapidly, and within ten days was dead. That he maintained his strength by a determination to finish them before he died, the same determination he showed when on the field, and this letter he wrote Dr. Douglas in July, only ten days before he died, shows plainly he knew his end was near:

I ask you not to show this to anyone, unless the physicians you consult with, until the end. Particularly, I want it kept from my friends. If known to one man, the papers will get it.

It would only distress my friends, almost beyond endurance, to know it, and, by reflex, it would distress me. I have not changed my mind materially, since I wrote you before in the same strain. Now, however, I know that I gain strength some days, but when I do go back, it is beyond where I started to improve. I think the chances are very decidedly in favor of your being able to keep me alive until the change of weather, toward winter. Of course, there are contingencies that might arise at any time that would carry me off very suddenly.

The most probable of these is choking.

Under the circumstances, life is not worth the living. I am very thankful to have been spared this long, because it has enabled me to practically complete the work in which I take so much interest. I cannot stir up strength enough to review it and make additions and subtractions that would suggest themselves to anyone else. Under the above circumstances, I will be the happiest, the most pain I can avoid. If there is to be any extraordinary cure, as some people believe there is to be, it will develop itself. I would say, therefore, to you and your colleagues, to make me as comfortable as you can. If it is within God's providence that I should go now, I am ready to obey His call without a murmur. I would prefer going now to enduring my present suffering for a single day.

General Grant died at Mt. Gregor near Saratoga, New York, on July 23d, 1885. I was absent from the city, but the family notified me and I returned and attended the funeral. He was universally mourned and great crowds turned out to show their sympathy. He was laid in a tomb or receptacle, temporarily constructed for this purpose, near the present fine memorial building.

There was quite a contention as to where he should be finally laid to rest; he had desired to be buried at West Point, but for the fact that Mrs. Grant could not be buried there by his side he named Galena or New York because of the friendships shown him by that state in his greatest need. His family selected New York City.

I was called upon by the Boston Journal, on his death, for an estimate of his character, and gave this:

General Grant is measured from two different standpoints. First, as a soldier and commander; second, as a civilian and

statesman. As a soldier General Grant was modest, retiring, unassuming and easy of approach, seldom if ever showing anger; standing by and supporting those in whom he trusted, or upon whom he had placed responsibilities, even in their failures, if he believed that they had carried out his commands to the best of their ability, and with the full strength of the force under them. He had no use or sympathy for an officer who in battle or holding any position did not use, to the utmost limit and fight to the utmost strength, every person under him. With General Grant such action on the part of an officer covered a multitude of omissions. His strength of character is well illustrated by his reply when asked what he claimed for the Battle of the Wilderness.

It is well known that Confederate officers maintain the opinion that if this battle had been fought under any other commander, the results ensuing would have caused a retreat instead of an advance. General Grant answered, "That all he claimed was that after that battle the Army of the Potomac would never fear Lee, and that Lee's losses could never be replaced, and that the Union troops would have a much smaller force to meet in the rest of the campaign than they had encountered at the beginning of the Wilderness fight."

General Grant's fame came from the fact that he was generally victorious, and finished successfully the Civil War, but the vital question is: Why did the people, with the unerring instinct, look to this unknown man when there were many others more prominent in the field, who were gaining great credit whilst he was under a ban, even after his first great victories? What led them to so firmly support him through all the time he was in the midst of a storm of abuse?

My answer is that Grant was the first commander who gave the North to understand that he would use the force placed under him for all it was worth. They said: "Here at last is a General who will not temporize, who will not compromise, and who will fight at every opportunity, regardless of numbers, and will attempt to capture every stronghold of the enemy and beat down his armies by main force."

General Grant believed that the North had superior numbers and stronger sinews of war, which, if properly used, would cause the victory to finally rest with him. Superiority of numbers and equipment would not succeed unless used with a determination and continued force commensurate with their strength. Grant saw this, saw that the nation demanded action, and the result was that he above all others, met this demand. The people saw it and demanded his services, no matter what the critics, strategists or officials said of him or his

acts, and today the world admits that his methods in war are the only ones to bring quick and sure results.

It was General Grant's determination in every battle to use against the enemy every gun at his command, and when his battles are studied it is wonderful to see how he marshaled his forces. They prove that he had the genius for concentrating and fighting his command upon a given point; therefore, it was mathematically certain that in the end he would win. He tied to himself with hooks of steel all those who served under him, from the fact that he sunk his own personality in his endeavors to give credit and honor to everyone who successfully took part in any battle under him.

General Grant as a statesman: As the years pass by and his acts are measured by the results of his administration, it is being generally admitted that he was equally as great a statesman as he was a soldier.

The Society of the Army of the Tennessee held its Reunion on October 8th, 1889, and took part in the dedication of the Grant Memorial in Lincoln Park, Chicago. Mrs. Grant was present, as the guest of Mrs. Potter Palmer, and the Society was very anxious to pay their respects to Mrs. Grant. I called upon her at Mrs. Palmer's. She was fearful she could not go through the ordeal of seeing so many of General Grant's old comrades, many of whom she knew personally; but I assured her that the comrades would avoid anything that would bring to her sad memories. With the aid of Mrs. Palmer I prevailed upon her to receive the old army.

At 2 o'clock that afternoon, October 8th, 1889, the officers arrived at the Palmer mansion. Mrs. Palmer, beautiful in a charming costume, received them and they were escorted into the great reception room to the right, where Mrs. Grant awaited them. The widow was attired in black, her silvery hair forming a halo around the saddened features. A meet word of welcome was on her lips as her husband's comrades in arms presented themselves.

The veterans were deeply affected. They approached her with reverence that was almost worship—the woman who had been the companion of the great General who had led them to

victory. Probably no General was surrounded by his officers with such memories of devotion as he whose bronze statue was unveiled yesterday, and all their love and admiration was given to the wife he had loved so well. Mrs. Grant was deeply affected. Many of those who bowed before her were near and dear friends of the long ago. They had fought by the side of General Grant when the fierce clamor of war had echoed throughout the land, and they had been his friends and advisers when peace had come. A tide of tender memories swept over the soul of that silvery-haired woman as she saw the well-known faces and it well nigh overcame her, but she controlled herself remarkably well and passed through the ordeal with fortitude.

The hostess, Mrs. Palmer, with rare tact, turned what would have been a melancholy reunion into a pleasant, enjoyable social event. The veterans, true to their promise, refrained from saddening allusions and the reception passed off most pleasantly. For an hour the officers conversed with their honored guest and then they departed.

Mrs. Palmer said :

Mrs. Grant has been deeply touched by the kindness shown her.

The magnificence of the demonstration yesterday, at the dedication of the monument, gratified her beyond expression. She feels exceedingly well today and I really believe that her little trip will be a great benefit to her physically. Of course, the sad memories which have come to her have affected her, but she has not been overcome. She was deeply touched by the kind greeting given her at the park exercises yesterday. Mrs. Grant was sitting in such a position that she could not see the salutes fired from the boats upon the lake. She arose to change her position, and, catching sight of her, the vast throng greeted her most heartily. The greeting was unexpected, as Mrs. Grant had no thought of such a thing when she arose. The heartiness with which she has been received everywhere and the sacredness of her husband's memory to the people of Chicago have been sweet to her, and she will never forget this visit to our city. Her heart, she says.

will always be warm to Chicago. I think, moreover, she will probably be permanently benefitted in health by her visit here.

General U. S. Grant died July 23, 1885. Soon after his death, the mayor and the leading citizens of the city of New York organized for the purpose of erecting a monument to his memory in the city of New York. They progressed successfully at first in this work, until something like \$150,000 had been subscribed. They advertised for plans; many were submitted, and that of Mr. Duncan accepted; then the matter halted and lay dormant until the 21st day of March, 1892, when General Horace Porter called together a small number of General Grant's friends at the Union League Club, in New York, and an organization was made of which General Porter was president, and I was vice president.

General Porter took up the active work of raising the balance of the sum needed to carry out the plans that had been presented by Mr. Duncan, and adopted by the original committee, an estimated cost of which was about \$600,000.

General Porter spent day and night addressing the people of the city, until he had organized 215 committees, representing all trade industries, etc., which were actively at work, and General Porter would come in from the field about midnight and report to us his success in the work, and plans would be laid for the next day's work, and in forty days, by his personal efforts, there had been subscribed the needed sum. The work had progressed so successfully that on April 28th, 1892, arrangements were made for the laying of the corner stone of the monument in the park where it now is located on Riverside.

At the laying of the corner stone, the president of the United States with his cabinet members, Mrs. Grant and family, the diplomatic corps, many distinguished officers of the army and navy, representatives of the G. A. R., patriotic societies, and many citizens generally, took part. There were some three thousand seats reserved which were occupied by

the guests and by members of different trades and professions who were taking part in raising funds for the building of the monument.

General Porter presided and delivered the address, giving an account of the monument; and the corner stone was laid by President Harrison with a "Golden Trowel." He said:

No orator, however gifted, can over praise General Grant. The most costly and impressive structure that the architect can plan or wealth execute, is justifiable when the name of Grant is inscribed upon its base. This stone, which has now been laid, accompanied by this magnificent expression of popular interest, is only the top stone of a foundation. It speaks to us of a structure imposing and graceful in its completeness, which shall rise from this supporting base.

Then the Honorable Chauncey Depew delivered an oration which was received with great applause. It was estimated that about one million people turned out to witness the procession, a large portion of which assembled at the location of the tomb.

The Grant monument was dedicated on April 27th, 1897. The mayor of the city called together friends of General Grant and made the preliminary organization by appointing and commissioning me as the Grand Marshal of the parade. President McKinley was to review the parade and General Horace Porter was to deliver the oration. The arrangements for the parade were the most extensive ever made in New York, and I was over a month attending to the details and completing the arrangements.

I had a very efficient staff, consisting of Colonel H. C. Corbin, General T. F. Rodenbough, A. Noel Blakeman, Captain John A. Johnson, Lieut. Wm. E. Horton, and Colonel William C. Sanger as the working force, and Captain Chester of the United States navy who was in charge of the naval parade for me, and 200 volunteer aides. The parade marched from Madison Square to the tomb, about four miles, and was in three grand divisions.

The first division—the regular army, the militia and marines. The second—the Grand Army and the Patriotic Organizations and societies. The third—the Civic Division. Of the regular army, militia and cadets, there were sixty thousand in line. Of the Grand Army and patriotic societies, about twenty-five thousand, and of the Civic Procession about twenty-five thousand—the largest parade ever seen in New York, and it was from 1:30 to 6:30 P. M., closed in solid column, passing the review stand.

The day was a cold, windy, uncomfortable day, but the police estimated that over three million of people lined the sidewalks, and whilst there were bleachers along the road to accommodate fifty thousand people, it was so cold and windy that many of them were deserted, people lining up on the sidewalks, and the handling of the crowd by the police was simply perfect.

The guests, many of the noted people of the United States, including the President and Cabinet, General Grant's family, diplomatic representatives of every nation, Congress and Executive officers and their representatives of every state, occupied seats around the reviewing stand. The naval parade included many of the United States ships, and a representation of naval ships from nearly every country. At the reviewing stand there were seats for five thousand people. The naval parade lined up along the Hudson River, from the tomb clear down to the Battery. The dean of the diplomats, Lord Pauncetote, wrote me a letter complimenting me as to the perfection of the arrangements and the ability with which the large mass was handled. I also received from foreign countries requests for my orders.

I arranged the formation of the parade so that the troops should not stand on the side streets more than half an hour before they fell into line. I ascertained the time that each command would take its place in the column by marching a company of troops from Governor's Island, from the Madison

Square to the monument and past to the dismissal of the parade, taking the time they passed each street, the time for resting, and in this way, knowing the number of troops in each command, was enabled to place the troops and veterans, the civic organizations, so that no one had to wait over half an hour. The last formation fell into line about 4:30 o'clock.

The address of the President of the United States was a very fine one; but the oration of General Horace Porter was a remarkable one, one of the finest probably ever delivered in this country, and there was no person better equipped, perhaps, than General Horace Porter, to tell the multitude of General Grant and what he had accomplished. His closing words in the dedication of the Grant tomb, April 27, 1897, were:

Most of the conspicuous characters in history have risen to prominence by gradual steps, but the senior of the Triumvirate, whose features are recalled to us today, came before the people with a sudden bound. Almost the first sight caught of him was in the blaze of his camp-fires and the flashes of his guns those wintry days and nights in front of Donelson. From that time until the closing triumph at Appomattox the great central figure of the war was Ulysses S. Grant. As light and shade produce the most attractive effects in a picture, the singular contrasts, the strange vicissitudes of his eventful life surround him with an interest which attaches to few characters in history. His rise from an obscure Lieutenant to the command of the veteran armies of the great Republic; his transition from a frontier post of the untrodden West to the Executive Mansion of the nation; his sitting at one time in a little store in Galena, not even known to the Congressman from his district; at another time striding through the palaces of the old world, with the descendants of a line of kings rising and standing with uncovered heads in his presence. These are some of the features of his marvelous career which appeal to the imagination, excite men's wonder and fascinate all who make a study of his life.

He was created for great emergencies. It was the very magnitude of the task which called forth the powers which mastered it. In ordinary matters he was an ordinary man; in momentous affairs he towered as a giant. When performing the routine duties of a company post there was no act to make

him conspicuous above his fellow officers, but when he wielded Corps and Armies the great qualities of the Commander flashed forth, and his master strokes of genius stamped him as the foremost soldier of his age. When he hauled wood from his little farm and sold it in St. Louis his financiering was hardly equal to that of the small farmers about him, but when a message was to be sent by a President to Congress that would puncture the fallacies of the inflationists and throttle, by a veto, the attempt of unwise legislators to cripple the finances of the Nation, a State paper was produced which has ever since commanded the wonder and admiration of every believer in sound currency. He was made for great things, not for little things. He could collect fifteen millions from Great Britain in settlement of the Alabama claims; he could not protect his own personal savings from the miscreants who robbed him in Wall street.

If there is one word which describes better than any other the predominating characteristic of his nature, that word is loyalty. He was loyal to his friends, loyal to his family, loyal to his country, and loyal to his God. This trait naturally produced a reciprocal effect upon those who were brought into relations with him and was one of the chief reasons why men became so loyally attached to him. Many a public man has had troops of adherents who clung to him only for the patronage dispensed at his hands, or being dazzled by his power, became blind partisans to a cause he represented, but perhaps no other man than General Grant ever had so many friends who loved him for his own sake, whose affection only strengthened with time, whose attachment never varied in its devotion, whether he was General or President. or simply a private citizen.

Even the valor of his martial deeds was surpassed by the superb heroism he displayed when fell disease attacked him: when the hand which had seized the surrendered swords of countless thousands was no longer able to return the pressure of a comrade's grasp, when he met in death the first enemy to whom he ever surrendered. But with him death brought eternal rest, and he was permitted to enjoy what he had pleaded for in behalf of others—for the Lord had let him have peace.

Whilst we were constructing the Grant memorial in New York City, our contract provided, to comply with the wishes of General Grant, that arrangements should be made in the crypt for two sarcophaguses, lying side by side, one for the use

of General Grant, and the other for Mrs. Grant. For some reason only the one sarcophagus was at first provided, which worried Mrs. Grant very much, and she wrote me in relation to it and often spoke to me about it; but I assured her the delay was simply the inability of the contractors to get a sarcophagus of the same material exactly as that of General Grant's.

When I wrote her that we had obtained the material and had placed a sarcophagus in the tomb alongside of General Grant's, she wrote me a letter telling me how greatly it had relieved her anxiety. She said to me that when General Grant and herself were in Europe they paid a visit to the tomb of Ferdinand and Isabella, both lying side by side in the tomb. The thought of the royal couple sleeping side by side for centuries appealed to General Grant, and turning to her, he said: "Julia, this is the way we should be in death."

General Grant, no doubt, had this in mind, when in a memorandum he stated that he preferred West Point as his burial place, but for the fact that his wife could not be placed beside him, named Galena or New York.

On December 14th, 1902, Mrs. Grant died in Washington. I happened to be in the city and immediately went to the house and found Mrs. Sartoris, her daughter, the only one of the family present, General F. D. Grant and family being on duty in Ft. Houston, Texas, and the other two sons, Ulysses S. and Jessie, and their families, living on the Pacific Coast. And at Mrs. Sartoris' request I immediately took charge of all the arrangements for burial, communicating immediately with General Frederick D. Grant at Ft. Houston, who also asked me to take charge.

General Frederick D. Grant and family soon returned and the War Department came promptly to our aid and made provision for taking the families and funeral cortege to New York. After the ceremonies in Washington, we took the remains to New York where the Grant Memorial Association took charge

of them, and made all the arrangements for placing her in the stone receptacle, alongside of her husband, where she had been so anxious to lie.

She was a devoted wife, Julia Dent Grant. After every campaign she visited General Grant, and was welcomed by everyone in his command. She had a kindly, gracious way that captured us. The officers who had annoyances and grievances they could not take to the General and his staff, appealed to Mrs. Grant. She was very diplomatic and knew which to consider, and which she could not take up with the General, and many an officer could thank her for interceding and straightening out his grievance. We went to her with great confidence in what she could do. Although she always asserted that she had no influence in army matters, I noticed none of us was ever concerned about or censured for our appeals to Mrs. Grant, and there was no soldier who did not love to see her with the army, and who did not regret her departure. During General Grant's administrations, his troubles and his sickness, she was always the same. She straightened out many little contentions, and a suggestion to the General often pointed the way to settle many little annoyances. After General Grant's death I saw much of her, and was charmed with the great number of incidents she had stored away, and her great memory for what happened. At our army reunions we always had a word from her, and sent her our greetings, and they were happy mile-stones in her life. Many happy hours I have spent with her, as she recalled the many events in the General's life, and any of his comrades received a hearty welcome from her. The Nation will never know how much it is indebted to her loyal devotion and good advice, and it is a singular fact that in his own home General Grant was uneasy and discontented when Mrs. Grant was away. He was devoted and loyal to her, and his last request that she be laid at his side, no matter where they placed him, was worthy of the great man, as well as due to his devoted helpmate. The hold she had, not

only on her country but on all others, was shown by the universal response at her death and the great respect shown her as we laid her beside the General at Riverside.

My relations with General Grant during the war were of the greatest interest, and his marked friendship for me on many occasions, his recommendations for promotion to higher command, were of untold benefit, for I was a young officer, holding commands all the time I served under General Grant that I was not entitled to by my rank, but was held in them until promotion came to me.

After the war my residence and occupation brought me often with General Grant and his family, and I was often a visitor to his home. When his son, Frederick Dent Grant, graduated from West Point, General Grant, I think, had an idea of having him go into business rather than into the army; and he sent him out to me to have him placed in an engineering corps, and I gave him a position in one of the corps that was making surveys in Colorado while we were building the Union Pacific Railroad.

When he joined the party he made himself one of them—acceptable to them, assuming nothing on his relations or his rank as a Lieutenant in the Army, and performed his duty the same as all the others, and won the respect and love of the party. He remained with the party until he went with General Sherman on his trip abroad.

After General Grant's death, the friendship of Mrs. Grant and family grew into a family affection, and at a meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee of my Regiment, the Fourth Iowa, and the Dodge Battery, at my home in Council Bluffs, Iowa, October 11th, 1911, Major-General Frederick Dent Grant paid me this fine tribute:

General Dodge, Ladies and Gentlemen, Veterans of the Fourth Iowa Regiment and of the Dodge Battery:

I am grateful to be with you here, and I feel deeply honored in receiving your kind welcome to the son of one who was your friend and comrade—General U. S. Grant.



MAJOR-GENERAL FREDERICK D. GRANT

No distance, no duties—nothing—could prevent my coming to Council Bluffs to meet you on this occasion and to greet your former Colonel, Iowa's distinguished citizen, General Grenville M. Dodge, for whom my father and my father's son have cherished always a heartfelt admiration and friendship.

I wish to add my tribute of praise and thanks to him whose work and deeds have been an honor to his country. Fortunately for me, I was with my father much of the time during those dark days of the Civil War, and through that terrible struggle for the Union, I, as a boy, witnessed that untiring devotion to duty, loyalty and unflinching courage of those noble, great men whose names must shine forever upon the rolls of honor in the archives of our Nation. I am thankful to have seen and known those heroes. I rejoice in having distinct, personal recollections of those distinguished Americans who, putting aside all selfish or personal interests, when their country was in need, when the Northern people were discouraged, hastened with grim determination to sacrifice their all, their lives if necessary, for the restoration of peace in our land.

It is to those heroes of our northern armies, to General Dodge, to you veterans here, and to those others, your comrades gone before, that we owe this great, beautiful country, with North and South united, resting in that peace and harmony in which this present generation so triumphs.

I have known and heard always of your loyal heroism and that of your Colonel, but I wish to speak a word now, not only of heroes but of a friend for whom I have cherished always the warmest admiration and affection, inherited from father and ever increasing throughout my long association with him. I refer to your much loved citizen, General Dodge.

I yield to no one, not to you, his veteran comrades; not to your State of Iowa, nor to his own family and nearest friends, as possessing a warmer or deeper feeling of devotion than my own for General Dodge. In this affection my son, Ulysses S. Grant, III, and all my family join me.

It was to General Dodge I confided my distress and grief in first learning that my dear father was stricken with a fatal illness and his days were numbered. When I learned also of that other great sorrow which came to our family in the passing away of my mother, I again turned to General Dodge for sympathy and found him as always, ready to extend heartfelt friendship and condolence.

Like all brave and truly great men, he has a warm and tender heart upon which his friends may rely always with confidence.

The happy gathering of veterans recalls to mind vividly the great victories and that national glory won by the Union forces during the Civil War—those heroes of the Army who in that fearful strife, by their sacrifices and valor, secured for us in reality and in fact, what our ancestors had organized in theory—namely, a land of Liberty and United Nation.

Let us never forget that to you heroes of the Union armies we owe all this in which we now triumph.

My happiest hours are those passed with you, General Dodge, and the other comrades of my father. This association, with my name, is my proudest heritage.

I am very grateful to be with you here, and thank you again for your kindness.

On April 12, 1912, another great sorrow came to General Grant's family in the sudden death of Major-General Frederick Dent Grant of the United States Army, he being about the age of his father at the time of his death. He stood very high in the records of the War Department. When President McKinley made him a Brigadier-General in the regular army, he said to me: "He needs no outside influence or recommendations; his record in the War Department entitles him to this promotion." He was universally liked by the army and by all those who knew him.

He had many of his father's characteristics, much more than any other member of the family, and it was generally conceded that, in case of war, he would develop many of the qualities as a General that made his father famous.

To the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, his death was a great loss. He took a great interest in his father's comrades, and by his modest and winning ways, won their affections and made himself universally liked and respected by them. He and his family always attended the Reunions.

His son, Captain Ulysses S. Grant, III, is bravely doing his duty in command of the United States Engineers at Vera Cruz, Mexico, where his grandfather won so much credit as a Lieutenant in the Mexican war of 1846-47.

General Grant, in discussing the criticisms upon himself, said:

Twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers who profess devotion to the nation, trying to prove that the nation's forces were not victorious. Probably they say we were slashed around from Donelson to Vicksburg and Chattanooga, and in the East, Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. I would like to see truthful history written, and history will do credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought.

Speaking of those who opposed our country during the war, Grant gave this opinion :

The man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. The most charitable post-humorous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is oblivion.

The facts are, that thirty years ago General Grant laid down the policies that the country maintains today on all great questions—the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, the settlement of all disputes by arbitration, the currency, gold standards, the upbuilding of the navy, the policy in the West Indies, acquisition of foreign territory, retirement of green-backs until paid out for gold, and the education of our people, upon which subject nothing more clear than his speech at Des Moines, Iowa, has ever been uttered. It has always been an enigma to me to hear people speak of General Grant, and say : “He was a great soldier but a failure in civil life,” for his standing throughout the world is as high or higher for his acts as a civilian as for the great victories of the Civil War. Grant as a statesman was the same as he was when a soldier. When we were living in camp and not on a campaign, he was indolent. It was hard to get a reply to a letter or dispatch, or get any comfort from him, but the moment he got on his horse to lead a campaign it seemed as though he anticipated all events. His judgment seemed infallible, his decision was made in-

stantly, and the answer to a dispatch or letter was ready the moment he read it. He never hesitated; he never was ambiguous. Any person receiving a letter did not have to ask a second explanation, and he greatly objected to receiving dispatches expressing doubts during a campaign. He said to me that he never doubted what I could or would do from my dispatches, and seldom if ever made a suggestion upon them. When I read them myself now I am absolutely astonished at the positive character of them, and their bluntness. To the subordinates he trusted he gave great latitude and seemed to have the utmost confidence in their success. His orders to them told what he wanted them to do, leaving to them all details, invariably saying if they needed help he would support them. He tied every officer and soldier to him with bands of steel, for he invariably gave everyone credit for what they accomplished, sinking himself. If they failed and he considered they had done the best possible, he shielded them, and assumed the responsibility of the failure.

After the war it was my good fortune to be thrown with General Grant a good deal, and I was associated with him in some of his enterprises, such as the railway from the City of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, and it was impossible for me to meet him as I did and not comprehend that he was in civil life, as in military life, of that peculiar make-up which let small matters go without attention, but in any crisis would rise to command it. He was so modest and so simple that his greatness was absolutely forced upon one from his very acts. Nevertheless, so far no critic in this nation, or any other, has ever been able to write a word against his military course or civil life which carried strength enough to be mentioned the second time. General Grant's greatness was admitted long before he left our shores, and although a simple citizen, he was honored as no one ever was before, and his simplicity simply astonished the world. Some critics of General Grant have

said that during the war he absorbed from others many of his great qualities as a soldier, but no one can read the war records without seeing that the strength of his dispatches and orders, the boldness of his plans, his fearless attack of superior numbers, and his decisive victories in the early part of the war were equal to if not superior to those of the last year of the war.

The great distinguishing qualities of General Grant were truth, courage, modesty, generosity and loyalty. He was loyal to every work and every cause in which he was engaged—to his friends, his family, his country and to his God, and it was these characteristics which bound to him with hooks of steel all those who served with him. He absolutely sunk himself to give to others honor and praise to which he, himself, was entitled. No officer served under him who did not understand this. I was a young man and given much larger commands than my rank entitled me to. General Grant never failed to encourage me by giving me credit for whatever I did, or tried to do. If I failed he assumed the responsibility; if I succeeded he recommended me for promotion. He always looked at the intention of those who served under him, as well as to their acts. If they failed in intention, he dropped them so quickly and efficiently that the whole country could see and hear their fall.



MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN. 1864

PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS OF GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN

As a soldier of the Union, General Sherman, by common consent, stands second only in a galaxy of great commanders such as no single cycle in the annals of time can parallel. This is the verdict of the most superficial reader and of the most diligent student of history.

A reference to the official list of battles, skirmishes, and other contests from April 15th, 1861, to the close of the war, develops the astounding fact that for every day, including Sundays, of those four years there were at least three of these struggles. If in such a death grapple General Sherman rose to the highest rank and command among the victors, it cannot but be interesting to turn back to the circumstances of his parentage and scan the surroundings of his youth to find, if we can, the formative influences which moulded the plastic tendencies of his nature into the lofty and harmonious individuality which marked him out for eminent leadership.

Both his father and grandfather had been learned in the law. His father not only mastered the intricacies of Coke and Littleton, but made himself familiar with whatever was worthy reading outside of the books of the law, and was therefore fitted to shine in the domain of general literature, as well as in the realm of technical jurisprudence. It was this gifted man who, when his third son was born, proposed to bestow upon him the name of a celebrated chieftain—as if seeing the child's future military career. Judge Sherman entertained a warm admiration for the celebrated Indian chief, Tecumseh, and this singular Indian was gifted with rare endowments, which gave him great prominence amongst his tribal allies, and

a commanding influence over his followers of the forest. Nature had made him a soldier, and he was a statesman by intuition. Farseeing in plan, wary to win, sagacious to combine, and inflexible to execute, these qualities made him a formidable leader and also a dangerous opponent. He was not habitually ruthless or cruel in his warfare; on the contrary, many acts of mercy, of generous chivalric protection, are recorded of him that would grace the annals of the knight errantry of old. It was the name of this renowned Indian that Judge Sherman bestowed upon the new-born son. Shortly after, at a social gathering in his house, Judge Sherman was remonstrated with, half in play and half in earnest, for perpetuating in his family the savage Indian name. He only replied, but it was with seriousness, "Tecumseh was a great warrior," and the affair of the name was settled, never to be changed, even as in the case of General Grant by dictum of West Point and the War Department.

A single apt remark will sometimes reveal to the experienced and observant, a clearer view than will be produced by long and labored description. Such a remark General Sherman once made to a lady, and the story was narrated by her to a party of friends, since the General's death. She was, many years ago, visiting her intimate friends, the family of Judge Wright, in Washington, where she frequently met General Sherman and his brother, the distinguished Senator. The Wrights and the Shermans, as she learned, had been next-door neighbors in childhood, and in their childhood days both families were large. On one occasion the General, in his animated way, was describing to this young lady how the two families of children had been accustomed to constantly play with each other, there being a private gateway giving communication between the two houses. At this point the young lady remarked that she "wondered that they had not sometimes got mixed up when bedtime came."

"Oh," said the General, laughingly, in his quick, impulsive way, "we were mixed up all the time; there was a nightly swapping of bed-fellows, and neither mother could be always sure whether her boys were sleeping at home or at her neighbors."

At another time the General confided to her the interesting fact that he used to enjoy stealing Dominie Wright's Sunday stock of kindling wood, late on Saturday evening, on account of the supposed embarrassment that would result to the pious preacher on the morrow—thus giving away the secret that he had been subject to some of the weaknesses of the average boy.

Professor Howe was for many years an educator of considerable local reputation in an Iowa town. During, and subsequent to, the war he was in the habit of telling on all fitting occasions, with great pride, of his having been in former years the instructor of the Sherman children, in Lancaster, Ohio. They were, according to his story, very promising and very interesting pupils, on the whole, but very obstreperous on some occasions, before he finally succeeded in getting them under control. To get to this control he found it necessary to give the brothers a sound thrashing. They resisted; the battle was fierce and protracted, but the pedagogue came out the conqueror, though himself in a sadly dilapidated condition.

After Sherman became General of the Army, a gentleman, who had heard this story, happened to be traveling with General Sherman up the Hudson river to West Point. During the conversation with the General it occurred to him to ask the question: "General, did you ever attend the school of a certain Professor Howe?" "Sam Howe?" was the response, "Why yes, he used to lick John and me like hell."

This was regarded as confirmation of the truth of the aforesaid story. When Professor Howe died at an advanced age, a few years ago, one of his children mailed a copy of his

obituary to General Sherman, which elicited this characteristic response :

Headquarters, U. S. Army,

Washington, D. C., April 26, 1877.

Warrington Howe, Esq.:

Dear Friend—I have received your letter, with the newspaper slip containing the full and just tribute to your father, the late Samuel L. Howe. I regret extremely that in my preambulations over this great country of late years I never had the chance to meet your father, which I wanted to do. And now, though forty long, eventful years have passed since I left his school at Lancaster, Ohio, I can recall his personal appearance to mind as clearly as though it were yesterday. I have always borne willing testimony to his skill and merits as a teacher, and am sure that the thorough modes of instruction pursued by him prepared me for easy admission to West Point, and for a respectable standing in my class. I have heard from time to time of the changes that attended his useful career, and am glad to learn that he left behind the flourishing academy at Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, with children qualified to take up his work where he left off, and carry it to completion.

I beg you will convey to your mother the assurance of my great respect and sympathy in her affliction. I recall her also to memory, a young mother, living in the house of "Pap" Boyle, close by the school house built by Mr. Howe in the old orchard, and it is hard for me to realize that she is now a widow and a grandmother. I feel sure, however, that Mr. Howe left behind him hundreds and thousands that revere his memory, and will perpetuate it by deeds and virtues which his example and precepts suggested.

Truly, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

I have thus dwelt upon the youth and parentage of General Sherman, because in addition to the interest which naturally attached to that part of this great man's life, but little attention has been hitherto given to it, even in his own incomparable Memoirs.

My first knowledge of General Sherman was when I was in command of the Central Division of the Mississippi, with headquarters at Trenton, Tenn. Later my spies brought me information that I thought of importance to the command at Memphis, and General Sherman acknowledged the information

with a letter, thanking me and proposing that whatever information of the enemy either of us obtained that related to our commands, we should note it and communicate it. The letter was such a remarkable and friendly one that it greatly impressed me.

The first time I came into personal contact with General Sherman was in September, 1863. I was lying very ill at Corinth; and was Commander of that District. General Grant had ordered Sherman west from Memphis, to rebuild the road through to Decatur, with a view of aiding Rosecrans in his campaign against Bragg, or at any rate to make a demonstration upon Bragg's communications. General Sherman brought with him an open letter from General Grant to me. He came in and sat down by my bedside and read the letter, which was very complimentary to me and my command. The substance of the letter was that when General Sherman reached my command I was to take from it whatever troops could be spared, and accompany him in his movement to the East.

After Sherman read the letter from Grant, he said: "Now are you well enough to do what General Grant suggested?" I said "Yes." He said, "All right, I will give you plenty of time, and you can bring up the rear, and I will issue the orders."

Sherman was then Commander of the Fifteenth Army Corps, that was crossing the country from Memphis to Decatur. Soon after his visit to me, I sent him the substance of reports of my spies and scouts working in my front and inside the enemy's lines, and in answer, I received the following letter from him, which will show you his method of treating a subordinate who was to command one of his units:

Headquarters, Fifteenth Army Corps,
October 22d, 1863.

General G. M. Dodge, Corinth.

Dear General:—I thank you for the budget of news, which is most serviceable, as we can approximate the truth. Of

course here I am halted by Bear Creek, which is a worse place than was represented to me.

I have my three leading Divisions across Bear Creek, and all hands busy at the bridge and trestles. We have lost eight killed and about thirty-five wounded, in all. Among the dead is Colonel Torrence, Thirtieth Iowa. I think it is well established that Lee, who came from Jackson, Clinton and Canton, with about 4,000 good cavalry, is to my front with Rody's Brigade; and I think also that Wheeler's cavalry has been driven out of Tennessee, and it is now resting between here and Decatur.

If all of this Cavalry turns on me, I will have a nice time, but can't help it. And if Porter gets me up some boats to Eastport I will checkmate them. The Tennessee is in very fair boating order for four feet, and I expect daily a boat up from Cairo, also a ferry boat. I have had the river examined well and am more than satisfied we cannot ford, even on the shoals.

Of course I don't believe the report you sent of the capture of Banks and fifteen regiments. Dick Taylor was somewhere west of the river, between Alexander and Shreveport. That ground is familiar to me, and I know Dick Taylor cannot get to the east side of the Mississippi with anything like an army. After the capture of Vicksburg we relaxed our efforts and subsided. The rascals display an energy worthy a better cause, but as it is, when they come to the finish they don't fight equal to their numbers. Chalmer's dispatch is a sample. He captured the camp of the 7th Illinois, off on Hatch's expedition, and nothing else of moment. But he may again attempt the road, yet Hurlbut has plenty to checkmate him if he don't attempt to follow, but anticipates and interposes the railroad and Tallahatchee.

I propose to finish the bridge and move on Tusculumbia, but in the end may actually cross to Eastport. My orders are fully comprehended in their drawing from Rosecrans the cavalry that has heretofore bothered him.

I had a regiment at Eastport. A party crossed over who saw no one, but here the river was patrolled so as to report all movements. I will fortify this place somewhat, so that if the enemy's cavalry attempt to operate against it they will catch more than they bargain for. Corinth is too formidable a place for them to dream of an attack, but you should keep a couple of regiments disposable to take the offensive.

I am obliged to you for all information, and will impart all positive information to you. Keep me well advised from day to day of Fuller's approach. I have one Brigade at Burnsville, and three Divisions in front of Bear Creek. Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN. Major-General.

It was about October 24th, 1863, that Sherman was given command of the Army of the Tennessee, and it was the next day I received this order:

Headquarters Dept., of the Tennessee.

October 25th, 1863.

General Dodge, Corinth:

I wish you to prepare to make up the best possible Division of troops, to be taken from those now in your own Division and such others as on railroad guard duty, not belonging to any of the organized Brigades of Hurlbut's Corps. You to command it and to accompany the movement up the Valley of the Tennessee. Our object is to secure absolute footing up the Valley of the Tennessee and the river, giving us a certain supply to Eastport now, and Florence very soon. We can risk the railroad, or use it as long as we can. Is your health equal to it? Come up and see me on the subject. Yours,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

I got on a locomotive, taking a doctor with me, and visited Sherman. On the 27th of October, while I was in consultation with him, Sherman received Grant's dispatch to drop all railway repairs east of Iuka and move as rapidly as possible to Chattanooga. The plans were then formed for crossing the Tennessee, and I was able from my knowledge of the country to aid him in putting his army across.

The history of that rapid march to Chattanooga is well known. I do not propose to go into it in detail. I drew from my commands troops for two Divisions, and Sherman organized them immediately into a Corps command. As we marched along he was in the habit of writing back personal letters to each of us who commanded a unit, and telling us where he thought we would find the best means of feeding our commands, because we were living off the country, only transporting sugar, coffee, bacon and ammunition.

When he got into the Elk River country with the Fifteenth Army Corps, he wrote me back a note saying:

The Fifteenth Army Corps has cleaned up everything as they went along; you had better not follow them: I do not

think you will find a chicken in their trail, and my advice is to push further north, say towards Pulaski or Columbia, and let me know what route you take.

I changed the direction of my column towards Columbia, as he had suggested, and reported my movements.

While on this march I received the following letter:

Headquarters, Army of the Tennessee.

Bridgeport, Nov. 18th, 1863.

Dear General:

Your letter, enclosing copy of your order is received. I heartily approve your order, and think it right to make citizens earn good treatment. They can suppress guerillas—I know it, and on my threat at Florence they brought in a man captured by guerrillas at Cravelly Springs. Keep your infantry so that you can concentrate, and let your cavalry watch well down to the mouth of the Elk on both sides. Don't let the enemy draw any supplies from north of the Tennessee.

I have been up to Chattanooga. Their poor mules and horses tell the tale of horrid roads and no forage. I hate to put ours up in that mountain gorge. The two Divisions have gone forward and two more follow tomorrow. I go to Chattanooga tomorrow, and think many days cannot elapse before we bring on a fight. It is intended to act quick, as Longstreet has gone up to East Tennessee.

General Grant says that everything has been done to push the work on the Nashville & Decatur road, but work on the railroad moves slow. Write me fully and frequently, and send me all the statistical information that I may stow it away for the future. Your sketch of your route shows Pulaski a good place from which to operate. I will try and get some more cavalry from the North.

I was greatly disappointed on receiving this letter, and a letter which he enclosed me from General Grant, telling me to rebuild the railroads in Central Tennessee. I answered General Sherman from Pulaski on the 23d. The first sentence of my letter let him know how disappointed I was; it was as follows:

I am in receipt of your letter of Nov. 18th, written at Bridgeport, and if a fight comes off at Chattanooga and we are not in it, we will be sadly disappointed, but take it for granted it is for the best.

After the Battle of Chattanooga, I received the following message:

We are all right. We defeated Bragg on Missionary Ridge and our troops are pursuing. I start at once for the head of my column. Keep your troops well in hand, and I hope soon to come to you, and we will then make it all right south and west of Decatur.

After the Chattanooga campaign Sherman marched to Knoxville. As soon as Longstreet knew he was en route, he left. He suggested to Burnside that they should go after Longstreet and drive him out of Tennessee; but Burnside answered that he could take care of Longstreet, and Sherman brought back the Army of the Tennessee and scattered it from Columbia along the line of the Nashville & Decatur road, and from Athens to Bridgeport along the line of the Memphis & Charleston road, with directions to fit up our command ready for a spring campaign; remount our cavalry, replenish our teams; in fact gave us carte blanche to do everything necessary to put our commands in good condition for the campaign Grant had in view.

On December 23d, 1863, General Grant called the Corps and Army Commanders of the Army of the Tennessee to Nashville to inform them of his plans for a winter campaign, and there met Generals Sherman, Rawlins and Dodge of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Granger of the Army of the Cumberland, commanding the District of Nashville. On our arrival General Grant took us to call upon Andrew Johnson, the Military Governor of Tennessee. We found him in a fine new residence. General Grant excused our appearance by saying we had not had time to change our clothes, and after a short conversation, Governor Johnson opened up with a great tirade against the rebels and how he would treat them. He brought his fist down on the piano with such force that one could have heard it sound all over the house, and declared: "No rebel need hope for mercy from me." We left, all of

us rather disgusted, as his tirade was uncalled for, and while I was in command of Middle Tennessee I hardly ever put my hand on a rebel, taking his stock or forage, but Johnson tried to stop it and protect him.

After our return to headquarters, Sherman's first suggestion was that we should go to the theater. We were all dressed in our rough, campaigning clothes, in fact we had nothing else with us, as we had not been able to get any supplies since we left the Mississippi River. That night we went to the theater, paid our way in, and obtained seats in the front row in the balcony. The play of "Hamlet" was upon the boards. You all know what a fine Shakespearean critic Sherman was. The play was simply being butchered—to the great amusement of a theater full of soldiers, who were either coming from leave of absence or going upon one. No one in the audience seemed to recognize us, and we sat there quite a while. Sherman, who was sitting next to me, talked so loudly about the play that everybody could hear him. He said: "Dodge, that is no way to play Hamlet!" and he went on so excitedly that I said to him two or three times, "General, don't talk so loud, some of the boys will discover us, and there will be a scene." But he was so indignant at the butchery of the play that he could not keep still. During the grave-digger's scene, where Hamlet picks up the skull of Yorick and soliloquizes upon it, a soldier in the back part of the audience rose up and halloed out at the top of his voice, "Say pard, what is it, Yank or Reb?" Of course the whole house came down, and Grant said, "We had better get out of here." We left, and no one knew that the two great soldiers of the age had been listening.

General Sherman suggested we should have an oyster supper, and put General Rawlins forward to find a place. Rawlins took us to a very nice restaurant. As we entered, he saw there was only a small table vacant, but at a large table that

would seat our party was only one man; and Rawlins, without saying who we were, asked him if he would move to the small table. The man looked at him with astonishment, and said "The table was good enough for him," and Rawlins, disgusted, turned and went out, and we followed. General Sherman said if we depended on Rawlins, we would get no oysters, and hailed a policeman, who pointed out an oyster saloon in a basement, kept by a widow. We went in, seated ourselves, and Sherman ordered the oysters. It was the first time we had been together so we could talk, and we naturally entered into conversation, and time passed. When we were about half through with our meal, the widow proprietress came in and told us we must go, as the order was to close at 12 o'clock, and we, of course, complied, leaving our meal half completed. We returned to General Grant's headquarters and settled down for the night, telling the Staff our evening's experience. They gave it to the Press, and before we were up the next morning the theater manager, the restaurant proprietor, the widow, the chief of police, and others were at headquarters to make their apologies to General Grant for their lack of courtesy, pleading that they did not know who we were. They all seemed to think that they committed some act that would bring action, closing their houses, or some other punishment. But General Grant enjoyed the joke and told them we had no complaint to make—in fact had passed an interesting and jolly evening.

At a dinner given us by General Granger, the General's mother, or mother-in-law, who had known Sherman when in the army, upbraided Sherman for the pillaging and "stealing" done by Sherman's soldiers on their march to Knoxville. She pecked and pounded away until finally the General turned upon her. He said:

Madam, my soldiers have to subsist even if the whole country must be ruined to maintain them. There are two armies here; one is in rebellion against the Union, the other is fight-

ing for the Union—if either must starve to death, I propose it shall not be the army that is loyal. There is nothing too good for the soldiers who wear the blue.

After a pause he added:

War is cruelty. There is no use in trying to reform it; the crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.

This response put a cold douche on the dinner and no effort of any of us could relieve the strain. The lady said no more, for it was a great rebuke.

General Grant's plan for the winter campaign was that he would take about 30,000 men from the Chattanooga Army and go down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to New Orleans, and with General Canby's Command move upon Mobile. General Sherman was to go to Vicksburg and take the Seventeenth Corps and other troops along the Mississippi, and move from Vicksburg to Meridian and join General Grant in the rear of Mobile. I was to take my two Divisions of the Sixteenth Army Corps, with several thousand Cavalry that had been organized by General William Suey Smith in Nashville, and move south from Decatur as far as the Tombigbee River, destroying the railroads and everything that could be used by the enemy, and sweep around into Mississippi and defeat any enemy that might be in that country, especially Forrest, if there, and move back by way of West Tennessee to Middle Tennessee, virtually making it impossible for any army to occupy that country.

We returned to our commands to prepare for this campaign, but when General Grant informed the authorities in Washington of his plans, President Lincoln objected very much to his taking any forces from Chattanooga, fearing that Longstreet, who was laying in East Tennessee, might try to re-occupy that country. This caused General Grant to go to East Tennessee with a view of attacking Longstreet and driving him out before he made the southern campaign.

But when he reached Knoxville, he found General Foster, who was in command, so very much opposed to the movement on account of his lack of troops, and as he claimed that he could hold Longstreet in East Tennessee, which would be just as effective as driving him out, and the time getting short, Grant finally acquiesced in Foster's views, and returned, so that the general plan was abandoned, and only General Sherman carried out his part of it, moving out as far west of Vicksburg as Meridian, meeting no enemy, and returning.

General Grant always regretted that he did not carry out his original purpose of moving upon Longstreet and driving him out of East Tennessee.

On March 4th, 1864, General Grant received his appointment as Lieutenant-General to command all the United States armies, and repaired to Washington to receive his commission. On his return from Washington we were all called to Nashville to meet him, and General Grant outlined his plans for our coming campaign. Grant was desirous of taking some of the officers, who had served with him in the West, to the eastern army. Sherman protested, desiring to have his army left intact, but Sheridan finally was selected and taken, against his protest, all the rest being left. Sherman went with Grant as far east as Cincinnati. During the reunion of the Army of the Tennessee at Cincinnati, in 1889, at the banquet in the Burnett House, Sherman pointed out to me the room where Grant and he sat down with their maps and came to their agreement as to the general movement that was to be made in Grant's campaign in May, 1864, which was to close the war. The agreement, as Sherman stated it to me, was for each to take care of the enemy in his part of the country, and Grant was to move all of the armies at once. Both agreed that they would each hold the enemy in their front; that although the rebels had the interior lines it would be the duty of each to prevent the movement of any of the enemy's forces from the front of one to the

other; and we all know how well they accomplished their purpose.

Grant said to Sherman: .

If Lee sends any of his troops to your front, I will send you twice as many men as he sends Johnston.

And during the campaign Sherman often said:

We must press Johnston so that under no circumstances can they detach a Corps or any part of their command to reinforce Lee.

After the Battle of Chattanooga the Government had been issuing and selling rations to the citizens of Tennessee. When General Sherman prepared for his Atlanta campaign he knew that its success depended upon his ability to feed his men and animals, and he therefore issued Order No. 8, stopping this issue to citizens. In a few days he received this dispatch from President Lincoln, dated May 4, 1864:

I have an imploring appeal from the citizens, who say your order, No. 8, will compel them to go north to Nashville. This is in no sense an order, nor is it even a request that you will do anything which in the least shall be a drawback upon your military operations, but anything you can do consistently with the appeals of these suffering people I should be glad of.

On May 5th, General Sherman sent an answer characteristic of the man and General:

A. Lincoln, President:

We have worked hard with the best talent of the country, and it is demonstrated that the railroad cannot supply the army and the people, too—one of them must quit—and the army does not intend to unless Joe Johnston makes us. The issues to citizens have been enormous, and the same weight of corn and oats would have saved thousands of mules whose carcasses now corduroy the roads, and which we need so much in war. I will not change my order, and I beg of you to be satisfied that the clamor is partly humbug and for effect. I advise you to tell the bearers of appeals to hurry to Kentucky and make up a column of cattle and wagons and go over the

mountains on foot by Cumberland Gap and Somerset to relieve their suffering friends, as they used to before the railroad was built. Tell them they have no time to lose. We can relieve all actual suffering by each company and regiment giving their savings. Every man who is willing to fight and work gets full rations, and all who will not fight and work we offer them free passage in the cars.

In April, 1864, the first intimations were sent, confidentially to the Corps Commanders, for the concentration of our forces and the movement of our troops. During my command in Middle Tennessee I had raised several regiments of colored troops, with General Sherman's approval, although he was criticised very severely for taking no colored troops with him. His answer to me on that criticism was:

I propose to leave the colored troops to occupy our lines of communication, where they can have the protection of entrenchments, and a chance to drill; and I do not propose in this campaign that the rebels shall say that for me to whip them it was necessary to take part of their niggers to do it.

So, in April, when he sent his orders, I wrote him that I proposed to take every white soldier on my line with me, and he, without answering my letter, sent me an order to go forward with my forces, but to leave one white Brigade (naming its commander) at Decatur; and in pursuance to these commands I commenced marching towards Chattanooga. When I was about half way there, I received a note from General McPherson telling me to put my forces upon the cars and with my ammunition reach Chattanooga before the 5th of May, leaving my trains and artillery to follow by wagon road. We arrived there on the morning of the 5th without tents or rations, and I immediately found our army commander, General McPherson, who was waiting for us. I remember that at the breakfast table at the hotel I was greatly surprised to find the knives and forks chained to the table, and concluded that the reputation of Sherman's "bummers" had preceded us.

Sherman had evidently held consultation with the army commanders before I arrived, because he said to McPherson: "I think I had better read Dodge these dispatches." And then he sat down and read those celebrated dispatches that passed between Grant and himself from May 1st to May 5th, which have all been published. When he had finished he said, "Now Dodge, you see what you have to do. Where are your troops?" I said, "They are unloading." He said to McPherson: "I think you had better send Dodge to Ship's Gap tonight." McPherson said: "Why General, that is thirty miles away." Sherman said, "No matter, let him try it." I asked for a guide, and McPherson said if they could find one they would send him to me. Sherman gave me a map with the road and gap, known as Ship's Gap, in the first range of mountains, marked, that I was to capture, and that night about midnight General Sprague, commanding a Brigade of Veatch's 4th Division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, reached the summit of the gap, and made the first opening through that range of mountains. This enabled us to pass through Snake Creek Gap before the enemy discovered the movement to their rear. To my own surprise and to the surprise of everybody else, we pushed through that long narrow gorge before midnight of the 8th, one day ahead of the time fixed, where one regiment of cavalry properly posted could have held us and forced a battle. Johnston's troops did not attack us until the morning of the 9th, so that the first plans of Sherman, as he has said to me, were so successful and so satisfactory that he thought the Army of the Tennessee should have planted itself across the railroad near Resaca in the rear of Johnston, which would have forced him to abandon his trains and fight us, or make a long detour to the east. That question had been fought over in the papers, and by the different officers, but Sherman, up to the time of his death, always felt and claimed that if the fifteen thousand men we had with us had been planted and

entrenched squarely in front of Resaca, it would have broken up Johnston's army.

I was too young an officer then to discuss these matters, but simply obeyed my orders, and I do not propose at this time to criticise the actions of General McPherson, or to pass judgment upon the opinion of Sherman, because it can do no good. There is no question that there never was a braver or more loved and trusted General in our Army than McPherson, and if he made a mistake, there is no person in or out of the army that does not know that he made it in the interest of what he considered to be his duty, and I claim that no one can now criticise him for it, for Sherman, after it was all over, never did. Our rapid movement surprised Johnston, and accomplished the principal object of the movement to his rear, forcing him out of his impregnable position at Dalton, and driving him south of the Ostanaula River.

During the march from Chattanooga to Atlanta we were very short of all kinds of provisions, canned fruits, vegetables, etc. We lived off bread, beans and bacon. I had been suffering during the whole of the campaign, was run down a good deal physically, and thought if I could get a change of food it would help keep me up. I went over to General Sherman's headquarters and asked him to allow me to send by Lieutenant Bailey (who had been detailed from my command in charge of the mails running from Nashville to the front), to bring me down some dried fruits and vegetables. I told Sherman that I was running down; that I had a very bad wound in the side, and it seemed impossible to keep it from sapping away my strength. Sherman looked at me and said: "Dodge, all you want is some good whiskey," and took me to his tent. Good or bad whiskey just then was entirely different to me from what it is now, but, of course, I submitted. I urged my necessity upon the General, but he said it was impossible to allow me to bring forward anything; that if he did it for one

he would have to do it for others; and I went away greatly disappointed, which Sherman saw. There was no way to get anything without his permission. It was not more than a day or so after that that Colonel Dayton, his adjutant, happened to be at my headquarters, and asked one of the staff officers if I had sent to Nashville for anything. The staff officer informed him that I had applied and could not get permission, and that under the circumstances I would not send. Dayton told the staff officer if they could get it through by Bailey to do so, that General Sherman, he knew, would not object, but, says he, "You don't want to say anything to Dodge," and the first thing I knew there came to my headquarters a box of supplies. It was a long time afterwards before I knew how they had been brought there. It is the only case in my experience where Sherman relaxed one of his orders.

The history of the Atlanta campaign has been written; nothing I can say about it can add to or take from it. It is the unwritten instances that I propose to talk about. I had a Corps command all the way from Corinth, Miss., to Marietta, Ga., with only the rank of a Brigadier-General. Probably there was never a greater effort made by Grant and Sherman to give me a rank suitable to my command, and avoid unpleasant complications, than as we marched down to Kenesaw. I was in command of that portion in the field of the Sixteenth Army Corps of the Army of the Tennessee, with officers of much higher rank holding lesser commands. This brought upon me many remarks that my staff would hear and repeat to me, and was annoying and made me uncomfortable. I sat down and wrote to General Sherman, explaining to him fully, that these criticisms had come to me, and that they made me feel very uncomfortable, that my staff were always talking about it; rumor stating that this and that officer was going to relieve me, and I said to Sherman that I thought he had bet-

ter give me a command better fitted to my rank, and relieve me and him. He put this endorsement upon the paper:

Suppose you wait until someone that has a right to complain does so; and go ahead and do your duty, and not trouble yourself about other's business.

W. T. SHERMAN.

He did not even sign it officially. He never referred to it during the war, but afterwards poked a good deal of fun at me for my foolish action. He soon after sent me a telegraphic dispatch that came from the President, telling him that he had relieved him from his difficulties about Dodge. My commission reached me, and I donned my two stars.

Sherman always sustained his officers who assumed great authority in an emergency, although they might be wrong. As an instance I give you the following:

Before General Sherman crossed the Chattahoochee for his attack upon Atlanta, his army was stretched from Soap Creek to Sandtown Ferry, facing the river. My Corps, the 16th, was upon the extreme right, and I thought the crossing was to be by the right flank, as it was so much nearer to Atlanta, and my orders were to seize all ferry boats and other means of crossing. General Sherman came to my headquarters, took out his map, and asked how long it would take me to construct a bridge across the river at Roswell, some thirty miles away beyond our extreme left, telling me it was rock bottom and could be forded, and that there was a road bridge at that point which the Confederates had destroyed. I supposed I would have to go into the woods and cut timber, and told him it would require at least a week. He had not been gone more than an hour when I received orders from General McPherson to move to Roswell, and that General Sherman would communicate directly with me. The march was a hot, dusty one, in the rear of the army, but I did not halt, except for our meals, and an occasional hour's rest. I received at

Marietta a dispatch from Sherman urging me to get there as soon as possible.

On arriving, I immediately put a Brigade across the river, and it was as fine a sight as I ever saw when Fuller's Ohio Brigade, in line of battle, forded the river. The enemy's cavalry held the other side. As they moved across, holding their guns and cartridge boxes high above their heads, the bands of the Corps struck up a lively tune. The rebels poured in a heavy fire, but it was too high. Now and then a boy would step into a hole and disappear for a moment, but all got across and immediately sought shelter under the steep-cut bank, where Fuller reformed and made his charge, clearing out the enemy in short order, and built a strong tete de pont.

Roswell had cotton and woolen factories that had been running up to the time that General Garrard's cavalry captured them, and burned most of the factories. The operatives were mostly women, and these Garrard moved to Marietta by detaching a regiment of cavalry, each member of which took one of the operatives on his horse, and in this way they were all taken into Marietta, and were sent north by Sherman. Over the proprietor's house was flying a French flag. I saw immediately that if I utilized the balance of the buildings I could erect the bridge in half the time, and instructed Captain Armstrong, who had charge of the 1,500 men detailed to build the bridge, to tear down the buildings which were left from Garrard's fire, and utilize them. The next morning some of my officers, who were better lawyers than I was, told me that the proprietor was making a strong protest, and that I was liable to get into trouble on account of violation of international law. Although I was using the material, I thought it best to write General Sherman a letter, stating what I had done, and what the claims were, at the same time notifying him that by using this material I would have the bridge completed by Wednesday. I arrived there by noon on Monday.

the 10th of July. Sherman answered in the following characteristic letter :

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field Near Chattahoochee River,
July 11, 1864.

General Dodge, Roswell, Ga. :

I know you have a big job, but that is nothing new for you. Tell General Newton that his Corps is now up near General Schofield's Crossing, and all is quiet thereabout. He might send down and move his camps to proximity of his Corps, but I think Roswell and Shallow Ford so important that I prefer him to be near you until you are well fortified. If he needs rations tell him to get his wagons up, and I think you will be able to spare him day after tomorrow. I know the bridge at Roswell is important, and you may destroy all Georgia to make it good and strong.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.

You will perceive it is very diplomatic ; he says nothing in relation to international law, or the French flag, but ends his letter by telling me that I may destroy all Georgia to accomplish what I am sent to do. Of course I read between the lines, and paid no further attention to the French flag. After the war great claims were made, and we were censured by the Government, which I have no doubt paid roundly for the factories.

On July 12, just three days after I arrived there, I notified General Sherman that the bridge was completed, and the army commenced crossing on the final movement to Atlanta. Sherman was greatly surprised, as it had been represented to him, by officers he had sent there, that it would require a much longer time to erect the bridge.

My official report read as follows :

A foot bridge 710 feet long was thrown across the river, and from Monday noon, July 10, until Wednesday night, July 12, a good substantial, double track, trestle road bridge, 710 feet long and 14 feet high, was built by the pioneer Corps from the command.

As the Fifteenth, Logan's Corps, was crossing the bridge, there came up a terrible thunder storm, and several of the men were knocked down while on the bridge, and a bolt struck in the midst of Murray's regular battery of the Sixteenth Corps, which was holding the bridge head across the river, killing and wounding several men. Naturally the superstition of the soldiers was aroused and all kinds of misfortunes were predicted, and sure enough in the next engagement, on the 22d of July, at the Battle of Atlanta, the battery was captured, while going from Blair's front to mine, by the same skirmish line of Cleburne's Division that killed McPherson on the road leading from my right to Blair's left. In fact, he fell right at the foot of one of the guns that had been captured.

The moment our army crossed the bridge our movement upon Atlanta began. It was the 19th or 20th of July when one of the spies, a boy of the Second Iowa Infantry, whom I had sent into the enemy's lines long before, came out to my lines and brought the morning paper and the news of the change of commanders from General Johnston to General Hood. I took him over to the road upon which Sherman was marching. He was with General Schofield's column. Sherman and Schofield, and someone else whom I cannot remember, discussed the news, and I remember distinctly Schofield giving his opinion of Hood—that it meant fight. While I stood there listening and watching, General Sherman sat down upon a stump and issued his orders, that concentrated his armies and brought McPherson from Stone Mountain, some twenty miles away, and closed us all in on Thomas, showing he fully comprehended the situation. Soon after, Hood, with his army attacked Thomas, intending to double him up from right to left, knowing how greatly extended Sherman's forces were.

After the battle of the 20th, we closed in around Atlanta. The concentration of the lines threw the Sixteenth Army Corps in reserve, and a Brigade of it was sent to the left of the

army and encamped behind the Seventeenth Corps, and another Brigade, Sprague's, was left at Decatur to protect the trains. That night there was a belief that Hood would evacuate Atlanta; in the morning it was reported that he had done so, in fact I received from the extreme left where one of my Brigades lay, reports to that effect from General Fuller. Later in the morning McPherson came to see me, as he was in the habit of doing; if there was any movement on hand he would come and tell us what he expected, and if not, he would have a kind, encouraging word for us, or a compliment for what had been done the day before. He was a man who issued very few orders on the field, and in this respect he was a good deal like Grant, who pointed out what was to be done and expected you, as Commander, to do it without entering into details, but left us at liberty to do whatever was considered best in the changes of the fight or the movements of the troops, expecting us to accomplish what he had told us was his objective point. McPherson was the same way, and when a movement was on hand, or when the army lay in front of the enemy, McPherson was in the habit of coming round, sitting down, talking matters over, and finally getting up to the point without giving an order, simply giving us the benefit of his great experience. I know he came to me in this way frequently, because I was a young officer and likely, perhaps, to go wrong quicker than those who were veterans in the service.

McPherson, that morning, came to my headquarters and ordered me to move out to the left of Blair's Seventeenth Army Corps, and when they moved to their new position, that he was that day intrenching, I was to join him and stretch as far to the left as possible, and if I saw a chance, was to grab and hold the Macon road. It seemed Sherman had intended to use my Corps for a different purpose, and had ordered McPherson to assign the Sixteenth Corps to the breaking up of the railroads east, towards, and beyond Decatur, but this order I did not know

anything about, nor did it reach me. McPherson received the orders after giving me my orders, and did not send them to me, and it was while pursuing McPherson's orders to move to the left that, at 12 o'clock on the 22d, nearly all of Hood's army got to our rear and made that terrible attack upon us, and, after fighting from noon until midnight was defeated at all points.

There is probably nothing in all Sherman's military career that he criticised more severely, to himself and to his confidential friends, than the fact that when this great battle was going on at the left, where thousands of men were being mowed down, where the roar of musketry lasted from 12:00 noon until midnight, he did not force the Army of the Cumberland and Ohio, over 50,000 strong, which stood intact that day, not firing a gun, into Atlanta and take it, for there was nothing in Atlanta except Georgia militia and teamsters. Sherman's statement is that he requested General Thomas to attack Atlanta, and if possible go into it. He told him a great battle was going on to the left, because it is well known to everyone in an army that one wing, when the wind is in the opposite direction, may fight a great battle, while the other wing, miles away, could only know of it by rumor. Thomas felt the enemy, and seeing the works held by the militia, answered that Hood's army was in Atlanta, that the works were fully manned, and it was not possible for it to be successfully attacked in his front. So all day long that little Army of the Tennessee, that was never known to give back an inch, fought and struggled and held its own against double numbers, thinking and believing that morning would show Atlanta theirs, for they knew that the whole of Hood's army was upon them.

At 2 o'clock in the day McPherson fell. I had no knowledge of his death, although he was killed near my line, until I received word from General Fuller, whom I had instructed

to change front to his right and clean out the enemy between him and the Seventeenth Corps, that he had captured the skirmish line of the enemy and taken from them General McPherson's field glasses and orders of Sherman to McPherson. The first news I received was that McPherson had been wounded, not killed, and it was 4 o'clock in the afternoon when Logan came to me asking for help to retake the line on the Augusta road, where the enemy had broken through and captured DeGresse's battery; I gave him Mersey's Brigade, but even then he did not tell me he was in command of the army. He came to me as we were in the habit of doing—Logan, Blair and myself—when one was hard pushed and the other was not, we sent troops without orders where they were most needed.

After the day's fight was over, and at 10 o'clock at night, Logan called Blair and myself to meet him, Logan then being in command of the army; we met in the rear of the Fifteenth Corps, under an oak tree on the line of the Augusta railroad, and discussed the results of the day. The fighting on Blair's right and Logan's left at Bald Hill was still progressing. We only knew then that we had held the enemy, and did not know how much we had punished them.

Blair's men were in the trenches in some places on his front, the enemy held one side and he the other. The men of the Fifteenth Corps were still in their own line, tired and hungry, but those of the Sixteenth Corps, after their hard day's work, were busy throwing up intrenchments on the field they had held and won. At Logan's request I sent Mersey's Brigade to relieve Blair's men at the critical point on Bald Hill.

Logan and Blair thought that the Army of the Cumberland or the Army of the Ohio should send a portion of the forces and relieve some of our exhausted men, and I was sent to see Sherman. My recollection now is that I met him in a

tent, though it is said officially that he had his headquarters at the Howard House. When I met him he seemed surprised to see me, but greeted me cordially and spoke of the great loss of McPherson. I stated to him my errand. He turned upon me and said: "Dodge, you whipped them today didn't you?" I said, "Yes sir." Then he said, "Can't you do it again tomorrow?" and I said, "Yes sir." I bade him good night and went back to my command, resolving never again to be sent on such an errand. Sherman explained to me afterwards that he knew what orders he had given to press Atlanta, and hold the forces in the intrenchments surrounding it, and he wanted it said that the little Army of the Tennessee had fought the great battle without any help, and he knew from the punishment that the rebel army had received that Hood would not dare to attack us in the morning.

There is no doubt but that, when I saw Sherman that night, he had ascertained the facts from the reports of the different commanders that Atlanta was without organized force, and that rather than reinforce the little Army of the Tennessee, he wished to impress the fact that he was responsible for not taking Atlanta, and did not propose to relieve himself of any criticism. He has since said to us, in his own quiet way, that he thought we ought to have taken Atlanta that day, but I have never heard him make any criticisms, or make any claim that any officer was to blame for not doing it, except himself; while they who watched and were a part of that great battle seemed to think that Thomas with 50,000 veterans ought to have poured into Atlanta while McPherson and Logan with only 20,000 men met and defeated one of the best planned and best executed attacks to the left, rear and front made in that campaign.

General Schofield, who commanded the Army of the Ohio, who was with General Sherman at the time of the attack of Stewart's Corps along the Augusta road, suggested to Sher-

man to throw his Corps behind and on the flank of Stewart, thus breaking Stewart's communication with the intrenchments of Atlanta, but Sherman for some reason did not approve of it.

The loss of General McPherson was greatly lamented by the entire army. He had endeared himself to the Army of the Tennessee, and General Sherman spoke his sentiments in this dispatch:

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field Near Atlanta, Georgia,
July 23d, 1864.

General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General United States Army,
Washington, D. C.

General:—It is my painful duty to report that Major-General James B. McPherson, United States Army, Major-General of Volunteers and commander of the Army of the Tennessee, was killed by a shot from an ambuscade about noon of yesterday. At the time of the fatal shot he was on horseback, placing his troops in position near the city of Atlanta, and was passing across a road from a moving column towards the flank of troops that had already been established on the line. He had quitted me but a few moments before, and was on his way to see in person to the execution of my orders. About the time of this sad event the enemy had rallied from his intrenchments of Atlanta, and, by a circuit, got to the left and rear of this very line and had begun an attack which resulted in a serious battle, so that General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant and heroic gentleman should wish. Not his loss, but the country's, and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by his merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the Nation had called into existence to vindicate her honor and integrity. History tells of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even the men who directed the fatal shot, never spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect. Those whom he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth. I feel assured that every patriot in America on hearing this sad news will feel a sense of personal loss, and

the country generally will realize that we have lost not only an able military leader, but a man who, had he survived, was qualified to heal the national strife which has been raised by designing and ambitious men. His body has been sent north in charge of Major Willard, Captains Steele and Gile, his personal staff.

I am with respect,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.

From this dispatch, it shows that General Sherman did not have proper knowledge of the attack of Hood's army in our rear, in which McPherson was killed. My Corps had been fighting desperately for nearly two hours, and McPherson had been watching them, and when he saw me defeat three desperate charges of the enemy on my lines, and hold them against the enemy's attack, who had a force three times mine, General McPherson left me to go to Blair, who was also in a desperate fight on his front and left rear, and was killed.

Rev. Thomas B. Sherman, in speaking to the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, paid a fine tribute to the fighting of the Sixteenth Army Corps on this day, and said in part:

How fortunate for the Army of the Tennessee that Dodge's Corps, the Sixteenth, lies in our rear; how more than providential that Dodge is a man rather than a theorist. Instantly he apprehends the deadly peril. Swiftly he readjusts his Corps, facing the enemy. Cutting all red tape, he is a colonel, brigadier, and division commander all in one. While Hardee's Corps moves out of the Chaparral and up against us in dread array of battle line, with good artillery support thundering before them, without waiting to let the enemy have the plan of attack and the momentum of surprise, charge is met by counter-charge; our cannon bay in answer to their thunder, our banners bend forward, our lines advance. Dodge is everywhere, dashing up and down his lines, lending his own sturdy spirit to every soldier in his Corps and the day is saved—in our rear, surprise and disaster are changed to victory! Again and again the brave Confederates madly charge. Again and again we meet them breast to breast and dash them back discomfited.

Sir, your presence here tonight may not save you from the much-deserved honor of this poor tribute to those splendid

qualities, for which the Army of the Tennessee holds you in eternal honor. In the name of the most gallant army, and in the name of my loved and honored father, I thank you, sir, for saving the fate of our National army at the famous Battle of Atlanta.

After the battle of the 22d we swung from the left to the right, and it fell to my lot to hold the lines while the rest of the army drew out. I heard of the change of the commander of the Army of the Tennessee—from General Logan to General Howard. I did not know the reasons, but felt that the little army that had served under Grant, Sherman, McPherson and Logan, and had fought a battle all day, part of the time by itself, without a commander, and had whipped the whole of Hood's army, had certainly left in it material enough to command itself. I had never met General Howard, and while I knew him to be an experienced and good soldier, it made no difference in my feelings; and I think after Howard commanded that army and placed it in battle, felt its pulse and saw what it was, he felt just as we did. On the march from the left to the extreme right I saw General Sherman at a log house. General Logan was sitting on the porch: he hardly recognized me as I walked in, and I saw a great change in him. I asked General Sherman what the change in command meant—why Logan was not left in command. As everyone knows, Logan's independence and criticisms in the army were very severe, but they all knew what he was in a fight, and whenever we sent to Logan for aid he would not only send his forces, but come himself, so, as Blair said, we only knew Logan as we saw him in battle.

Logan could hear every word that was said between Sherman and myself. Sherman did not feel at liberty to say anything in explanation of this change. He simply put me off very firmly but nicely as he could, and spoke highly of General Howard, who had been given the command. I went away from the place without any satisfaction, and when I met

Logan on the outside I expressed to him my regrets, and I said to him: "There is something here that none of us understand." Logan said: "It makes no difference; it will all come right in the end."

The first meeting I had with General Howard was on that morning, and I wish to say that while I remained with him, and ever since the war, there has been no one that was kinder to me, or who has said kinder things. I am sorry it was not my fortune to have been able to follow him through to Washington.

At the close of the war when General Sherman came to St. Louis, he explained to me the reason he did not give the command of the Army of the Tennessee to General Logan. He said he consulted General Thomas and told him that General Logan was entitled to the command, but Thomas objected very decidedly, and Sherman said to him: "That it placed him in a very difficult position." Thomas said, "If he gave Logan the command he should feel like asking to be relieved." Sherman said, "Why, Thomas, you would not do that!" And Thomas answered, "No, I should not, but I feel that the army commanders should be on friendly terms, and Logan and I could not." Sherman answered, "It would be very embarrassing for me to ignore Logan." Thomas then said, "Let the President name the commander." Sherman replied, "No, it is his duty, and I will perform it." Sherman said under the circumstances, he felt it was to the best interest of his army, on account of General Thomas' strong protest, to select a commander outside of our army, and he discussed with Thomas who should be selected. General Hooker was the senior officer, but both of them said he would not do; and General Sherman said he selected Howard as he had pleased him very much in his action under him at Chattanooga, and in the efficiency he showed in their march to Knoxville to relieve Burnside. Howard was in command of the Fourteenth Corps, and had seen

long and important service in the East. And so Major-General Howard was given the command of the Army of the Tennessee. This caused a protest from General Hooker, and he, at his own request, was relieved from further service in Sherman's army.

After the war, General Sherman and General Logan, both being friends of mine, I then endeavored to bring about a settlement of the difficulties between them. Knowing the real reason why Sherman didn't put Logan in command of the army, I felt that he should make such reason known to Logan, and see if it would not make a difference in their feelings in the matter.

It was a great disappointment to Logan, of course, and to all the Army of the Tennessee, that he didn't take command. My correspondence with Logan and Sherman did not seem to result in any settlement, though both of them expressed high opinions of each other.

It was a great satisfaction to me that Sherman brought the conciliation about himself, and on December 28th, 1886, General Sherman, in a letter to Whitelaw Read, editor of the New York Tribune, set forth fully the circumstances of that conciliation as follows:

At a banquet in February, 1883, in Washington, at which General Logan and General Sherman were present, General Logan paid this fine tribute to General Sherman:

They were ready in the storm and in the sunlight; they were ready in the darkness or daylight; when orders came they marched, they moved, they fought; whether their guns were of the best quality or not; whether their clothing was adapted to their condition or not; whether their food was all they would have asked or not—was not the question with these men. The question was, "Where does Sherman want us to go, and when must we move?" Sir, these men marched with him through valleys, over hills and mountains, across rivers, and over marshes, and the only question asked in all these campaigns was, "Where is the enemy?" There were no ques-

tions of numbers or time. And for General Sherman, I will say, there was not a soldier who bore the American flag, or followed it; not a soldier who carried the musket or drew a sabre, who did not respect him as his commander. There was not one, sir, but would have drawn his sword at any time to have preserved his life. There is not one today, no matter what may be said, that would dim in the slightest degree the lustre of that bright name, achieved by ability, by integrity, and by true bravery as an officer. And in conclusion, let me say this: While that army, when it was disbanded, was absorbed in community like raindrops in the sand—all citizens in the twinkling of an eye—and back to their professions, and their business, there is not one of these men, scattered as they are, from ocean to ocean, who does not honor the name of the man who led them to triumph through the enemy's land. Wherever he may go, wherever he may be, whatever may be his condition in life, there is not one who would not stretch out a helping hand to that brave commander who led them to glory. Speaking for that army, if I may be permitted to speak for it, I have to say, "May the choicest blessings that God showers upon the heads of men go with him along down through his life." It is the prayer of every soldier who served under him.

General Sherman went immediately over to General Logan and thanked him most cordially, and wrote him this letter:

Washington, D. C., Sunday, Feb. 11, 1883.

General John A. Logan, U. S. Senate,

Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

This is a rainy Sunday, a good day to clear up old scores, and I hope you will receive what I propose to write in the same friendly spirit in which I offer it.

I was very much touched by the kind and most complimentary terms in which you spoke of me personally at the recent Corkhill banquet, on the anniversary of my sixty-third birthday, and have since learned that you still feel a wish that I should somewhat qualify the language I used in my *Memoirs*, Volume 2, pages 85 and 86, giving the reasons why General O. O. Howard was recommended by me to succeed McPherson in the command of the Army of the Tennessee, when by the ordinary rules of the service, the choice should have fallen to you. I confess frankly that my ardent wish is to retire from the command of the army with the kind and respectful feelings of all men, especially of all those who were with me in

the days of the Civil War, which must give to me and to my family a chief claim of the gratitude of the people of the United States.

I confess that I have tortured and twisted the words used on the pages referred to, so as to contain my meaning better without offending you, but so far without success. I honestly believe that no man today holds in higher honor than myself the conduct and action of John A. Logan from the hour when he realized that the South meant war. Prior to the war all men had doubts, but the moment Fort Sumpter was fired on from batteries in Charleston these doubts disappeared as a fog, and from that hour thenceforth your course was manly, patriotic and sublime. Throughout the whole war I know of no single man's career more complete than yours.

Now as to the specific matter of this letter. I left Vicksburg in the fall of 1863, by order of General Grant in person, with three Divisions of my own Corps (15th) and two of Dodge's (16th), to hasten to the assistance of the Army of the Cumberland (General Rosecrans commanding), which, according to the then belief had been worsted at Chicamaugua. Blair was with me, you were not. We marched through mud and water four hundred miles from Memphis, and you joined me on the march with an order to succeed me in the command of the 15th Corps, a Presidential appointment, which Blair had exercised temporarily. Blair was at that time a member of Congress, and was afterwards named to command the 17th Corps, and actually remained so long in Washington that we got to Big Shanty before he overtook us. Again, after the Battle of Missionary Ridge and Knoxville, when Howard served with me, I went back to Vicksburg and Meridian, leaving you in command of the 15th Corps along the railroad from Stevenson to Decatur. I was gone three months, and when I got back you complained to me bitterly against General G. H. Thomas—that he claimed for the Army of the Cumberland everything, and denied the Army of the Tennessee any use of the railroads. I sustained you, and put all Army and Corps commanders on an equal footing, making their orders and railroad requisitions of equal force on the depot officers and railroad officials in Nashville. Thomas was extremely sensitive on the point, and as you well know had much feeling against you personally, which he did not conceal. You also went to Illinois more than once to make speeches, and you were also absent after the capture of Atlanta and at the time we started for Savannah, and you did not join us until we had reached there.

Now I have never questioned the right or propriety of you and Blair holding fast to your constituents by the usual

methods; it was natural and right, but it did trouble me to have my Corps commander serving two distinct causes, one military, and the other civil or political, and this did influence me when I was forced to make choice of an army commander to succeed McPherson. This is all I record in my Memoirs; it was so and I cannot amend them. Never in speech, writing or record, surely not in the Memoirs, do I recall applying to you and Blair, for I always speak of you together, the term of "political generals." If there be such an expression I cannot find it now, nor can I recall its use. The only place wherein "politics" occur is in the place I have referred to, and whereon I explain my own motive and reason for nominating Howard over you and Blair for the vacant post. My reason may have been bad, nevertheless it was the reason which decided me then, and as a man of honor I was bound to record it. At this time, 1883, Thomas being dead, I cannot say more than is in the text, viz: That he took strong ground against you, and I was naturally strongly influenced by his outspoken opinion. Still, I will not throw off on him, but state to you frankly that I then believed the advice I gave Mr. Lincoln was the best practicable. General Howard had been with me up to Knoxville and had displayed a zeal and ability which then elicited my hearty approbation, and as I trusted in a measure to skillful maneuvers rather than to downright hard fighting, I recommended him. My Memoirs were designed to give the impressions of the hour, and not to pass judgment on the qualities of men as exemplified in after life.

If you will point out to me a page or line where I can better portray your fighting qualities, your personal courage, and magnificent example in actual combat, I will be most happy to add to or correct the "Memoirs," but when I attempt to explain my own motives or reasons you surely will be the first man to see that outside influence will fail.

My course is run, and for better or worse I cannot amend it, but if ever in your future you want a witness to your intense zeal and patriotism, your heroic personal qualities, you may safely call on me as long as I live. I surely have watched with pride and interest your career in the United States Senate, and will be your advocate if you aim at higher honors. I assert with emphasis that I never styled you or Blair "political generals," and if I used the word "politics" in an offensive way, it was to explain my own motives for action, and not as descriptive.

Wishing you all honor and happiness on this earth, I am as always your friend.

W. T. SHERMAN.

General Logan answered this letter immediately, as follows:

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.,
Sunday, February 18th, 1883.

General W. T. Sherman.

My Dear Sir:—I have delayed acknowledging your letter of the 11th inst. up to this time for the reason that I have been so much engaged every moment of the time that I could not sooner do so; for your expression of kindly feeling toward me, I tender my grateful acknowledgments.

I am inclined, however, my dear general, to the opinion that had you fully understood the situation in which I was placed at the times mentioned by you, that I returned North from the army for the purpose of taking part in the political contests then going on, that perhaps your criticisms on my then course would not have been made. I did not do it for the purpose of "keeping a hold on my people." I refused a nomination in my own state, for a very high position, for the reason that I would not have anything to do with parties while the war should last. In 1863 when I went home to canvass in Illinois, and to help in Ohio, General Grant was fully advised, and knows that although I had to make application for leave of absence, I did not do it of my own volition, but at the request of those high in authority. So when I left on leave, after the Atlanta campaign, for Mr. Lincoln, I did it at the special and private request of the then President. This I kept to myself, and have never made it public, nor do I propose to do so now, but feel that I may in confidence say this to you, that you may see what prompted my action in the premises. I have borne for this reason whatever I may have suffered by way of criticism, rather than turn criticism on the dead.

So far as General Thomas having feeling in the matter you mentioned, I presume he entertained the same feeling that seemed to be general—that no one without a military education was to be trusted to command an army; this I think was the feeling then, and is now, and will ever be. I find no fault with it; this, as a rule, is probably correct. but the experience of the world has occasionally found exceptions to this rule. I certainly never gave General Thomas any occasion to have strong feelings against me. I did complain that I was not on an equality with him while I commanded between Decatur and Stevenson; that my passes on the roads were not recognized, and I have General Thomas' letter afterward, admitting the fact and apologizing to me for the conduct of his officers in this matter. I, at all times, co-operated with him cordially and promptly during my stay at Huntsville and at all other

times subsequent. Certainly I did for him afterward what few men would have done. When ordered to Nashville, with a view of superseding him, at Louisville I found the situation of matters and I wrote and telegraphed Grant that he, Thomas, was doing all he could, and asked to be ordered back to my own command, which was done. This I say to show my kind feeling for him and to say that if I ever did anything to cause him to complain of me I was not aware of it.

One thing, my dear general, that I feel conscious of, and that is that no man ever obeyed your orders more promptly, and but few ever did you more faithful service in carrying out your plans and military movements than myself.

I may have done yourself and myself an injustice by not disclosing to you the cause of my returning North at the time I did, but now you have the reasons for it. I felt in honor that I could rest.

This letter is intended only for full explanation, and for yourself only. I do not feel aggrieved as you think, but will ever remain your friend.

Yours truly,

JOHN A. LOGAN.

I now with reverence for his memory, admiration for his heroism in battle, and love for the man, hereby ratify and confirm every word of his letter of February 18th, 1883.

I was fully conscious that General Logan felt deeply what he believed at the time a great wrong to himself, and that he yet continued with unabated ardor, zeal and strength to fight to the end for the cause we both held sacred. For the twenty-one years since the war has ended, we have been closely associated in many army societies, which treasure the memories of the war, have shared the same banquets and spoken to the same audiences. Only recently at San Francisco, Seattle, and Rock Island, we were together, each a rival to give pleasure and do honor to the other, and still later, within the past month, he was at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, his rooms next to mine, and not a night passed but we were together discussing old or new events. Both of us were men of strong opinions, sometimes of hasty expression, yet ever maintaining the friendship which two soldiers should bear to each other. Most undoubtedly did I expect him to survive me, and I have always expressed a wish that he, the then strongest type of the volunteer soldier alive, might become the President of the United States.

It is ordered otherwise, but as it is, he has left to his family a name and fame which could have been little increased had

he lived to attain the office for which so many good men contend, in spite of the experience of the past.

When the Society of the Army of the Tennessee holds its next meeting in Detroit, next September, if living, I may have more to say on this subject.

Your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN.

The following are the passages from his Memoirs, referred to by General Sherman :

Memoirs of General William T. Sherman. Vol. II, pages 85 and 86 :

But it first became necessary to settle the important question of who should succeed General McPherson. General Logan had taken command of the Army of the Tennessee by virtue of his seniority, and had done well ; but I did not consider him equal to the command of three Corps. Between him and General Blair there existed a natural rivalry. Both were men of great courage and talent, but were politicians by nature and experience, and maybe for this reason they were mistrusted by regular officers like General Schofield, Thomas and myself. It was all important that there should exist a feeling of perfect understanding among the army commanders, and at a conference with General George H. Thomas, at the headquarters of General Thomas J. Woods, commanding a Division of the Fourth Corps, he (Thomas) remonstrated warmly against my recommending that General Logan should be assigned to the command of the Army of the Tennessee by reason of his accidental seniority. We discussed fully the merit and qualifications of every officer of high rank in the army, and finally settled on Major-General O. O. Howard as the best officer who was present and available for the purpose. On the 24th of July, I telegraphed to General Halleck this preference and it was promptly ratified by the President. General Howard's place in command of the Fourth Corps was filled by General Stanley, one of his Division commanders, on recommendation of General Thomas.

All these promotions happened to fall upon West Pointers, and doubtless Logan and Blair had some reasons to believe that we intended to monopolize the higher honors of the war for the regular officers. I remember well my own thoughts and feelings at the time, and feel sure that I was not intentionally partial to my class. I wanted to succeed in taking Atlanta, and needed commanders who were purely and technically soldiers, men who would obey orders and execute them promptly and on time : for I knew that we would have to exe-

cute some difficult maneuvers, requiring the utmost skill, nicety, and precision. I believed that General Howard would do all these faithfully and well, and I think the result has justified my choice. I regarded them both, Generals Logan and Blair, as "volunteers," that looked to personal fame and glory as auxiliary, and secondary to their political ambition, and not as professional soldiers.

During the battles around Atlanta, and after we had gone from the left to the right, it was my misfortune to be given a confederate leave, for I was supposed to be fatally wounded. The doctor reported to Sherman, and he, desiring to keep the news from my family, instructed every telegraph operator to send only his dispatches, but in doing this he forgot that there was nothing that occurred but what went over the wires immediately. So the news reached my people that I had been fatally wounded. Dispatches came to my staff, trying to obtain the facts, but they could not reply because of Sherman's orders. In talking about it afterwards, he said:

I acted from my instincts. I simply wished to send the truth, but I only succeeded in making trouble, and that has always happened to me when I tried to be extra cautious; I always put my foot in it; some smart Aleck gets ahead of me.

As soon as Sherman heard I was wounded he came to my tent with Dr. Kiddo, his chief surgeon, and found a surgeon of my own Corps in charge of me. As soon as the shock of the wound passed away I gradually became conscious as to hearing, but not as to seeing, and the first words I heard were when Sherman turned on Dr. Kiddo and said: "Kiddo, Dodge is not going to die. See, he is coming to all right." You can imagine what my feelings were on hearing talk of that kind from Sherman. I recognized his voice, and also the fact that probably I was badly hurt. The doctors advised Sherman to send me North, but Sherman said: "No, we can keep Dodge two weeks, and then he will be all right; we want him with his Corps."

I considered the fact that he would not let me go to the rear until he was forced to swing around south of Atlanta, and abandon everything to the north, one of the greatest compliments he ever paid me.

I was taken to Greenville, Ind., to a relative, for a rest before I was sent to my own home in Iowa. The first or second evening after I arrived in Greenville, as I lay upon my cot, I listened to the demonstrations being made by the return of the delegates who had been to Chicago and nominated McClellan. I was astonished and indignant to hear cheer after cheer given at the station for Jefferson Davis. I could hardly realize that I was in a northern state, not having been north before since the beginning of the war. I now realize what was meant by the term "copperhead" and "fire in the rear." As soon as I was able, I sat down and wrote this to Sherman. It was some time afterwards when I received his answer, which is too characteristic to publish, but it said:

We will settle with those fellows after we get through down here.

While in front of Atlanta, General Sherman wrote this remarkable letter to an old friend away in Georgia:

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi,
In the Field Near Atlanta, Georgia,
August 10th, 1864.

Daniel M. Martin, Sand Mountain.

My Dear Friend:—When in Larkinsville last winter, I enquired after you, and could get no positive answer. I wish you had sent me your letter of January 22d, which I have just received, for I could have made you feel at ease at once. Indeed, do I well remember our old times about Bellefonte, and the ride we took to the corn mills, and the little farm where I admired the handsome colt and tried to buy it. Time has worn on, and you are now an old man, in want, and suffering, and I also, no longer young, but leading a hostile army on the very road I came when I left Bellefonte, and, at the moment, pouring into Atlanta the dread missiles of war, seeking the lives of its people. And yet, I am the same William Tecumseh Sher-

man you knew in 1844, with as warm a heart as ever, and anxious that peace and plenty shall prevail in this land, and, to prove it, I defy Jeff Davis, or General Lee, or General Hood to make the sacrifice for peace that I will, personally or officially.

I will today lay down my power and my honor—already won—will strip myself naked, and my wife and child stark naked in the world as we came, and begin life anew, if the people of the South will but cease the war, elect their members of Congress and let them settle, by argument and reason, the question growing out of slavery, instead of trying to divide our country into two angry halves, to quarrel and fight to the end of time. Our country cannot divide by an east and west line, and must be one, and if we must fight, let us fight it out now, and not bequeath it to our children. I was never a politician, but resigned from the army and lived in California till 1857, when I came back with my wife and three children, who wanted to be near home—Mr. Ewing's, not Mr. Corwin's—but I had the old army so ground in my composition that civil pursuits were too tame and I accepted an offer as president of the Louisiana Military Academy. Therefore, at the time of Lincoln's election, I was at Alexandria, on Red River.

I saw, and you must have seen, that the southern politicians wanted to bring about secession—separation. They could have elected Mr. Douglass but they so managed that Lincoln's election was made certain, and after they had accomplished this, was it honest or fair for them to allege it as a cause of war? Did not Mr. Breckenridge as Vice President, in his seat declare Mr. Lincoln the lawfully elected President of the United States? Was it ever pretended the President was our Government? Don't you know that Congress makes laws, the supreme court judges them, and the President only executes them? Don't you know that Mr. Lincoln of himself could not take away your rights? Now, I was in Louisiana, and while the planters and mechanics and industrious people were happy and prosperous, the politicians and busybodies were scheming and plotting, and got the Legislature to pass an ordinance of secession, which was submitted to the people, who voted against it, yet the politicians voted the State out, proceeded to take possession of the United States mint, the forts, the arsenal—and tore down our flag and insulted it. That, too, before Mr. Lincoln had got to Washington. I saw these things, and begged Bragg and Beauregard, and Governor Moore, and a host of other friends to beware. In that was high treason. But they answered, "The North was made up of mean manufacturers, of traders, of farmers, who would not fight." The

people of the North NEVER dreamed of interfering with the slaves or property of the South. They simply voted, AS THEY HAD A RIGHT TO DO, and they could not understand why the people of the South should begin to take possession of the United States forts and arsenals till our Government had done something wrong—something oppressive. The South BEGAN the war. You know it. I, and millions of others living at the South, know it—but the people of the North were as innocent of it as your little grandchild. Even after forts had been taken, public arms stolen from our arsenals and distributed among the angry militia, the brave and honest freemen of the great North could not realize the fact, and did not until Beauregard began to fire upon a garrison of United States troops, in a fort built by the common treasury of the WHOLE country. Then, as by a mighty upheaval, the people rose and began to think of war, and not until then.

I resigned my post in Louisiana in March, 1861, because of the public act on the part of the State in seizing the United States arsenal at Baton Rouge, and went to St. Louis, where I received lucrative employment, hoping that some change would yet avert the war. But it came, and I, and all of military education, had to choose. I repeat, that then, as now, I had as much love for the honest people of the South as any man living. Had they remained true to the country, I would have resisted, even with arms, any attack upon their rights—even their slave rights. But when, as a people, they tore down our flag, and spit upon it, and called us cowards, and dared us to the contest, then I took up arms to maintain the integrity of our country, and punish the man who challenged us to the conflict. Is this not a true picture? Suppose the North had patiently submitted, what would have been the verdict of history and the world? Nothing else but that the North was craven and cowardly. Will you say the North is craven and cowardly now?

Cruel and inhuman as this war has been, and may still continue to be, it was forced upon us. We had no choice and we have no choice yet. We must go on, even to the end of time, even if it result in sinking a million of lives and desolating the whole land, leaving a desert behind. We must maintain the integrity of our country. And the day will come when the little grandchild you love so well, will bless us who fought, that the United States of America should not sink into infamy and worse than Mexican Monarchy, who care no more for you, or such as you, than they care for the Hottentots. I have never under-rated the magnitude of this war, for I know the size of the South, and the difficulty of operating in it. But, I also

know the northern races have, ever since the war began, had more patience and perseverance than the southern races. And so it will be now, we will persevere until the end. All mankind shall recognize in us a brave and stubborn race, not to be deterred by the magnitude of the danger. Only three years have passed, and that is but a minute in a nation's life, and see where we are. Where are the haughty planters of Louisiana, who compared our hard-working, intelligent whites of the North with their negroes?

The defeats we have sustained have hardly made a pause in our course, and the vaunted braves of Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Missouri, etc., instead of walking rough-shod over the freemen of the North, are engaged in stealing horses and robbing poor old people for a living, while our armies now tread in every southern state, and your biggest armies in Virginia and Georgia lie behind forts, and dare not come out and fight us cowards of the North, who have come five hundred miles into their country to accept the challenge.

But, my dear old friend, I have bored you too much. My handwriting is not plain, but you have time to study it out, and, as you can understand, I have a great deal of writing to do, and it must be done in a hurry. Think of what I have written. Talk it over with your neighbors, and ask yourselves if, in your trials and tribulations, you have suffered more from the Union soldiery than you would had you built your barn where the lightning was sure to burn or tear it down. Their course has provoked the punishment of an indignant God and Government. I care not a straw for niggers. The moment the master rebels, the negro is free, of course, for he is a slave only by law, and the law broken, he is free. I commanded in all Tennessee, Kentucky, Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia. The paper I endorse will be of service to you.

Love to Mrs. Martin.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

It was on the 1st of September that I parted with the Army of the Tennessee. During my convalescence I visited General Grant and that magnificent Army of the Potomac at City Point. As soon as able, I had orders to proceed to Vicksburg, and it was the intention while Sherman marched to Savannah that I should take a column from somewhere in that country and get to the rear of Mobile, and at St. Louis I received dispatches from General Howard to repair to St. Louis, and there

fell to the command of the Department of the Missouri, relieving General Rosecrans. The first order I received came from Stanton; it was a complimentary message from Grant, telling me I must send everything I could to help Thomas at Nashville, and I sent out of that department every organized force. When the battle of Nashville was fought I had not an organized Union regiment in my department.

I found General Sherman's family in St. Louis, and naturally, coming from an old commander like him, it was my pleasure to do anything and everything I could do for his family. Mrs. Sherman was trying to soften the hardships of war by getting people out of prison, and by relieving their necessities. There had been a great many arrests made. I found the prisons full and commenced emptying them, with the idea that it was a great deal cheaper to let these people talk than to feed them, but I got one or two severe reprimands for so doing. I know that Mrs. Sherman wrote to the General and told him what I was doing, and how kind I was to her, and how I carried out any requests she made, so far as it was possible for me to do so; and Sherman, still looking after my interests, as he had always done, wrote me a letter and said:

You must not issue these orders and release these people simply because Mrs. Sherman requests you to do so. You must use your own judgment in this matter, and only issue orders where you know it is absolutely right.

He said it in a kindly way, and he said a great many other things in his letter to me about my policy. He also said:

I appreciate fully what you are doing, and why you do it, but, my dear General, you know you must still cling to a soldier's duty.

While I was in command of that department, Lee and Johnston surrendered. I had received an order from Secretary Stanton instructing me to pay no attention to the Sher-

man and Johnston parole. During this excitement a dinner was given at the Lindell Hotel, that brought together the loyal people of St. Louis, to which I was invited as commander of that department. I was astonished to hear Union people get up and denounce Sherman, criticising not only his acts but his motives. I listened as long as I could to these excitable speakers, and finally got up and stated that I had served near and under Sherman for two years, and while I knew nothing at all about the terms of surrender of Johnston, except the orders I had received from the Government, nevertheless, I did not propose to stay at any dinner table, or any assembly of any kind where the loyalty of Sherman was questioned; that whatever he had done, whether right or wrong, had been done by a soldier who had but one thing at heart—his duty to his country and the destruction of the rebel army. It was not very long after this that my words reached Sherman. They brought back the kind of response that he made in such cases, and it was only a short time after this until Sherman himself appeared at his home in St. Louis. The war being virtually over, and being an old resident of that city, it was natural when he arrived that the people should seize upon him and pay him great attention, take him out to dinners, etc. A great many of his old friends were rebels, and I suppose they saw in his terms to Johnston an opportunity to break the force of the Union sentiment against them, for there was no place in the whole United States where the bitterness of the Union and rebel sentiment was so apparent as it was in the state of Missouri. It kept the state in dissensions during the entire war. The attentions of the sympathizers with the rebellion to Sherman were very marked, so much so that some of the Union people called upon me and talked to me about it, and when Sherman came down to my headquarters, as he did daily, I spoke to him about it, and told him how they were talking and how they felt. He said: "They are going to give me a

dinner here in a few days, and General, don't you worry, I will settle that question there."

He made a remarkable speech at that dinner. He said that since the war was over he did not feel that it was necessary for him to refuse any attentions, no matter from whom they came, but when it came to the question between loyal men and rebels everyone knew where his heart was, and everyone knew what his thoughts were; that it was only the clemency of the government that saved them from receiving their just dues long before this time. We never heard anything more in that country as to Sherman's position, and no one after that misunderstood him. At this banquet given in his honor at the Lindell Hotel, St. Louis, July 20, 1865, Sherman spoke as follows:

I feel tonight more than usually honored, for I am in the presence of many with whom I have been associated in years gone by—in business, in the social circle, and in public affairs. To receive the warm commendations I have just heard from the gentleman preceding me affords me the greatest pleasure, and I would that I were as gifted as my friend who has just taken his seat, so I might interest you—I would travel all over the world to find topics to suit the occasion. Gladly would I talk of Greece and Rome (but I fear they are gone by) or better still, point to the history of our own great country, that is teeming with recollections, recollections that to me are doubly, trebly dear, from associations; to the history of the Spaniard on the lone river, or still more to old Colonel Bonneville, who is yet living among you, and whom I saw yesterday. But the world sweeps on, and I will not pause, for I see, by the paper before me, that you bring me before you as an actor in the scenes just past; that you bring me as one of those men who have simply wafted our country past a dangerous abyss, and placed it on firm ground where it may sally forth again on a new career of prosperity and glory. (Cheers.) I admit that the past four years seem even to me a dream; I can hardly realize the part I have taken, although step by step rises up when my memory retraces them, but yet it seems to me as a dream that men reared under our laws—men who were enjoying prosperity, which they themselves admitted never was surpassed, should rise up in rebellion against the land and Government of Washington. It seems to me an impossibility; but

it is now past, thank God. (Cheers.) We have a right, as citizens and historians, to cast our eyes and memory back, and see if in the past events we can learn lessons, lessons of wisdom that will make us better men, better citizens and better patriots in the future; and if I can trace anything in the past calculated to effect this object, I will account myself repaid.

Here, in St. Louis, probably, began the great center movement which terminated the war; a battlefield such as never before was seen, extending from ocean to ocean almost with the right wing and the left wing, and from the center here, I remember one evening, up in the old Planters' House, sitting with General Halleck and General Cullman, and we were talking about this and that and the other; a map was on the table, and I was explaining the position of the troops of the enemy in Kentucky. When I came to this state, General Halleck knew well the position here, and I remember well the question he asked me—the question of the school teacher to his child: "Sherman, here is the line, how will you break that line?" "Physically, by a perpendicular force." "Where is the perpendicular?" "The line of the Tennessee." General Halleck is the author of that first beginning, and I give him credit for it with pleasure. (Cheers.) These were the grand strategic features of that movement, and it succeeded perfectly. General Halleck's plan went further—not to stop at his first line which run through Columbus, Bowling Green, crossing the river at Henry and Donelson, but to push on to the second line which run through Memphis and Charleston. But troubles intervened at Nashville, and delays followed; opposition to the last movement was made, and I myself was brought an actor on the scene. I remember our ascent on the Tennessee river; I have seen tonight captains of steamboats who first went with us there; storms came and we did not reach the point desired. At that time General C. F. Smith was in command; he was a man indeed. All the old officers remember him as a gallant and elegant officer and had he lived, probably some of us younger fellows would not have attained our present positions. But that is now past. We followed the line—the second line—and then came the landing of forces at Pittsburg Landing. Whether it was a mistake in landing them on the west instead of the east bank, it is not necessary now to discuss. I think it was not a mistake; there was gathered the first great army of the West—commencing with only twelve thousand, then twenty, then thirty thousand, and we had about thirty-eight thousand in that battle, and all I claim for that is that it was a contest for manhood; there was no strategy. Grant was there, and others of us, all young and unknown men at that time, but

our enemy was old, and Sidney Johnston, whom all the officers remember as a power among the old officers, high above Grant, myself or anybody else, led the enemy on that battlefield, and I almost wonder how we conquered. But as I remarked, it was a contest for manhood—man to man—soldier to soldier. We fought and we held our grounds and therefore accounted ourselves victorious. (Cheers.) From that time forward, we had with us the prestige; that battle was worth millions and millions to us by reason of the fact of the courage displayed by the brave soldiers on that occasion, and from that time to this, I never heard of the first want of courage on the part of our northern soldiers. (Cheers.) It then became a grand game of war; armies were accounted equal, and skill and generalship came into play. We gained there by the movement on Corinth which Halleck designed here; there his command ceased, and a new shuffle of the cards of war was made. Halleck went to the east and Grant to the West, but summer overtook us with the heat, and we could not march. Northern Mississippi was dry as ashes; it was impossible for men to live and march from stream to stream, and to follow the roads that lie between these, men would have parched with thirst; been overcome by heat. Therefore we delayed until fall, and late that fall I met Grant by appointment at Columbus; there again we went over the map, and the next thing was to break the line of the Tallahatchie. Many of you here remember that movement. You citizens do not understand it at all, for I have never yet seen a newspaper account of it that approximates the truth. (Laughter.) Pemberton commanded the army of the Confederacy in our front. We had superior numbers, our men were scattered, and we first concentrated on Tallahatchie, below Holly Springs. Grant moved direct on Pemberton, while I moved from Memphis, and struck directly into Granada, and the first thing Pemberton knew, the depot of his supplies was almost in the grasp of a small cavalry force, and he fell into confusion, and gave us the Tallahatchie without a battle. But with some people an object gained without a battle is nothing. In war we gain success by any and every means; it is not fighting alone. Bulls do that, and bears, and all beasts, but men attain objects by intellect, and the introduction of physical power, moved upon salient points. And so we gained the Tallahatchie, and although hardly a gun was fired, yet we gained a battle equal in its results to any other battle on earth. (Cheers.) It gave us uninterrupted possession of Northern Mississippi and undisputed possession of the resources of that country; and that country has been in our possession ever since, in a military sense.

Then came the great campaign down your river, of which you and I and all of us were more deeply interested than in any other that can be developed on this continent. The possession of the Mississippi river is the possession of America, (cheers) and I say that had the Southern Confederacy—(call it by what name you may)—had that power represented by the Southern Confederacy, held with a grip sufficiently strong the lower part of the Mississippi River, we would have been a subjugated people, and they would have dictated to us if we had given up the possession of the lower Mississippi. It was vital to us, and we fought for it, and won it. We determined to have it, but we could not go down with our frail boats past the batteries of Vicksburg. It was a physical impossibility, therefore what was to be done? After the Tallahatchie line was carried, Vicksburg was the next point. I went with a small and hastily collected force and repeatedly endeavored to make a lodgment on the bluffs between Vicksburg and Hain's Bluff, while General Grant moved with his main army so as to place himself on the high plateau behind Vicksburg, but "man proposes and God disposes," and we failed on that occasion. I then gathered my hastily collected force and went down further, and then, for the first time I took General Blair and his Brigade under my command. On the very day I had agreed to be there I was there, and we swung our flanks around, and the present Governor of Missouri fell a prisoner to the enemy on that day. We failed. I waited anxiously for a co-operating force inland and below us, but they did not come, and after I had made the assault I learned that the depot at Holly Springs had been broken up, and that General Grant had sent me word not to attempt it. But it was too late. Nevertheless, although we were to carry it at first, there were other things to be done. The war covered such a vast area there was plenty to do. I thought of that affair at Arkansas Post, although others claim it; and they may have it if they want it. We cleaned them out there and General Grant then brought his whole army to Vicksburg, and you, in St. Louis, remember well that long winter—how we were on the levee, with the water rising and drowning us like muskrats; how we were seeking channels through Deer Creek and Yazoo Pass, and how we finally cut a canal across the peninsulas, in front of Vicksburg. But at that time the true movement was the original movement, and everything approximating to it came nearer the truth. But we could not make a retrograde movement. Why? Because your people of the North were too noisy. We could not take a step backwards, and for that reason we were forced to run the batteries of Vicksburg. It is said I protested against it—it is folly. I never protested in my life—never. (Laughter.)

On the contrary, General Grant rested on me probably more responsibility even than any other commander under him, for he wrote me, "I want you to move upon Hains' Bluff, to enable me to pass to the next fort below—Grand Gulf. I hate to ask you because the fervor of the North will accuse you of being rebellious again." (Laughter.) I love Grant for his kindness. I did make the feint on Hains' Bluff and by that means Grant ran the blockade easily to Grand Gulf, and made lodgment down there and got his army upon the high plateau in the rear of Vicksburg, while you people here were beguiled into the belief that Sherman was again repulsed. But we did not repose confidence in everybody. Then followed the movement on Jackson, and the Fourth of July placed us in possession of that great stronghold, Vicksburg, and then, as Mr. Lincoln said, "The Mississippi went unvexed to the sea."

From that day to this, this war has been virtually and properly settled. It was a certainty, then. They would have said, "We give up," but Davis would not ratify it, and he had them under good discipline, and therefore it was necessary to fight again. Then came the affair of Chickamauga. The Army of the Mississippi, lying along its banks, were called into a new field of action, and so one morning early I got orders to go to Chattanooga. I did not know where it was hardly. (Laughter.) I did not know the road to go there. But I found it, and got there in time (laughter and cheers), and although my men were shoeless and the cold bitter frosts of winter were upon us, still I must go to Knoxville, 130 miles further, to relieve Burnside. That march we made (A Voice—and you got there in time). Then winter forced us to lie quiet. During the winter I took a little exercise down the river, but that is of no account.

But as spring came on, General Grant and I met at Nashville and talked the matter over, and we agreed that I should take all the armies that I could make out of the Western armies and fight Joe Johnston, go where he might, while he took the more ungracious task—the command of the old Army of the Potomac. (Laughter.) We agreed upon the time at which we should be ready, and we were ready almost at the same time, and moved upon the common enemy nearly simultaneously, although a thousand miles apart. The history of that is so well known that I need not tell it. Grant struggled at Petersburg and I at Atlanta, and for a time things looked dark, and as though at last we had come to a dead standstill. But it was not so bad as that. As long as there is a will there is a way, and there was a will there, and that will pointed towards Jonesboro, and we took Atlanta. (Loud cheers.) You cannot attain great success in war without great risks. I admit we

violated many of the old established rules of war by cutting loose from our base and exposing 60,000 lives. But when a thing has got to be done it has got to be done. (Laughter and cheers.) I had faith in the army I commanded; that faith was well founded. But there was the old story exemplified—we had the elephant and it troubled us to know what to do with that elephant, and again we had to put our wits together and we concluded to kill the elephant. (Laughter.) We did not like to do it. I come now to a piece of military history which has been more discussed than any other. I contended at first, when we took Vicksburg, that we had gained a point which the Southern Confederacy as belligerents, and so recognized by ourselves and the world—were bound to regard—that when we took Vicksburg, by all the rules of civilized warfare, they should have surrendered, and allowed us to restore Federal power in the land. But they did not. I claim also that when we took Atlanta, that they were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their cause. It was then hopeless, and it was clear to me as daylight that they were bound to surrender and return to civil life. But they continued the war, and then I had a right, under the rules of civilized warfare, to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the Government, and cause them to succumb to our national authority. (Cheers.) I have again and again proffered kindness towards the people of the South, and I have manifested it on thousands of occasions. I lived among them and received generous hospitality; but at the same time, if their minds are not balanced so as to reason aright, we have the right to apply the rod. (Cheers.) So we destroyed Atlanta, and all that could be used against us there will have to be rebuilt. The question then arose in my mind, how to apply the power thus entrusted by my Government so as to produce the result—the end of the war—which was all we desired: for war is only justifiable among civilized nations to produce peace. There is no other legitimate rule—except to produce peace. That is the object of war, and it is so universally acknowledged. Therefore, I had to go through Georgia, and let them see what war meant. I had the right to destroy their communications, which I did. I made them feel the consequences of their war, so they will never again invite an invading army.

Savannah fell as a matter of course, and once in our power, the question again arose, “what next?” All asked, “What next?” I never received any orders from anybody. I had nothing to look to but my own brain. I asked advice again and again but I got mighty little. I can tell you, except from Grant who is always generous and fair. (Cheers.) No advice, no

word at Savannah, save Mr. Lincoln's, "what next?" I told him I would tell him after awhile.

Then came that last movement which I do contend involved more labor and more risk than anything else which I have done, or ever expect to do again. I could take Charleston without going there. First, by segregating it from the rest of the country so that it could not live. Man must have something to live upon. He must go where there is something to eat. Therefore, I concluded to break up the railroad, so the people had to get out of Charleston or perish. Then the next thing was to place the army in Columbia, which I tell you is more of a place in the South than you are aware of. Years ago I thought Columbia would be the scene of the great and final struggle of the war. I thought our western army would go eastward and our eastern army southward to Columbia, and that we would fight it out there. The people there regarded it as a place of security. They sent their treasures there and their wines and liquors, which, my friend Blair remembers so well. (Laughter and cheers.) But if you place an army where the enemy say you cannot, you gain an object. All military readers will understand the principle. And therefore, when I could place my army in Columbia, I fought a battle—reaped the fruits of a victory—bloodless, but still produced military results. The next question was to place my army still further, where I would be in communication with the old Army of the Potomac—where we could destroy the life of the Confederate armies—for it seemed at one time as though they were determined to fight to the "last ditch."

So we went to Goldsboro, and then I hastened to see Grant, and Mr. Lincoln, for the last time. We talked the matter over, and agreed perfectly. Grant was moving then. I had been fifty odd days marching on light rations. My men were shoeless and without pants, and needed clothing and rest. I hurried back to Goldsboro and dispatched everything with as great rapidity as I could, and on the very day I appointed, I started in pursuit of Johnston, let him be where he might. Understand now, that in this vast campaign we had no objective point on the map, all we had to do was to pursue the Confederate armies wherever they might go and destroy them wherever we could catch them. The great difficulty was to bring them to bay. You can chase and chase a hare until the end of time, but unless you bring him to bay you can't catch him. Grant was enabled to bring Lee to bay by means of Sheridan's Cavalry. I did not have sufficient cavalry; if I had, I might have brought Johnston to bay; but with my then force I could not, because my cavalry was inferior to his numbers. Therefore, when Lee surrendered, Johnston saw, as

clearly as I had seen for months before, that his cause was gone.

I had been thinking of it for months; therefore, when he met me and announced the fact that he was "gone up," I was prepared to receive it. (Laughter.) It was exactly like a familiar song. It seemed to the North a new thing. We had expected it, and when they gave up, we supposed there was an end of it. "How did they give up?" was the question. "Gave up. That was all. No use fighting any longer." "On what terms did they give up?" "On the same terms that Lee gave up." I have described sufficiently clear in my official reports all the conversation that took place, and all I will say is that the North seemed to be taken unawares, although every newspaper in the land and every county court orator had preached about peace for the last four years, yet when it came they did not recognize it. All I claim is, that I was prepared for it from the start. The moment Johnston spoke to me I saw peace at once, and I was honest enough to say so, but the world was startled by it.

"Sherman had turned traitor, and Jeff Davis had bought him up with Confederate gold." I rather think he would have found it a pretty hard job to have bought me up. (Cheers.) Poor Davis. I know he never had enough gold to buy me, although I won't mention my price. (Laughter and cheers.) But all that is now past, and I am satisfied in my heart that we have peace. I am satisfied by the combined armies and navies, and the citizens of the North, and many of the South, that now we have peace in the land, and what is the consequence? It is simply one stage in our history: We have had wars heretofore. Did we cut the throats of our enemies? Certainly not; like sensible men, when the war was over, we went to work to recover what we had lost by the war, and entered on a new stage. Now, if any man will show me how Arkansas may be improved, and Louisiana and Georgia, I will sit down and discuss it with great fairness. And any improvement in Georgia, in the cultivation of her rice fields, or other branches of industry will bring in more revenue. As a part of the United States she will assist in paying our debt. It will add to the wealth of the nation; and therefore, anything that improves Georgia will improve the United States of America. If a man commits a crime, it is necessary he should be turned over to the sheriff and the court. There they are. But so far as the future is concerned, manifestly our duty should be to put every man, woman and child capable of earning a living, or of taking any part in the body politic, to work again where they may earn an honest living and contribute to the National wealth. Anything looking to that end, I certainly

think every American citizen can well do, without being considered as conniving at crime, for I say criminals can never be pardoned by military men. Murder is murder and will be till the end of time; arson the same, thieving the same. We cannot deal with these; we simply deal with men in arms that defy the civil authority; when they cease to do this, our task is done, and we retire whence we came. That is the law of England, France and Austria, and our own country, ever since we had one, and will be till the end of time. As to the usurpations of the civil power by the military, there may be at times cases occur in the history of wars when the passions and feelings of man may be aroused so as to over-ride civil authority, but in time of peace it is impossible that any American soldier, any American officer, any educated officer, should wish to over-ride the civil power; we just exercise the military power. We look upon the civil power as something below us. We do not wish to detract from its merits. On the contrary, quite the reverse. But it is a different sphere of action—one in which we take more pleasure—and certainly I do not wish to over-ride the sheriffs and common courts. Therefore, my friends, now that the war is over, let us all go to work and do what seems most honest and just to restore our country to its former prosperity,—TO ITS PHYSICAL PROSPERITY. As to its political prosperity, I know nothing of it, and care far less about it. (Prolonged cheering.)

During the year 1865 and the spring of 1866 it fell to my lot to make the Indian campaign over the plains, and to kill a few Indians, and among them a few squaws and children—when there was a general outcry raised all over the United States, and through the peace commissioners the whole Indian policy was changed from war to treaties of peace; and, being desirous of retiring from the army, Sherman knowing all my plans, I wrote him in April, 1866, a personal letter asking for leave of absence, my resignation not having been accepted. I have no copy of my letter to him, but he understood the matter fully, for we had discussed it together, and in answer to that letter I received the following:

Headquarters, Military Division of the Mississippi.
Major-General Dodge.

Dear General:—I have your letter of April 27th, and I readily consent to what you ask. I think General Pope should

be at Leavenworth before you leave, and I expected he would be at Leavenworth by May 1st, but he is not yet come. As soon as he reaches Leavenworth or St. Louis even, I consent to your going to Omaha to begin what, I trust, will be the real beginning of the great road. I start tomorrow for Riley, whence I will cross over to Kearney by land, and thence come in to Omaha, where I hope to meet you. I will send your letter this morning to Pope's office and endorse my request that a telegraph message be sent to General Pope to the effect that he is wanted at Leavenworth. Hoping to meet you soon, I am,
Truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, M. G.

On receipt of this letter I proceeded to Omaha, Nebraska, and on May 6th, 1866, took charge of the survey and construction of the Union Pacific railroad.

General Sherman in his Memoirs states that in the year 1849 he was sent by General Smith up to Sacramento City to instruct Lieutenants Warner and Williamson, of the Engineers, to push their surveys of the Sierra Nevada mountains, for the purpose of ascertaining the possibility of passing that range by railroad, a subject that then elicited universal interest. It was generally assumed that such a road could not be made along any of the immigrant roads then in use, and Warner's orders were to look further north—up the Feather River, or some of its tributaries. Warner was engaged in this survey during the summer and fall of 1849, and had explored to the very end of Goose Lake, the source of Feather River, when this officer's career was terminated by death in battle with the Indians. General Sherman was too modest to add, as was the fact, that those instructions were sent at his own suggestion; that that was the first exploring party ever sent into the field for the special purpose of ascertaining the feasibility of constructing a railway on a portion of the line of the trans-continental routes, and that they preceded by at least four years the act of Congress making appropriations "for explorations and surveys for a railroad route from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean."

On January 6, 1859, General Sherman addressed a letter to Hon. John Sherman, M. C., and made public through the "National Intelligence." It is one of the most remarkable and instructive short papers to be found in the literature of trans-continental railway construction. He gave many weighty reasons why a railway to the Pacific should be built, but thought it could not be done unless done by the nation. "It is a work of giants," he sententiously declares, "and Uncle Sam is the only giant I know who can grapple the subject." That paper alone, in the light of later events, would stamp its author as a far-seeing statesman and an enlightened engineer. He said:

It so happens that for the past ten years the Sierra Nevada has been crossed at every possible point by miners in search of gold, by emigrants going and coming, and by skilful and scientific men. I, myself, have been along a great part of that range, and have no hesitation in saying that there are no passes by which a railway, to be traveled by the most powerful locomotion now in use, can be carried through the Sierra Nevada, unless at the extreme head of the Sacramento, near the town of Shasta or Fort Reading, or at the extreme head of the San Joaquin, near the Tajon.

And now I wish to say that if there are any two men in the United States who were entitled to the credit of enabling us to construct the Union Pacific railway, outside of those who put their money in it, and made it a success, those two men were Generals U. S. Grant and W. T. Sherman. I undertake to say that had it not been for the personal, active and always liberal co-operation of the armies under their direction, the people who built that road and faced its difficulties would have somewhere been stopped.

During all the time of construction of the Union Pacific, either Grant or Sherman gave orders that anything General Dodge asked for should be given to him, "because he knows under the regulations what he is entitled to." I made some requests upon the military commanders that were unusual,

and I said to the commanders: "I want you to obey this, and I will protect you."

When the official reports of what had been done reached Sherman, he wrote me a kindly letter, but he said to me:

Don't forget not only what your duties are to the Union Pacific, but also what your conscience tells you is right towards the United States in such circumstances, and what we can approve.

Of course, it was a nice, quiet, gentle reminder that they trusted me, and I had gone a little beyond what they considered was fair to their trust.

General Sherman came up to look at the first section of the road examined after I took charge of the line. If you go back and read the records you will see he was present. Major Bent, a gentleman who was at one time at the head of one of the greatest industries in this country, was assigned to the duty of taking care of the people who examined the road. General Sherman said to him: "Every time they build a section here I will be on hand to look at it, and see that it is properly built."

Bent wagered with General Sherman a basket of champagne that he would not do it. Sherman's headquarters were in St. Louis, and we were building and examining about thirty miles of road a month. This would have brought him up to examine the road about once every month, and after we built about one hundred miles of road he wrote me and said: "I am not going to come up there any longer; I am ready to pay my bet."

One evening at the Union League Club, only a short time before he died, he said to me: "I wish, Dodge, that you would get Bent down to New York and I will pay that basket of champagne that I owe him."

As the road progressed, there was hardly a mile of it that was not built under the protection of the United States forces.

Every engineer that made its surveys had to be protected against the Indians. The men, when they started to work in the morning, stacked their muskets by their work, ready to fall in at any moment in case they were attacked by Indians, and I have often known them to fall in and defend their camp.

Every year while we were building this road Sherman went over it, and I reported to him just as regularly as I did to my superior officers, telling him what I was doing and asking advice. He saw through the papers that there was a question between myself as chief engineer and Mr. T. C. Durant, the chief contractor, as to the lines, and that Mr. Durant had declared against the lines that the engineers of the road had said were the true lines in a commercial and engineering point of view, and that if the lines were not sustained I would have to resign.

I was in Utah at the time, and I received a dispatch from Durant, dated at Laramie, to return there immediately to meet Generals Grant and Sherman. I immediately took the stage and started for Laramie. When Durant received my absolute refusal to accept the lines they had adopted, he wired to Sherman, and Sherman to Grant, and both came to Laramie, thousands of miles, showing their interest in the subject. They protested against Durant's action, and when I stepped off the stage Durant said to me: "General, I want you to withdraw your dispatch; the lines you want you may have. I am convinced that you are right."

There I met Grant and Sherman, and went over with them the whole possibilities of the Union Pacific line, and told them, in my opinion, that during the year 1869, with no untoward events, we would have the connection. They discussed its probabilities, and said then and there to me: "If that is your plan, General, whatever you want you may have."

And they so instructed the commander of that department, and what I asked for I received.

General Grant and General Sherman took very strong grounds with Durant and Dillon, telling them frankly that the Government would not stand for any change in my lines, and that they should insist upon my remaining upon the road. I had stated frankly to General Grant and General Sherman, to Dillon and Durant, that I would not submit to such interference as had been made; that it was not for the benefit of the road, but simply for the purpose of driving me off the road. They knew they could not have their way while I was on the road, and watched my every movement. It resulted in Durant and Dillon withdrawing all orders for change of location, and Generals Grant and Sherman exacted an agreement from me that I would not resign, but stay with the road until it was finished.

This meeting of the largest number of distinguished officers that had met since the Civil War, was a very noted event. The officers present were: General U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General W. T. Sherman, Major-General Phillip Sheridan, Major-General W. C. Harney, Major-General John G. Gibbon, Major-General Grenville M. Dodge (chief engineer U. P. R. R.), Brigadier-General F. Dent, Brigadier-General Adam Slemmer, Brigadier-General Joseph C. Potter, Brigadier-General Louis C. Hunt, Brigadier-General August Kautz. A local photographer took a picture of the groups which included T. C. Durant, vice president Union Pacific railroad, Sidney Dillon, Mrs. Gibbon and Mrs. Potter, and three local officers of the Post, also U. S. Grant, Jr., son of General Grant.

I forgot all about this picture until in 1892, when on a trip to Oregon, looking over the Union Pacific interests, I visited General Gibbon at Ft. Vancouver and he showed me a small copy of it. This I obtained from him and had it enlarged, and it has been sought for by a great many persons. It was util-

ized by the Union Pacific Railway, who had an immense number of copies made for an advertisement. There is a copy of it in my book, "How We Built the Union Pacific Railway." In later years the photograph has been sought by many libraries, museums, and by many officers of the army.

Generals Sherman, Harney, Kautz, Slemmer and Hunt were going as a peace commission to treat with the Sioux. General Sherman wanted to know my reasons for not making an agreement with the Sioux in 1866, allowing them to come down to the North Fork of the Platte. I told him that my troops, in the expedition to Powder River in 1865, had discovered gold through the Black Hills, through the hunting grounds of the Ogalalla and Brule Sioux, and that I knew as soon as I made a treaty with the Indians that Chaffee in Colorado and Fair and others in California were preparing to send men in there. I had with me in that campaign, part of a Colorado regiment and part of the California regiment, many of them expert miners, and they panned every stream we crossed and had discovered gold. They were afraid to go in there because my agreement with the Indians in 1866 was that it would be impossible for me to keep the whites out of there, and therefore, I would not sign any treaty of peace which would bring them down to the North Platte. My idea was to hold them north of the Belle Fourche Fork of the Cheyenne, and if they behaved themselves, I would endeavor to keep the miners from going into that country; if they went in violation of my orders, I gave the Indians permission to keep them out, and this, I know, kept the miners out of that country. The Indians were not willing to give up this ground under any circumstances, as it was their best hunting ground. General Sherman and his commission, under the orders of the President, made the agreement with them to come to the North Fork of the Platte, taking in all the Black Hills north of Ft. Laramie. This treaty had hardly been ratified when the Colorado and California

miners poured in there and discovered the Homestake mine, which has been a great producer. The Government made no effort to keep the Indians out of this country and carry out the terms of their treaty. Sitting Bull, who was the chief of the tribe of Indians who occupied these hills, made protest to the Government, demanding that they should have their treaty carried out; but the Government paid no attention to it; then Sitting Bull took the matter into his own hands, which brought on the war between the Indians and the Government in 1876, in which occurred the Custer massacre. The Indians are not to blame for this, for they were only maintaining their rights, and it was the fault of the Government in agreeing to the treaty and then not living up to it. There is no escaping this fact, and Custer and his regiment were sacrificed because the Government of the United States did not live up to its agreement and do its duty towards these Indians.

On July 29th, 1868, I arrived at Omaha and took General Grant, Sherman and Sheridan to my residence in Council Bluffs. As General Grant had been nominated for the Presidency, and no doubt would be elected, I took great pains on this trip to post him thoroughly about everything connected with the Union Pacific railway, and especially as to the interference that there had been west of the Missouri since we commenced building it. General Sherman, who had been watching this also, took an active part in the conversation. They were greatly interested in having the road completed, and my assurances of our completing the road within a year from the time we commenced work, April 1st, which would probably take us into May, seemed to greatly impress them. General Sherman said it was too big a job, he thought, for us to complete in the time I said, but as I had made good every statement I had made so far, he would give up his judgment for mine. While General Grant seemed to have full faith that we would be able to do it, he assured me that as far as he was con-

cerned, we would have his support, and on his return to Washington he would make known to the Government the conditions as he found them. I opened up with the question, that was then being started, about the Central Pacific overlapping the lines—they claimed to build to Echo and we to Humboldt Wells, so that he was fully posted in this matter. I showed him that the Central Pacific was trying to enforce the location of their lines over a road which we had graded, and which would have a track upon it long before they could reach Ogden. General Sherman wrote me often during the construction, showing his grasp of the whole problem. The following is his first letter:

St. Louis, Jan. 5, 1867.

My Dear General Dodge: At New Orleans I received your welcome letter from New York, and I assure you, on its faith, I boasted not a little of the vast energy of our countrymen; 303 miles of railroad finished in one year is a feat that may well be boasted of. I assure you of my hearty congratulations, and that greater problem of the railroad seems to be solving itself very fast.

You are exactly right in making your location independent of local influence. When I was at Denver and saw the lay of the land, I felt certain that you would locate north of that city, and said so, incidentally, but some fellow got hold of it and pitched into me. As it was none of my business, I held my tongue and counsel, but still it is not enough to deflect from its course the Great National Highway. I also learn with pleasure that your eastern connection is done within twenty-two miles, and I have ordered all troops and stores for the Department of the Platte to go via Chicago, Clinton and Omaha.

The loss of Col. Fetterman's command up at Phil Kearney may disturb your people; but don't let it, for we shall persevere and push that road to Virginia City, and it will divert the attention of the hostile Sioux from your road. The point where you cross the North Platte and Fort Laramie will become great military points, and you should make arrangements for cars to land our troops and stores there. I take it for granted that you get along well with Cooke, and his quartermaster, Myers.

I would like to know how far this side of old Camp Wahlbach you propose to leave the Lodge Pole. It looks to me as

if you could take the divide some ten miles this side, and get up some 700 or 800 feet before you reach the Black Hills. I remember well the difficulty in California. Our first locations clung to the valleys for some thirty miles out of Sacramento, and then it was too late to rise to the mountains. Whereas, now, the road begins to rise at once on leaving Sacramento, so that they get up near two thousand feet before they strike the mountains. I suppose your location descends into the Laramie plains not far from Willow Springs Station, twelve miles southeast of the new Fort Stevens (John Buford).

The coming year, for better or worse, is to be an important one to our country, and if you could, by superhuman effort, reach the foot of the mountains near Wahlbach, it would be a great achievement. That will be the military point for the road. North and south from that point the roads are good by reason of the nearness of the wood, the abundant grass and water, and valleys that afford good roadways for traveling. I will do my utmost that General Cooke will have force enough to cover your parties absolutely, which will be easy from the forks of the Platte westward.

I came up from New Orleans by rail, saw our old stamping grounds, Jackson, Miss.; Canton, Grenada, Grand Junction and Jackson, Tenn. I feared somebody would offend me, but such was not the case. I saw any quantity of old rebels who were as polite as possible.

Wishing the great enterprise as much success in 1867 as in 1866, I am, as ever, your friend,

W. T. SHERMAN.

On January 14th, 1867, I wrote this letter to General Sherman, giving my plans for that year's construction:

Council Bluffs, Jan. 14th, 1867.

Lieut. Gen. W. T. Sherman.

Dear General: Yours of the 5th inst. came duly to hand. I enclose a rough map of located line from North Platte City; crossing of North Platte River to Ft. Sanders; crossing of Laramie River, for your information. It will give you the line better than I could describe it.

We run up Lodge Pole Creek 105 miles, leaving it 55 miles east of Camp Wahlbach and not far from where the middle fork Laramie and Denver wagon road crosses that stream. You put last year a lot of friendly Indians in camp on this road, near the crossing of Horse Creek. From point where we leave Lodge Pole it is 31 miles almost due west to the R. R. crossing of Crow Creek, and we gain some 700 feet elevation

in this distance. At Crow Creek Crossing we commence ascending the mountains, and we consider this point the eastern base of the "Rocky Mountains." It is on a meridian nearly 20 miles east of Camp Wahlbach, or LaPorte, hence the advantage. From Crow Creek Crossing to Ft. Sanders is 59 miles. We get into Laramie Plains in sight of Willow Spring Stage Station.

I note what you say about military points. At North Platte City is the end of our first 300-mile division. We shall put up extensive warehouses, round-houses, 20 stalls, machine shops, and have already built a large hotel to accommodate travel, etc., and the place is rapidly building up. I anticipate no difficulty in accommodating here all troops or business that the Government may send over to us. North Platte is also the base from which contractors operate next season. The railroad from Omaha to that point goes into the hands of company proper January 1st, to be operated by them. We are piling up there large quantities of ties, iron and all material for this year's work. In May we mean to be at Sedgwick, 80 miles from the end of the track, 40 miles of which is graded, when we can land your troops and stores if desired by 1st of September at Crow Creek Crossing, and in December at Ft. Sanders.

Either at point where we leave Lodge Pole or at Crow Creek Crossing will be the end of our next division, and where we shall change machinery for mountain runs. We shall, no doubt, at this point build up quite a place, and a Denver branch will connect at or near one of these points—I am unable to say which just now, but think Crow Creek will be the place; from either point Ft. Laramie can be reached—60 or 70 miles over an excellent wagon road—either by road along east base of Black Hills, which you have traveled, or by middle Laramie road, equally as good, and I think better. It may be you will finally determine to make your depots for Laramie and Fort North at Fort Sanders, as it is nearer timber, coal, etc., than the east base of the mountains, and is not so much farther from Fort Laramie. However, during the season you will find, no doubt, use for delivery of goods, troops, etc., to North Platte, then Fort Sedgwick, then 40 miles up Lodge Pole, where first Laramie road crosses to Mud Springs; then point where we leave Lodge Pole, and then Crow Creek. By that time you can determine the best point to settle down on. We are doing all in power of man in getting out ties, pushing forward materials, etc., so that we can accomplish our plan of reaching Laramie in 1867. If we do not have to contend with financial reverses in the country, I predict we will reach the objective point and more. I have my fears for the

future; financial matters generally do not look promising; if country steers clear of that breaker, we are all right.

I wrote you about General Cooke. We get along first rate with all the military, and if any new commander comes, I am ready and shall be glad to give him all information or aid in my power, and will do the very best to help him along in taking care of the Indian troubles, overland routes, etc.

We want to cover our work from Alkali to Laramie River as soon as frost leaves the ground, say in March. Contractors are already pushing west, getting ready. I hope you will have troops to give us ample protection; we are going to be short of labor, and any lack of military protection, when Indians are at war, would render it almost impossible to keep men on the line. What we want is the laborers to have confidence. I believe the moment you get into Indian country with troops for campaign, Indians will leave Platte route the same as they did in '65. But that will not fully relieve me, because what you and I know, is going to be hard to make a lot of Irishmen believe. They want to see occasionally a soldier to give them confidence, and that is all we need to get labor on the line. I have made an official application to the department commander for what I consider necessary.

General Myers is an able Quartermaster, understands his business and does it. We get along well with the staff department and help each other. I said to you in my letter about General Cooke that you would need 5,000 effective men north of South Platte and east of mountains. To make it plainer, I think in Nebraska, Colorado, Utah, Dakota, Montana, west of the Missouri River, you will need 10,000, and I hope the Government will not do by you as they did by me, get you well after the Indians, just ready to punish them, and then under the hue and cry of wrongs, cruelty, etc., stop you. If you get after them early with good officers who will never give up, but follow them day and night, until doom's day if necessary, until they are severely punished for past crimes, and feel our power, so that they will in future respect us, is the way to settle the Indian policy, and it can be easily done. I have always held this and I know Indians look upon us with contempt and with no respect.

C. B. & St. Joe road is finished, and running from Council Bluffs, 30 miles south. Northwestern Railroad is within five miles, will be at the Bluffs next week. It landed your troops within eight miles of Omaha.

You can get all the produce, flour and grain, and perhaps some groceries needed for troops and posts north of Kansas and Nebraska here in Western Iowa, and lay it down in Council Bluffs or Omaha, cheaper than you can right in St. Louis

market, thereby saving time and transportation. The railroad south lets us right into the finest part of Missouri and best of Western Iowa—the road opens up the grain and produce market of Central Iowa, the best of the state. It is hard to get the staff department at Washington out of the old channel. They don't grasp those things as I think they ought to do; hope you will help them.

I am now making surveys for the Missouri River bridge; a knotty or "sandy" question, but will solve it. We want to build this year. May have to wait 'til after spring freshets before we can do much.

I keep General Cooke and his staff department posted in our movements, so that they can take advantage of them in their plans; and I believe as I have answered all your questions and given you much insight as to future plans, it will enable you to take advantage of it. What I have said about points, intentions, etc., I prefer you should keep private, as such things, when they are made public, often annoy or sometimes damage us; but you understand it all.

Mrs. D. and myself desire to be remembered to your family; hope you will come to see us soon and bring Mrs. S.

I shall go to Utah in May or June to fix locations from Laramie River to Salt Lake. Will you not go out there this year? I was very sorry to hear of the death of Sawyer.

I saw General Grant while east; says he will go to Denver in spring or summer.

Was glad to hear rebs continue their respect for you. Do they have much honest respect for us? And do they at heart care anything for the old flag? Will they not side with any power that is against, rather than for us?

I am truly and respectfully,

G. M. DODGE.

St. Louis, January 16th, 1867.

I have just read with intense interest your letter of the 14th, and though you wanted it kept to myself I believe you will sanction my sending it to General Grant for his individual perusal, to be returned to me.

It is almost a miracle to grasp your proposition to finish to Fort Sanders this year, but you have done so much that I mistrust my own judgment and accept yours.

I regard this road of yours as the solution of the Indian question, and of the Mormon affairs, and therefore give you all that I possibly can, but the demand for soldiers everywhere, and the slowness of enlistment, especially among the blacks, limit our ability to respond. Naturally each officer

exaggerates his own troubles, and appeals for men; thus Ord is greatly exercised lest the blacks and whites commence a race war, and would have four or five regiments scattered over the whole state of Arkansas to prevent local trouble. I want to punish and subdue the Indians, who are the enemies of our race, and progress, but even in that it is well sometimes to proceed with due deliberation. I have now General Terry on the Upper Missouri, General Auger with you, and General Hancock just below, all young, enterprising men, fit for counsel or the field. I will endeavor to arrange so that hereafter all shall act on common principles and with a common purpose, and the first step, of course, is to arrange for the accumulation of the necessary men and materials at the right points, for which your railroad is the very thing.

Auger will be with you before this, and you will find him prepared to second you to the utmost of his power. I want him to study his problem and call on Grant, through me, for the least force that is adequate, for we must respect the demand from other quarters. Of course, I am disposed to find fault that our soldiers are now tied up in the southern states, but in the light they are now regarded, it would be impolitic and imprudent for me to say so publicly. All I can do is to keep General Grant well informed, so that he may distribute his army to the best advantage of the whole country.

As to supplies, General Auger will be and is at liberty to control this question according to the state of facts. The staff officers at Omaha are supplied with funds, and are on the spot, authorized to buy or call for supplies from Chicago or St. Louis. Though West Iowa might supply your market abundantly, yet if suddenly called on for millions of pounds of flour, sugar, coffee and bacon, they would jump the price, but you know we have now quartermasters and commissaries absolutely disinterested, and qualified to arrange this matter. I will surely be up this year many times, and will go over every rail more than once. I don't want to go to Utah until your road approaches Bridger, which cannot be this year, and I don't want Congress to bother itself about Mormon affairs until then, and the Gentiles would do well to hold their tongues and pens until it becomes feasible to act in case of law or threats. It is nonsense now for us to send a large force there, and besides, it is impossible, and would be to the interests of the Mormons, by the prices they would exact of us for meat and bread.

Don't fail to keep in with General Auger, Myers, etc., who can be of service to you in many ways.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

General Sherman sent me this letter he received from General Grant:

I have carefully read the enclosed letter from General Dodge, and in accordance with your request return it. Now that the Government has assumed the obligation to guarantee the bonds of the Pacific Railroad, it becomes a matter of great pecuniary interest to see it completed as soon as possible.

Every protection practicable should be given by the military, both to secure the rapid completion of the road and to avoid pretexts on the part of the builders to get further assistance from the Government.

I do not see my way clear now to furnish you further reinforcements beyond one regiment of infantry. As soon as one regiment of the invalid Corps is organized, I can have the Canada frontier garrisoned by it, with a few companies of artillery, and send you the 4th Infantry now on duty there.

It might be further practicable to send you a regiment of invalids to occupy such depots as are necessary to be kept up, and thereby relieve more active men for duty in the front. I will not send them, however, without an intimation from you that they can be made available. You might be reinforced to some extent by increasing the standard of companies to the maximum number allowed by law.

General P. St. George Cooke, who was in command of the department, was relieved and General Auger appointed to the command. As General Cooke had been very active in giving us aid and escorts, I wrote General Sherman in relation to it, and this is his answer:

St. Louis, January 22d, 1867.

Yours of January 9th, for some reason, did not reach me 'til today. I had nothing to do with Cooke's removal. The order originated at Washington and came to me completed, without my being consulted, and I do not know what influenced General Grant, but never supposed General Cooke was in the least to blame for the Phil Kearney massacre. That post had been completed and garrison increased to the largest estimate made by anyone up to that time, and I would have volunteered to General Cooke that explanation, only the instant I sent him a copy of the telegram, he replied that he presumed I was the cause of his removal, which debarred me from making any explanation.

As to Auger, I only know him of his old army record, which was very good. He was always a favorite, and was, I

think, one of Grant's comrades of the 4th Infantry. The probabilities are he will be in command of that department a long time, and will soon master all the questions, and be able himself, if necessary, in person to lead his troops. You will lose nothing by the change, for I will make it incumbent on the military to give you earnest attention for the protection of your road. You have General Hancock on the south of you, and Auger with you—two of the best officers, and they shall have every man that I can get and spare. We are pressed for men at all points. I fear the political status has a tendency to make men of property of the south oblivious to their own interests, for outrages on negroes and Union men appear to increase. It is alleged that the better people don't lend their help to stop it, as they say it is none of their business. If our army has to do all the dirty police work of the south, you can see it will all be absorbed there, giving us a small share of the army for the real public enemy—the Indian. But so far as interest in your success is concerned, you may rest easy, that both Grant and I feel deeply concerned in the safety of your national enterprise.

On February 20th, 1867, General Sherman wrote me as follows:

I have just received your letter, of February 8th, and map. I now have an engineer officer with me, Colonel Merrill, the same, you will remember, who went with Thomas as far as Atlanta. He will now be able to compile and make useful all maps that are authentic, and I will be obliged for all and any you can give me.

By this time you must be well acquainted with General Auger, and I hope you will work together like brothers.

I will want to come up to Omaha soon, and would like to have a pass over the road from Chicago to Omaha. I have a yearly pass over the Chicago & Northwestern road, but don't think that is the company that comes to Omaha. Do you know if the railroad from Keokuk to Des Moines will join the Boonsboro road by the main valley or move to the west by the Coon Line of the Rock Island road? All could save distance by making junction with the finished Omaha road at a point in Carroll county. I am satisfied that our St. Louis and Missouri people are alive to the necessity and will, within twelve or fifteen months, have communication with Council Bluffs, via St. Joseph and the Missouri Valley, as also by prolonging the North Missouri railroad to the Keokuk and Des Moines. Condit Smith is the contractor on both, and tells me he is making sure and good progress.

I think in another year, by these railroads and the extension of your great road to the Black Hills (Sanders, if possible) and the Smoky Hill to the neighborhood of Cheyenne Hills, we can act so energetically that both the Sioux and Cheyennes must die, or submit to our dictation. This year we are forced to do the best we can, but hope you will keep your men at work, in spite of rumors and even apparent dangers, for both General Auger and I will do all to cover the working parties that is possible, only we may consider it better done by combining all against the hostile Sioux offensively, instead of keeping the soldiers close in, in sight of your men. I think with a little explanation from you, the working parties will understand that they are more safe along the Lodge Pole with our soldiers two or three hundred miles north, than if those same soldiers were close at hand.

I also received this letter in May, notifying me of his contemplated trip abroad:

St. Louis, May 7th, 1867.

My Dear General Dodge: I have your valuable letter of April 28th, and am fully convinced that you will complete that road this season to the head of Crow Creek, and it may be, to Fort Sanders. Where the spring has been so prolonged, I think you may safely count on a late fall. I will not be surprised if you lay rails up to Christmas.

I think this year is our crisis on the plains, because every month and year will diminish the necessity for troops in the reconstructed states, and give us more and more troops for the plains, especially cavalry.

I suppose I am in for the excursion up the Mediterranean. We are advertised to sail for Gibraltar June 8, and ought to reach Marseilles July 4. We are then to cruise along the Mediterranean and Black Seas, stopping at Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Athens, Constantinople and the Crimea (Sebastapol); then out to Smyrna, Beirout, Joppa and Alexandria, back to the coast of Spain, and out to Medina, and home in October. If you will keep Nichols here advised, he will reach me through General Dix at Paris, and I will arrange for General Grant to telegraph me should anything of enough importance occur to call me back, in which event, I will be prepared to leave the ship and return by way of England. My departments are now well commanded, and should any combination of the troops be necessary, General Grant will order. I would not go if I thought anything would suffer, but it is vain for me to suppose my presence necessary when General Grant freely

offers to spare me. I will bear in mind your wish and will write you some letters from abroad as a keepsake, and as evidence of my personal friendship.

Wishing you and yours all possible happiness, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN.

On receipt of General Sherman's letter of May 7, I wrote him fully about the attacks on our forces and the depredations of the Indians, and he answered as follows:

St. Louis, May 27, 1867.

I received your dispatches, and now have your interesting letter of May 20th.

I have had a good deal of correspondence about the protection of the country along the railroad, which I deem of the first importance, although to make it effectual I see no other way than first to attack the Sioux, who remain near the Yellowstone in defiance. If they remain, as a matter of course, they will not confine themselves to attacking the trains that go to supply Phil. Kearney and C. F. Smith, but will come south to your road. I think General Auger should go there in force, and we must also get other troops to defend our working parties. I have asked General Grant for another battalion of cavalry for that special purpose, and if he can he will grant it. You know that the same call comes from every quarter, and it is very hard to say which is of the most importance. I wish to assure you that I do not under-value your work for, on its account, I give up my proposed trip to Europe, and if I can, will come up this summer and attend to it in person; but I know that of myself I can do little without a force in reserve, and that I will try and obtain. If the worst comes to the worst, I will call on Nebraska for a regiment of mounted troops, for the special task of defending interests which are vital to her progress. I don't want to do this if it can be avoided, as every state and territory that has contact with Indians will raise a clamor, as has been done more than once, for local troops serving in their own interest. One would suppose more of the regular army should be among the Indians, where danger is imminent, instead of in southern cities, such as Mobile and New Orleans, but when Mr. Key can announce that he can have all the regular army to back him in his speeches at the south, we see that there is a call for troops there, on questions that Congress thinks are as vital as those of the Indian question. I have the same appeals from Minnesota, Montana and Dakota, as well as from Kansas, New Mexico and Colorado. Each wants enough of the army to

guard them against all the Indians, but I note your road as of the most important and have given General Auger a very large portion of my whole command, but will increase it if I can get the men.

February 22d, 1868, when I was in command of the Department of the Missouri, I located the post of Fort Sanders, where I thought the railroad would pass very near and I made a reservation there of ten square miles of ground. When we came to make our surveys, our line passed through this reservation. We established the town of Laramie City on a portion of this reservation. I had no idea the Government would make any objection to our occupying the reservation. But the officers at Fort Sanders reported the fact that we were locating the line and building it through the reservation, and it brought orders from the War Department in relation to it, and on February 21st, I wrote General Wm. T. Sherman to be allowed to go on the reservation until proper authority from the War Department was obtained.

On March 3d, 1868, General Sherman wrote me the following letter in relation to the subject which I had laid before him:

St. Louis, Mo.

I got your dispatch last night and have answered it; have also written General Auger in general terms to facilitate the progress of the road by conceding the use of ground near Fort Sanders for depot, etc. But what you want is a permanent title, not that mere temporary use that we are empowered to grant.

I advise you to cause the most accurate plat to be made that you can, and delineate thereon the ground you want, with its metes and bounds, and what part of it is included within our Fort Sanders, the indefinite use of the space delineated, or for an absolute title. This paper should go to the Secretary of War, who would probably send it down through General Grant and myself, to General Auger, the department commander, all of whom would doubtless recommend the grant, provided the depot, as you say, be as far off from the posts as two miles.

In case the land has been publicly dedicated to use as a military reservation, an act of Congress might be necessary to

convey it to you, but, as the public land surveys have not yet reached the Laramie plains, I take it that our occupation of that reservation can be limited by a simple order of the Secretary of War, so as to leave the railroad company the right of selection, under the bill you showed me in Washington this winter.

I would not be willing to order the modification of the limits of reservation, after the map has been made and filed in the War Department, as I believe is the case with the reservation in question, but I would not hesitate to grant you the right-of-way and the use of any reasonable part of the reservation for side tracks and depots, but my grant would only be temporary, and could be modified, altered, or annulled by my successors in office, or by higher authority.

In a similar case, at Fort Riley, Congress granted twenty acres for a depot within the reserve, and a fractional section on its western edge.

I had been pressing General Sherman and General Auger to make preparations for the furnishing of my engineering parties with escorts and for placing troops along all the lines that was to be opened up, for the purpose of protecting them from the Indian depredations. The Indians had been aggressive since 1867, and from the information I could get were preparing to swoop down upon us as soon as we opened up work in the spring.

In answer to my letters, on January 23d, 1868, General Sherman wrote me as follows:

January 23d, 1868.

Last summer when on the Indian commission, Senator Henderson repeatedly told me that the subsidy of \$16,000 per mile to railroads and the liberal compensation to the stage lines was intended purposely to be in line of "protection" by the military. General Auger has shown me your letter of the 14th, in which you ask pretty large escorts and posts for the protection and the operation of your road. I wish you would see Mr. Henderson. Show him this, and have a simple resolution passed Congress directing the General-in-Chief, or President, to afford suitable military protection to the parties engaged in the location and construction of the Pacific Railroad. This will warrant the expenses to which we are put in providing the troops and trains employed for that purpose.

There is no one who has taken so active a part, and who has accomplished so much for the benefit of the Government, in the building of the transcontinental railroads as General Sherman. He has taken occasion to look after and to speak his mind freely about them since their construction, and in September, 1888, in commenting upon a paper which I read before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, upon the Transcontinental Railway, he spoke as follows:

I need not speak to an audience such as this in praise of the historic paper just read by General Dodge. It so happened that I was, before the Civil War, during it, and since, deeply interested in the great problem of a Pacific railway. Every word of General Dodge's paper is true to my personal knowledge, and I endorse every proposition he has made.

When the Civil War was over, you must all remember that I was stationed in St. Louis, in command of all the troops on the western plains as far out as Utah. I found General Dodge as chief engineer of the Union Pacific railroad, in the success of which enterprise I felt the greatest possible interest. I promised the most perfect protection by troops of the reconnoitering, surveying and construction parties, and made frequent visits, on horseback and in ambulance, and noticed that the heads of all the parties had been soldiers during the Civil War. I firmly believe that the Civil War trained the men who built that great national highway, and, as General Dodge has so very graphically described, he could call on any body of men to "fall in," "take arms, form platoons and companies," "deploy as skirmishers" and fight the marauding Indians just as they had learned to fight the rebels down at Atlanta. I will not claim that they were all of the Army of the Tennessee, but the heads of the parties were all, or nearly all Union soldiers.

I was particularly interested in that part of the paper wherein is described the discovery of the way to cross the Black Hills beyond Cheyenne. There was no Cheyenne then. They were limited by the law to 116-foot grade to the mile. Instead of following the valley of Lodge Pole Creek, as all previous engineers had done, he chose the upper or anti-clinal line, instead of the lower, or sin-clinal line. This was a stroke of genius, by which they surmounted the Rocky Mountains by a grade of eighty feet to the mile, whereas by any other route then known he would have been forced to a grade of 200 feet, or to adopt short curves through the Laramie Pass.

The Union and Central Pacific Railroads were the pioneer trans-continental roads in America, and every man who did his part should receive all honor. Now there are five trans-continental railroads, the last the Canadian Pacific.

It so happened that two years ago, having traveled by every other way, I expressed a wish to return from San Francisco eastward by the Canadian Pacific, just completed. To my amazement I discovered that the president of that railroad was Sir William C. Van Horne, one of our railroad men, educated in our war between Nashville and Atlanta. He was then, as now, the president of that railroad, with a salary of from \$25,000 to \$50,000, and they talked of making him a Duke. He can hold his own with any Duke I have thus far encountered. Anyhow, he acted like a Prince to me. From his office in Montreal he ordered his agent at Victoria, in British Columbia, to extend to General Sherman every possible courtesy, which was done. I had a special car for myself and daughter, Lizzie, with privilege of stopping over at any station.

On my way eastward I met many people and heard many things of deep interest to me, and, maybe to you. There are three mountain ranges between the Mississippi, or rather the Missouri Valley, and the Pacific Ocean—the Rockies, the Wasatch and the Cascades. These converge to the northwest, so that in the Canadian Pacific the engineers had to meet them closer together than by our Northern Pacific or by the Central or Union.

In the first explorations the English engineers saw no escape from the conclusion that to pass these ranges from their starting point on to the Pacific at Vancouver, a magnificent port, they would have to follow the grade of Fraser River, by its west branch to its very head, near the Henry House, and thence descend the Athabasca eastward to Winnipeg, etc. This route was about 400 miles longer than the direct line. The board of directors in Montreal then called on the experienced engineers of the United States, and found a man who undertook to cut across this great bend or loop.

Instead of following the west branch of the Fraser River, he took the east branch, Thompson's, up to the Kampools' lake. The mountains eastward seemed impassable, but he reasoned "where there's a will there's a way." Through brush and trees he forced his way, and found a pass in the Cascade range called Kicking Horse, where his horse had kicked him on the knee. Persevering, he in the next or main range, observed the flight of an eagle, which did not as usual pass over the highest visible peak but disappeared around a point; so he followed the same course, found an unexpected break, and located a railroad with less grade than the Union Pacific, and

saved a distance of four hundred miles, or twenty millions of dollars.

In looking over the usual timetables of the Canadian Pacific, you will find the Kicking Horse and Eagle Pass through which millions of people will travel and millions of dollars of freight will pass. All are, in part, the consequence of our Civil War, and the men it educated.

These men were S. B. Reed and M. F. Hurd, both engineers in the survey and construction of the Union Pacific railway.

General Sherman heard I was going to Europe and voluntarily sent me this letter:

Headquarters, Army of the United States,
Washington, D. C., April 20th, 1877.

To U. S. Counsuls Abroad:

I learn that General G. M. Dodge is starting soon for Europe, expecting to leave his children at school whilst he returns to America, where he is actively employed in railroad construction and management. I take great pleasure in commending General Dodge and family to the courtesy and politeness of all Americans, especially such as occupy official positions, because General Dodge is one of the generals who actually fought throughout the Civil War, with great honor and great skill, commanding a regiment, brigade, division and finally a Corps d'armee, the highest rank command to which any officer can attain.

He was with me in the west, especially in the Atlanta campaign, where he was severely wounded, close to Atlanta, and I think that he, and especially his children, should experience the attention of all officers of a government that might have perished had it not been for the blood of just such men as General Dodge.

With great respect,
W. T. SHERMAN, General.

After the publication of General Sherman's Memoirs, there were a great many criticisms from officers under him and from others in relation to many of the statements in the Memoirs as to the part taken by each, and as to his own movements.

In answer to these criticisms, General Sherman said he thought each person should write up the Civil War as they

saw it; that was the way he did and he thought everyone else should do the same; that no two persons saw the same thing alike.

General Sherman wrote me a letter asking me to write up the part the Sixteenth Army Corps took in the campaign as I saw it and when I sent the paper to him, he immediately wrote me that it was of so much importance that he should print it in the appendix to his second edition, which was done.

My communication to him was as follows:

Dear General: Your suggestion to send you a brief resume of the part taken by my Corps (the Sixteenth) of the Army of the Tennessee in the Atlanta campaign, was received some time ago. I reply as early as possible in view of absence and other engagements.

I wish to refer to only such parts of the Atlanta campaign as have been to some extent the subject of public comment, through your Memoirs, and to which my personal testimony may contribute light.

I shall therefore confine myself to the attempted surprise of Resaca, May 9, 1864, and some following events, and to the repulse of General Hood's rear movement at Atlanta July 22.

The Sixteenth Corps, as the vanguard of General McPherson's army, penetrated, first through the Chattanooga mountains, and made the attack on Resaca. The same Corps, while moving to a new position around Atlanta, fell across the way of Hood's army, and met him on such opportunely good ground that the battle was accepted on the spot.

I state these general facts to save you the trouble of explaining them again if you should ever make use of this letter. Your rapid and general summary of a maze of events, in which the part of a Corps is more or less lost in the movement of several armies, has attracted my admiration for its clearness, and I can well see how the limitations of your book have compelled a severe distribution of prominence to the many detachments.

The left wing of the Sixteenth Corps, the other wing not being in this campaign, arrived at Chattanooga in the evening of May 5, in the cars, the batteries and transportation following by road from Pulaski, Tennessee, and Athens, Alabama.

The same evening General McPherson's orders arrived to take the initiative for his army, and to move to Gordon's Mills. While marching there the next day, verbal orders came to push a portion of my command forward toward Villanow, and seize

Ship's Gap. Sprague's Brigade, of the Fourth Division, did this at midnight of the same day, and the next day we had passed through and occupied Villanow.

The third day (May 8), my command, with the Second Division in advance, moved rapidly to Snake Creek Gap, one day before my orders had contemplated, they advising me to march when the Fifteenth Corps had closed up on me.

I had heard from General McPherson, personally however, that the object was to threaten Johnston's flank and communications, and the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, supported by the Thirty-ninth Iowa, went forward through the Gap to Sugar Creek Valley, a portion of the Corps without transportation, following, and intrenching that night, thus holding its eastern outlet.

On the evening of May 8, instead of May 9, I was astonished to find this strong position, the sidegate to Johnston's rear, not only undefended but unoccupied, though a few men might have held it.

Having reported the fact to General McPherson, and also that Colonel Phillips reported Resaca occupied by a Brigade of the enemy, I received his orders to march at 6 o'clock next morning, the 9th of May, toward Resaca, and there await specific orders and instructions. The object of the movement was stated to be a demonstration upon Resaca, while other troops were to cut the railroad north of that place.

At daylight of the 9th, my advance, consisting of a regiment of mounted infantry, supported by a regiment of infantry, was attacked by Fergusin's Brigade of the enemy's Cavalry, and Colonel Phillips was severely wounded.

We drove the enemy rapidly before us to Rome Crossroads, where I received orders to advance upon Resaca, to press forward until I should succeed in developing the enemy in line of battle, or in his fortifications, but not to attack him there without orders.

I was also ordered to hold the Calhoun and Dalton Crossroads, about two miles west of Resaca, if I became possessed of it, until the Fifteenth Corps arrived. These orders were obeyed, my force skirmishing heavily the entire distance to the Calhoun Crossroads.

The enemy was discovered in line of battle on Bald Hill, three-quarters of a mile west of Resaca, and also in his works at Resaca.

I placed the Fourth Division at the crossroads, formed the Second Division in two lines, and carried the hill and holding them under instructions, awaited my orders from General McPherson, to whom I had promptly reported, sending, I think, my staff officer, Captain Edward Jonas, telling General Mc-

Pherson that if we could make a prompt attack we could carry Resaca, as the enemy in my front gave way readily, and that though prisoners had reported the arrival of Canty's Brigade the night before, I did not believe it, as no such force as a Division showed in our front.

General McPherson soon came upon the ground in person. He directed me to send some mounted men up the Dalton road to reconnoiter the country and find an approach to the railroad, while he would go back and bring up the Fifteenth (Logan's) Corps.

Until the Corps arrived, I was to hold the Bald Hill indicated, and the Dalton and Calhoun Crossroads. I sent all the mounted men I had with me at the time, 18 in number (of the Ninth Illinois) under Captain Hughes. They proceeded toward Dalton, struck the railroad two miles south of Tilton, and found it strongly patrolled by cavalry. They cut the telegraph wires, burned a wood station, and reported to me again at dark.

Meanwhile the enemy came marching out of Resaca up the Dalton Railroad, and I ordered the Fourth Division to march from Calhoun Crossroads and to intercept them, and to take position on the railroad north of Resaca. This order was reported to General McPherson promptly; he replied that I must hold the crossroads until relieved.

It was about 4 o'clock when I finally received from one of General McPherson's staff officers the information that the Fifteenth Corps was closing up and that I was now at liberty to carry out my movement against the railroad.

It was intrusted by me to General Veatch, with Fuller's and Sprague's Brigade of his Division (the Fourth). The Second Division was stationed on Bald Hill, which I had occupied about noon, and the left of this Division was now assailed with musketry, while the marching Division was fired upon as they advanced in column in full view of the enemy.

Fuller, in the advance, moved with spirit across the west fork of Mill Creek, crossed an open field, and the skirmish line was up to the timber skirting the railroad, when another order came from General McPherson to look to my right, as the enemy was massing to strike me there. I was with Fuller's advance at this time and the enemy that had come out of Resaca had opened on Fuller's troops in the open field.

Nearby was a good cover of woods on the east side of the creek, to attain which I changed the direction of Fuller's column more to the north; his skirmish line took some prisoners; the morning rumor was confirmed by them that Canty's Brigade had arrived.

Fuller steadily advanced, however, and as soon as his skirmish lines debouched from the woods, a regiment of the enemy's infantry and a battery in position opened directly upon his right and front. Another notice had been received from General McPherson, as we got to the roads, that Sprague's Brigade was not following us, having been arrested by him to hold the space between the Second and the advance of the Fourth Division.

While Fuller was executing the movement to gain the railroad, a final order came to me from General McPherson to halt the column, and to repair in person to him back of Bald Hill occupied by the Second Division. There I found General McPherson and General Logan with the advance of Logan's Fifteenth Corps. They were discussing the propriety of an attack upon Resaca. General Logan asked me what I thought of the situation and if we could carry the place. I replied I thought we could. Logan responded that he was glad I had so much faith.

McPherson appeared to feel the responsibility of his orders from the Commander of the Army, as well as the responsibility of holding the gap we had already seized. He listened attentively to the conversation, to my description of the position, and to the nature of the orders I had given. He reluctantly gave orders for us to return immediately.

The Sixteenth Corps withdrew over the eight miles they had already marched that day, reaching the eastern debouche of the gap at midnight. I had with the entire Corps only 17 wagons since leaving Chattanooga.

My transportation had not yet come up, and the men and animals had been without any food for a day and a half other than what could be afforded by the poor and picked country we had marched over.

A day or two after our return to the gap, General McPherson stated to me the contents of a letter or letters from General Sherman commenting upon the march to Resaca. He seemed to feel that their criticism amounted to censure, but he had assumed the responsibility.

He said a part of one of his Corps was still west of the Gap, guarding trains; that he could not have thrown his whole force across the railroad, as they were situated, and that he looked for his vindication to the successful termination of the campaign. He said:

We had ascertained, from prisoners taken the day of the advance to Resaca, that the enemy knew just what force had passed through the Gap, and where the balance of the army was. He made the final decision to return to the Gap between

5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, being satisfied nothing could be accomplished by attacking an entrenched post that late in the day.

At Snake Creek Gap we waited three days, seeing the whole army move through the pass we had captured, "to Johnston's complete surprise," and fortifying Sugar Creek Valley. May 13, the Fourth Division of my Corps formed on the right of the Fifteenth Corps, resting on the Oostenaula River, and took part in the attack on Resaca.

My Second Division (Sweeney's), May 14, went on to Lay's Ferry, below Resaca, to cross the Oostenaula River and threaten Johnston's communications. General Rice with the advance Brigade crossed in the face of Walker's Division. As soon as this movement in the rear was accomplished, Johnston began to retreat from Resaca, which he had defended a second time with his whole army, and which he "only evacuated because his safety demanded it."

I desire only to refer to the action of July 4, described in the Memoirs as "noisy but not desperate."

The Fourth Division of my Corps, under General Fuller, pressed forward on that day, crossing the Nickajack Creek at Ruff's Mill, driving the enemy before us, until, after two miles of skirmishing, we developed him in strong entrenchments and in a very heavy force.

The Memoirs imply that this was the head of the column of the Army of the Cumberland, and unintentionally leave it to be inferred that the storming of the works was General Thomas' performance. It was General McPherson who sent me a message to attack at discretion, or if I thought I could, carry the works. A prisoner informed me that Hood's Corps was before me, and I proceeded to reconnoiter their works, which I found very strong, but, as I observed a singular confusion there, indicative of retreating, and knew that the 4th of July would be a good day to assault, I formed a charging column of a part of the Fourth Division, the 39th and 27th Ohio, and the 64th Illinois Infantry of my Corps, under command of Colonel E. F. Noyes.

A supporting column was made up of the Sixty-sixth Illinois and the Second Iowa of the Second Division. Noyes moved forward with gallantry, although he fell at the first fire and lost his leg, but through almost impenetrable abattis and fallen timber, the men went over the intrenchments, and took 100 prisoners, and they so settled the enemy's confusion, if any there was, that the whole of that line was soon abandoned.

I now come to the last subject of my letter, the battle of the 22d of July, where General McPherson lost his life.

The movement ordered by General Sherman, of the transfer of the Army of the Tennessee from the right to the extreme left of the combined armies began June 9.

Marching from Sand Town, by the rear to the left, on the 9th of July, the Sixteenth Corps, bivouacked, at 10 o'clock at night, near Marietta, continued on at 3 o'clock, in the dark of the morning, and that day had crossed the Chattahoochee, spanned it with a foot-bridge 700 feet long, covered it with a long tete-du-pont and intrenched on the Atlanta side.

The march was 31 miles, the heat was intense, yet the men were uncomplaining and ardent, and for nearly three days more they worked in reliefs of 1,000 in the mud and water until we completed, July 13, at Roswell, Ga., a double-track trestle bridge 14 feet high and 710 feet long. The material used was standing timber and some cotton mills. Over this bridge the entire army of the Tennessee, with trains and artillery, passed.

On the 17th the command moved toward Decatur, cutting a new road so as not to infringe upon the Seventeenth and Twenty-third Corps, which took the old roads, keeping its communication with those Corps; the Sixteenth advanced behind its pioneers, preceded by the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, which skirmished with the enemy at Nancy's Creek and drove them across. Here one of my scouts, who had left Atlanta that morning, brought the first intelligence of Hood having superseded Johnston, which was at once sent to Generals Sherman and McPherson.

Decatur was occupied July 19, after a heavy skirmish and artillery fighting, and Colonel Sprague, with Second Brigade of Fourth Division, was placed there to relieve General Gerard's Cavalry Division, and to guard the trains. As we approached Atlanta the converging Corps forced the Sixteenth Corps out of line, and a series of transfers began.

On the 21st of July General Fuller, with First Brigade, Fourth Division, was put in reserve to the Seventeenth Corps, and United States Regular Battery F, of the Fourth Division, was put in front line of General Giles A. Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Corps.

My Second Division, under General Sweeney, moved forward three-quarters of a mile beyond its old position to a range of hills, the enemy contesting this advance very sharply, and intrenched there. At 4 o'clock the next morning General Sweeney reported to me that the enemy had disappeared from his front; whereupon, I ordered him to push forward a heavy skirmish line. He soon found the enemy in force, in works surrounding Atlanta.

The Second Division being displaced by the contraction of the lines, and the Fifteenth and Twenty-third Corps closing up on each other, General McPherson ordered me to move to the left of the army, and place Fuller's First Brigade on the left of the new position to be assumed by the Seventeenth Corps, and hold the rest of the command in reserve on the extreme left.

Before this was done, I rode with General McPherson from his headquarters to the front on the direct Decatur and Atlanta road. It was quite early in the morning, the day of the Battle of Atlanta. The sudden evacuation of the enemy was surprising to both of us, and gave General McPherson serious concern. He requested me to return immediately to my command and get the troops upon the ground they were to occupy and first examine that ground myself and choose a position on the left of the Seventeenth Corps, and also to feel towards the wagon road running from Atlanta south.

I started at once. There was a crossroad leading to the left from the Atlanta road, in the rear of the Fifteenth, and passing through the left of the Seventeenth Corps, by which I gave orders for the Sixteenth Corps to march, while I went forward rapidly with my engineers and a part of my staff to select the new position.

I rode out beyond the Seventeenth Corps, far in advance and within easy musket-range of the works of Atlanta, passing the pioneers of the Seventeenth Corps intrenching the new line. The stillness was oppressive and I thought almost ominous. I could plainly see the enemy's troops working on their fortifications on the south side of Atlanta, and they allowed myself and staff to approach within easy musket range, not firing upon us until we turned about to return after having picked out the ground for the Corps.

As we retired, the enemy opened on us briskly with musket and artillery. I at once sent word to General Fuller to send out working parties to intrench his line on the new position, and for the Second Division to move to the rear of the Seventeenth Corps and bivouac.

While passing through the Seventeenth Corps, I left an order for Murray's Second U. S. Battery to join its command, and also met General Giles A. Smith, commanding the left Division of the Seventeenth Corps, who told me that the Seventeenth Corps would not move into their new position until night.

Immediately on receiving this information I sent General Sweeney orders to halt and bivouac his Division (the Second) where he then was, viz, about three-fourths of a mile in the

rear of the Fifteenth Corps (General Logan's), and on the right and rear of the Seventeenth (General Blair's).

At noon I reached General Fuller's headquarters, in the rear of the Seventeenth Corps and almost directly on an extension of the line of Sweeney's Division, which had halted upon receiving my order, and was resting by the roadside.

While at Fuller's headquarters I heard straggling shots fired to the east and to the left of General Sweeney's Division, which warned me, and I ordered General Fuller to put his command immediately in position, and spoke to him of the gap of about one-quarter of a mile that had existed between him and General Giles A. Smith, and of the exposed condition of the left flank of our army.

I called his attention to the position of the ammunition train of the army, on the right of Fuller and in the rear of General Smith, where they were very much exposed, but I had scarcely given General Fuller his orders when the report came in that the enemy was in force in our rear, and developing far beyond Sweeney.

I sent a staff-officer to General Sweeney on the minute, with orders to immediately close on Fuller, (and he had already sent forward skirmishers in the direction of the enemy's fire) and developed the enemy in large force. The Second Division had just got into position when Hood's army appeared in force, advancing in three columns.

I waited until the enemy was fully developed, then dispatched a staff officer to General Giles A. Smith, telling him that the enemy was attacking in his rear, that he must refuse his left and join with Fuller. My staff-officer came back with the information that General Smith had not then been attacked, and the enemy was all developing beyond my right in the timber, covering Fuller's right flank, with their skirmish line extending around to the left of Sweeney.

I observed no movement of General Smith, and became very anxious for the safety of that flank. I sent another staff-officer to General Smith, giving him fully the position of the enemy and telling him that a very large force was upon our rear. General Smith was by this time apprised of the fact of the enemy's intentions, from the general attack which had been made along my whole line.

It was afterwards made plain to me by General Smith why he hesitated to comply with my first request. He was in the act of refusing his left, when General McPherson sent him orders to hold his ground, and that reinforcements would be sent to him, or his left protected. General McPherson had evidently sent this without knowing the position of the enemy as fully

as I did. I received no orders from General McPherson during the battle.

In moving out of the timber into the open field in my front, now the rear of the army, one of the enemy's columns of attack (the center column) struck a mill pond, or some other obstruction, just on the edge of an open field, and became entangled, retarding its progress and exposing the flank of the other column.

I saw that something had confused the enemy, and immediately ordered Colonel Mersey's Brigade to charge the advance column on the exposed flank, and also sent orders to Fuller to instantly charge the enemy in his front and to take advantage of their embarrassment. Both commands moved promptly, and fell upon the enemy and drove them back across the field, and I have no doubt this saved my command.

While this attack was progressing, not hearing from the staff-officer I sent to General Smith, and seeing that the enemy was passing to my right in the rear, and far down the line of the Seventeenth Corps, I sent another staff-officer to that flank, who must have passed up the road a short time before General McPherson, for he found General Giles A. Smith hotly engaged and unable to move.

Fortunately, two batteries that were in line were in the center of Sweeney's Division, on a knoll naturally strong, covering both the right and left of Sweeney's Division. This knoll being the apex of the formation of Sweeney's Division, and the road turning west at that point, Sweeney followed the direction of the road, forming his line right where his men were resting.

These two batteries fired very effectively upon the enemy's advance forces, pouring into them canister at short range. The fire was so destructive and Mersey's charge so furious that the enemy soon gave way on their front and fell back to the timber, General Fuller advanced rapidly across the field driving the enemy before him, developed them in a gap between General Smith and his right, and drawing a rapid fire on his right flank from the body of the enemy that had poured around the left of the Seventeenth Corps, he promptly changed front with a portion of his Division and, under a galling fire, moved on the enemy in the timber, clearing that point.

The Sixty-fourth Illinois pushed in between the main column of the enemy and their advance in the timber and captured their skirmish line—the same that killed General McPherson a few minutes before and who were then in possession of his papers and effects, including his orders, which we obtained.

The fighting in General Fuller's front was very severe, and the ground contested inch by inch, his artillery doing very effective service. Finally, the enemy fell back along Fuller's whole line, and I swung my right in order to bring it into line with the Brigade that McPherson had ordered up to General Giles A. Smith's aid, which had been forced to take position to the right and somewhat to the rear of Fuller's advance.

The Seventeenth Corps reformed its left at right angles with the original lines, and joined this Brigade. This brought the enemy well to our front, and there we kept them the rest of the day. Major-General McPherson arrived on the ground during the attack on me; stood near the ammunition train on the right of my line, watching the result of my counter-charge upon the enemy.

As soon as the tide turned in my favor he followed a road through the timber, leading from Fuller's right before the advance of the left of the Seventeenth Corps, still unaware of the advance of the enemy into the gap between Fuller's right and the Seventeenth Corps.

About half an hour after my first repulse of the enemy, I received a report that General McPherson was wounded and it was about 3 P. M. before I was aware he was dead.

About 4 P. M. General Logan called, in person, for aid to drive back the enemy on the Decatur and Atlanta road, where he had made a sortie and gained a temporary advantage, breaking through General Morgan L. Smith's Division of the Fifteenth Corps. I sent the Second Brigade of the Second Division, under Colonel Mersey, accompanied by Captain Jonas of my staff.

Mersey's Brigade immediately went into line and moved down the main road, participating in the charge with General Wood's Division of the Fifteenth Corps, retook the works and batteries that had been lost, Colonel Mersey receiving a wound in his leg, having his horse killed under him. General Morgan L. Smith, who witnessed Colonel Mersey's attack, sent by Captain Jonas a very complimentary message as to Colonel Mersey's charge and its success. When General Logan called for Mersey's Brigade, he told me that if the enemy again attacked me and I needed help to call upon General J. D. Cox, of the Twenty-third Corps. At 5 P. M. the enemy made a demonstration on my extreme left, and I requested General Cox to send me a Brigade, which he promptly did. The enemy, however, only opened with artillery.

Again Mersey's Brigade was called into action about midnight, when General Logan ordered two regiments from it to occupy the hill, that had been hotly contested in line of the Seventeenth Corps, and relieve the troops of that command.

Mersey's troops promptly executed the request, crawling on their hands and knees, finding the enemy in the ditch on the outside and driving them out.

The time of Colonel Mersey's Brigade had expired; they were exempt from participating in this battle, had they chosen to avail themselves of this right, and were awaiting transportation north. They fought successfully on different parts of the field, suffering heavy loss in killed and wounded. General Sprague, who was at Decatur holding that town, covering the trains of the Army of the Tennessee with three regiments of his Brigade and six guns of the Chicago Board of Trade Battery and one section of the Eighth Michigan Artillery, was attacked by the enemy in overwhelming numbers.

Two Divisions of Wheeler's Cavalry, dismounted, charged upon Sprague from three different directions. General Sprague concentrated his command, and, after a doubtful and determined contest, held the enemy in check and gained a position north of the town, which he was able to keep. In their charge the enemy twice got possession of Sprague's artillery but were immediately driven from it.

General Sprague, by his good generalship and hard fighting, saved the trains of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps at Decatur and en route from Roswell to the army. The trains on the march were guarded by the Ninth Illinois, and the Forty-third Ohio, which regiments, upon their arrival at Decatur, went promptly into the action.

The Sixteenth Corps, at the time of Hood's attack, was in the rear of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps, stretched out upon a common wagon road. Three Brigades disposed in single line, numbering about forty-five hundred men and not in line with the other Corps, had met the attack of the rebel army, staggered it at the first onset, and driven it back with great slaughter, leaving the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands.

Any failure of the part of the Sixteenth Corps to check the enemy's advance when he was already in our rear and certain of success, would have been disastrous to the whole Army of the Tennessee. The fortunate topography of the ground, the intelligence of the commanders, and the alacrity and bravery of the troops, enabled us to take advantage of the confusion created in the enemy's ranks, on finding this Corps prepared for attack, and to rout the enemy.

The disparity of the forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by the two Brigades under Fuller and Mersey, they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight Brigades, and three Divisions. These two Brigades brought back eight battle flags from the enemy.

After the fight, 422 of the enemy's dead were buried in my front, and large numbers of the wounded were cared for in my hospitals. The Sixteenth Corps suffered terribly in the Battle of Atlanta. Their loss in killed and wounded was 854 out of 5,400 men engaged, and nearly every field officer of my command was killed or wounded.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. M. DODGE,
Council Bluffs, Iowa. Maj. Gen. U. S. A.
November 30, 1875.

There had been, at many meetings of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, discussions of the Battle of Shiloh, and at a meeting of the Army of the Tennessee in Cincinnati, April 6, 1891, General Sherman gave his views as follows:

Comrades and Friends:

We are again assembled, pursuant to adjournment of our last meeting in Chicago, and according to the constitution of our Society. It was once said that the Army of the Tennessee could safely meet on any day of the year, and that day would prove to be an anniversary of some one of our battles, but it is plain to me that the local committee has chosen this particular day because it is the anniversary of the battle of Shiloh, which gave us much of the fame of which we, the survivors, believe we have just reasons to be proud.

Nineteen years ago tonight we lay on the bare ground in heavy rain, after a bloody battle, to steal a few hours of rest and sleep, certain the next day to renew a struggle which, for better or worse, was to have a tremendous influence on the history of our race.

I do not intend to enter on a narrative of events, for I have already done that in print; nor do I wish to revive any of the controversies to which that great battle has given rise, like Waterloo, Gettysburg, Koniggratz, and hundreds of others, but simply to ask your indulgence for the few minutes of time allotted to me, to illustrate some of the minor phases common to all battles.

In Badeau's Military History we have recorded, substantially, General Grant's account of the antecedent events, and of the battle itself. In Volume 7 of the United States Military Reports of the Rebellion, compiled by Colonel R. N. Scott, we have two hundred and thirty-four pages of the official reports of the commanders of divisions, brigades, regiments and detachments; and in Volume 3, part one, of the same compilation, we have two hundred and forty-eight pages of the Con-

federate reports of the same battle. Besides these, I have in the course of my official life examined thousands of pages of other manuscript matter, all more or less bearing upon this particular battle, and my conclusion is that General Badeau's condensed account is as near the exact truth as history will likely reach; and that my own account is good enough to stand by—being the exact truth from my own standpoint.

These varied accounts of the same general event illustrate what has been remarked by every lawyer—that the best witnesses, testifying in court, will describe the same thing differently, just as every landscape in nature presents a different aspect from each point of the compass. Every man naturally exaggerates the importance of what he himself has done and seen, and correspondingly depreciates that of which he saw nothing; and it is perfectly consistent with truth that those who were near Shiloh church on the eventful days of April 6 and 7, 1862, should vary, in their narrative of events, from those who remained at the steamboat landing, three miles away; or the more intelligent and disinterested observers who wrote from their offices at Paducah and Cairo, two hundred miles away. Yet for our present purpose it is sufficient for us to know that on the 6th of April, 1862, five Divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped in the woods back of Pittsburg Landing on the upper Tennessee river; that our numbers were about 32,000 men; that we were attacked furiously by the rebel army, ably commanded, composed of at least 42,000 men; that we fought unaided during all that day; were beaten back step by step, till at night we formed two sides of a rectangle, the right covering Snake Creek bridge, and the left a ravine about the steam-boat landing: that we were not beaten or demoralized, but were abandoned by many of our comrades and dreadfully exhausted, with nine thousand of our comrades dead or mangled on the field, mingled with an equal number of our foes; that during that night we were reinforced by Lew Wallace's Division of our own army, and by three Divisions of Buell's Army of the Ohio, just arrived from Nashville, and that on the next day we swept the field and gained a glorious victory for our country, the moral effect of which lasted throughout the war.

Notwithstanding that we now have the official statements of the chief actors in that drama, I am conscious that some of the good people of Cincinnati prefer to believe the first account of their own "reporters on the spot," viz, at Paducah and Cairo, who gathered their knowledge from fugitives and deserters; yet we, who remained to the last, prefer to believe each other; and in this connection I propose to recount some of the smaller episodes not heretofore given.

General James H. Wilson, who commanded a Cavalry Corps about the end of the war, tells of his once approaching the heads of his column, engaged in a noisy skirmish, when he met one of his men hurrying back to the rear, evidently demoralized. He called on him to halt, and commenced calling him hard names, among others, "coward." The man protested he was not a coward, but insisted that "he had lost confidence in his Colonel." So at Shiloh, some men lost faith in their colonels and naturally justified themselves by decrying their commanders.

My camp, or bivouac, was on a small hill near the old log house called "Shiloh Meeting House," which gave name to the battle. We had a colored man called "Bustamente," who was our cook, and looked after our horses. I remember that morning well; we all mounted our horses after an early breakfast and started to the front. The battle soon began and none of us had much time to think of our camp afterwards. During all that day we fought, and night found us a mile to the rear of our camp, which was in possession of our enemy. The next day we gained ground steadily, and about 4 P. M. I was again on horseback close by our old camp; the tents were still standing, though riddled with bullets. At the picket rope in front lay two of my horses, dead. Dead bodies of men in blue and gray lay around thick, side by side, and scraps of paper show what was the fact—that Beauregard, Breckenridge and Bragg, old personal friends, had slept the night before in my camp, and had carried away my scanty bedding. That night of the 7th, as I lay side by side with the dead, I wondered what had become of Bustamente.

His dead body was not there; he was neither "present or accounted for." Several days passed, and we had become convinced that our enemy had gone, and gone in disorder and retreat. But where was Bustamente? About five days after the battle, returning from an extensive reconnoissance, tired and weary, who should appear but the veritable Bustamente himself, radiant and undoubtedly happy to resume his place as cook and hostler. "Where have you been, you old rascal?" "Why, master, this was no place for sich as me; I done git out, cotched a steamboat and went to Paducah; heard you was all right again and here I is." And there he was, sure enough, and he served us well for many a weary month afterward. I think Bustamente was not only right, but reasonably prudent. The 6th of April, 1862, was not a healthy place for "sich as he," but for some others I can never be as charitable.

My aide-de-camp, General Sanger, also had a colored servant whom he had brought from Illinois, who stayed near

us all that day—generally availed himself of the cover of a good sized tree, but I recall with gratitude that at night he came to us with some hard biscuit and boiled pork, which he said he had found in McArthur's camp. Again the next day, April 7, he FOUND in some sutler's camp a big cheese, which he brought to us and spread out on a log; which cheese formed the basis of a claim against Uncle Sam for loyal property appropriated by the army in the subsistence of his troops, and for the evidence of which that sutler persecuted me for years afterwards.

There is no movement laid down in tactics so intricate and skillful as the "zigzag" that boy would perform in coming from the rear to the front with a cigar, or anything called for; down behind a log, then a bee line for a big tree, a good peep around the corner, then a run for another tree, till he was in sight of the party sought for, when signals were begun. We have always given General Albert Meyer the credit of being the author of our system of army signals, vulgarly known as the "Wig-wag," but I must testify that Sanger's boy practiced them in the woods at Shiloh before any of us had ever heard of the army signal service.

For some days after the Battle of Shiloh, and during the march to Corinth, my camp was often visited by my old class-mate and friend, George H. Thomas, and his staff, and it was as good as a farce, when at table, to watch that boy hand to Thomas quicker than Signor Blitz, and Lagow and the Staff rarely managed to get anything else than "commissary," whilst Thomas and his favorites always got the best in camp.

In the very crisis of the battle of April 16, about 4 o'clock P. M., when my Division occupied the line from Snake Creek bridge to the forks of the Corinth and Purdy road, there occurred an incident I have never seen recorded. Birge's sharpshooters or "Squirrel-tail's" occupied the stables, granaries and house near the bridge as a strong flank. My Division occupied a double line from it, along what had once been a lane, with its fences thrown down and the blackberry and sassafras bushes still marking the border of an open cotton field in front, and the left was a ravine near which Major Ezra Taylor had assembled some ten or twelve guns. This ravine was densely wooded and extended to the front nearly two hundred yards, and I feared it might be occupied by the enemy, who, from behind the trees, could drive the gunners from their posts. I ordered the Colonel of one of my regiments to occupy that ravine to anticipate the enemy, but he did not quickly catch my meaning or comprehend the tactics by which he could fulfill my purpose. I remember well that Colonel Thomas W. Sweeney, a one-armed officer who had lost an arm

in the Mexican war, but did not belong to my command, stood near by and quickly spoke up: "I understand perfectly what you want, let me do it." "Certainly," said I. "Sweeney, go at once and occupy that ravine, converting it into a regular bastion." He did it, and I attach more importance to that event than to any of the hundred single achievements which I have since heard "saved the day," for we held that line and ravine all night, and the next morning advanced from there to certain victory.

In like manner, on the 8th, when I was ordered by General Grant to move forward with one of my own Brigades and another of Thomas J. Wood's Division of the Army of the Ohio, to ascertain if the rebel army had actually retreated to Corinth, or were simply repairing damages to renew the attack, I led in person Hildebrand's Brigade. We reached, about six miles out, an old cotton field with deadened timber standing, fences all down, and mud in the road and in the plowed field ankle deep. Seeing ahead a large number of tents with men and horses moving about, I concluded to deploy a couple of companies of the leading regiment forward at "five paces interval," with the remaining eight companies in line to support, leaving the rest of the Brigade to follow along the road by the flank. I gave the orders in person, and the Colonel confessed that he knew not what I wanted or how to perform so simple a tactical maneuver. Thus were we forced to teach tactics on the very field of battle. Fortunately, Major Fearing, now a citizen of Cincinnati, spoke out, "I know what you want and can do it," and promptly he deployed the leading companies as "skirmishers," by the right flank across that old cotton field, with the remainder of the regiment in line following in support. As we approached the ridge, down came with a yell, Forrest's cavalry firing right and left with pistols, over the skirmish line, over the supports, and right in among me and my staff. Fortunately, I had sent my adjutant, Hammond, back to have the Brigade come forward into line quickly. My aide-de-camp, McCoy, was knocked down, horse and rider, into the mud; but I and the rest of my staff ingloriously fled, pell mell through the mud, closely followed by Forrest and his men, with pistols already emptied. We sought safety behind the Brigade in the act of forming "forward into line" and Forrest and his followers were in turn "surprised" by a fire of the Brigade, which emptied many a saddle, and gave Forrest himself a painful wound, but he escaped to the woods on the south of the road. We promptly moved the whole Brigade in line of battle over that cotton field to the ridge, and captured the LAST of the rebel hospitals in charge of Surgeon Lyle.

McCoy came in afterwards, covered with mud, but in possession of a jaded horse which he had picked up, different from his own, but there was no one to question his title, and on the whole he concluded he had got the best of the bargain.

All who were with me on that 8th of April will recall the scenes of desolation and misery we beheld by the roadside and at the hospital camp of Surgeon Lyle. Wagons hauling in dead men and dumping them on the ground, as cordwood, for burial in long trenches, like sardines in a box. Wounded men with mangled legs and arms, and heads half shot away, horrible to behold, and still more wounded appealing for water, and for help in any form. If there be any lesson I would impress on the young of today it would be to warn them against the men who make war necessary; men who, like Jeff Davis, Yancy and Toombs, usually arouse the passions and prejudices of their fellow mortals 'til war becomes a necessity, whilst they, the real cause, hold back and leave their deluded followers to catch all the blows and buffets of the storm which they had no hand in creating. I wish that some man, Dr. Lyle himself, would paint in true and graphic colors, what he saw and endured on that 8th day of April, 1862, on the ridge behind Pittsburg Landing, for I believe it would be better warning against war in the future than all the humiliations of Appomattox and Greensboro.

I have seen Forrest since the war; have talked with him about this very matter, and he explained that he was left behind by Breckenridge to protect this hospital camp, and if possible to check the pursuit of our forces, which was naturally expected after the close of the Battle of Shiloh. I am sure that had he not emptied his pistols before he passed the skirmish line, my career would have ended right there.

War has its ludicrous, its farcial features, as well as everyday life. Everyone can at this distance of time recall events at which he laughed as heartily as he ever mourned the death of a comrade. I remember today the expression on the face of an Arkansas ranger, brought in as a prisoner of war, leading a sorrel mare into our camp near Corinth. When led up to me he said, "General, he (pointing to the guard) fooled me; he had on a white hat, and called out, 'come over here;' I came over, and he said, 'you are my prisoner.'" It was the white hat that caught him. Then the Arkansas man said: "General, you are not going to take my horse, are you?" "Certainly," I said, "your horse is captured property." "But it is a race horse," said he. "All the better," said I, and I think one of my staff-officers rode that same sorrel mare many hundred miles afterwards, but I never saw that ranger again. The provost marshal took him in.

All reliable accounts agree that General C. F. Smith posted the army at Pittsburg Landing to fulfill General Halleck's instructions of March 1st, 1862; that General U. S. Grant succeeded to the command, and exercised it at the time of the battle, and that Division commanders ranked in the order of McClernand, Lew Wallace, Sherman, Hurlburt, Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace; yet I am often held responsible by the critics for the "surprise and stampede" of the fugitives, although it is equally well known that McPherson and I had previously reconnoitered the country forward for ten miles and had been skirmishing with the enemy for several days prior to the battle. I have never been in battle but what somebody was surprised. A good many persons were surprised at Shiloh, but there were none but what had a fair notice to be ready for anything—for everything that might happen, and the report that anybody was bayoneted in bed has long since been exploded. Prentiss' Division and mine were in the extreme front—were all ready when the blow came, and all the others were behind us and had ample time for preparation. The simple truth is that we were on the west bank of the Tennessee with a purpose to attack the enemy's position at Corinth; that General Buell's army of the Ohio was marching from Nashville to reinforce us, and that the rebel general, Albert Sydney Johnston, resolved not to wait our attack on Corinth, but to attack us before Buell could arrive.

His army was divided into three Corps, commanded by Polk, Bragg and Hardee, with reserve commanded by Breckenridge. His object was to capture or destroy us before these reinforcements could arrive. He failed in this most signally, and therefore to us belonged the victory—a victory little appreciated at that time, and not fully comprehended today. But that victory was one of the most important which has ever occurred on this continent. It dissipated forever that nonsense of one southern man whipping "a dozen Yankees." It gave us the prestige, which we had only to follow up, as we did at Corinth, at Iuka, at Vicksburg, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Columbia and Raleigh—yea, to the end of the war, to assure absolute success.

I have always estimated the victories of the Army of the Tennessee at Fort Donelson and Shiloh as the most valuable of all, because of their moral effect. They gave our men confidence in themselves, and in a corresponding degree shook the confidence of southern men in their own prowess, for at no subsequent battle did they ever attack with as much vehemence and perseverance as they did on the morning of April 6. The battle of Shiloh was the precursor of many subsequent victories which ended, as all the world knows, in the

TRIUMPH of our arms and of our cause, so that we have reason to assemble here tonight in commemoration of that eventful battle.

General H. W. Halleck at that time was in chief command over all the armies in the West, with his headquarters in St. Louis, but soon after, he came to Shiloh in person with many able and experienced staff-officers, among them Colonel George Thom, then and now of the engineer's corps. He caused the battlefield to be surveyed, and his map is still the standard one. But Colonel Thom was not present before or during the battle. I am convinced he has located on his map the several Divisions incorrectly. I know such is the case with regard to my own, and believe so in regard to others, and, therefore, I have had prepared a tracing of this map and have located the troops as I believe they were at the beginning and end of the first day. The map, as thus modified, tells the story of the battle.

The many roads indicated on this map did not exist at the time we first reached Pittsburg Landing, nor at the time of the battle. Then there was but one single road—the Corinth road, which reached the river, affording room for only four or five boats to unload, but as other boats accumulated, other roads were improvised up the hill from the water's edge to the general plateau above, and new roads were made by the wagons hauling supplies from the boats to the several camps. All these roads as marked on the maps were mud roads; not roads at all in a military sense, but simply open ways by which six mules could haul about a ton of freight from the river to the camps. The general plateau, excepting the cleared fields, was wooded with oak, maple and hickory, the latter in some places so thick that there was real difficulty in forcing one's way through on horseback.

I know there are many present in this room tonight who can verify the changes I suggest, and I will leave this traced map with the Secretary of the Society for future use.

General Sherman and his army were very often criticised for acts said to be committed by stragglers, such as pillaging, robbery, etc. If this was true, it was absolutely against all the orders. General Sherman held to the policy, that in the enemy's country, where necessary, they should live off of the country, and he had full precedent in this by every other nation.

The English were very critical in this matter, but anyone

can read of the campaign of the Duke of Wellington, who practiced and upheld this policy. He followed it in Portugal and Spain. Writing to the Earl of Liverpool, February 23, 1811, he says:

The French have shown throughout the war in the Peninsula, but particularly in the last campaign in Portugal, that they operate on the flank and rear and communications of their enemy, never having any anxiety about their own. And this system is the consequence of the mode in which they subsist their army.

They plunder everything they find in the country, every article, whether of food or raiment, and every animal and vehicle of every description is considered to belong of right and without payment to the French army.

His campaigns were noted for the pillaging of his soldiers and the living off of the country.

Napoleon quartered his armies on the enemy and subsisted off of the country. Germany, Austria and Russia did the same, but they did not do it in as orderly a manner or under such strict instruction as Sherman's army did.

General Sherman says in answer to these criticisms:

The Army of the Tennessee traversed the land from Paducah to Memphis, and from Vicksburg to Washington, inland, a distance of more than two thousand miles of country, sparsely populated, with families wide apart, the male members of which were in the ranks of our opposing armies, and in the two years—1864-65—I heard of but two cases of rape. Again, all the able-bodied white men of the South were in the armies of the Confederacy, far away from their homes, leaving their families to the care of the black slaves. Now I do not know a single instance where the females of any family were abused by the blacks. These black slaves labored for their master's wives and daughters, protected them, and never, to my knowledge, in a single instance violated that sacred trust, although they well understood that our success would be their freedom, and the success of their masters would doom them to another long period of slavery. If for no other reason than this, every southern gentleman, every southern man who claims to be a descendant of the proud Chevaliers and Hugenots, should honor the black man for his fidelity in that dread

period; should protect him in all his acquired rights, and aid him to rise to the scale of social and political life. It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring force to bear on the individual living in a prejudiced community, as for instance in Utah, and in the South, where slavery had made the common white citizen (the juryman) regard the negro as necessarily his inferior, because no man in this country can be punished for crime, save on presentment by the Grand Jury, and after trial by a petit jury on the vicinage. This, our Constitution, our fundamental law, which the President, Congress and all the courts must enforce, was unquestionably meant by our forefathers to protect the weak against the strong, but now it shelters the guilty against the humane purposes of the law. Prejudices will, however, gradually disappear; they have largely disappeared in our day, and we who believe in the triumph of abstract, have faith that the day will come, in good time, when all men will be absolutely and perfectly equal before the law. Time is the great physician, and we who can compare the state of feeling and of facts in 1861, can measure the future by this scale of twenty years, and thereby prognosticate what will be the probable state of feeling and of facts in this, our country, at the end of the present century. We believe that history will adjudge the Civil War to have been not only one of the greatest, but one of the best wars that ever occurred on earth, and that the Army of the Tennessee accomplished a large share in its beneficent results.

On December 21, 1884, Colonel F. D. Grant informed me that he had just come from Dr. Fordyce Baker, who told him that his father could not live long; perhaps a month or two; perhaps not so long. He said that Governor Fish and Dr. Newman were the only ones that knew it. I was thunder-struck, for only the Sunday before I was at the house, and the General looked fairly well, though I knew he was much distressed.

I told Colonel Grant that Sherman was in the city, and suggested going down and telling him how sick his father was, and have him see him. We went to the Fifth Avenue Hotel and found General Sherman, who said he was in good health; was troubled some with asthma, but was full of work, attending to meetings, etc., etc. Colonel Fred said to General Sherman:

I think my father's history tells more of what you did than your own Memoirs.

Sherman said :

Well, when Grant writes anything we can all depend on getting the facts. When he writes and says himself what was done, and what he saw, no soldier need fear; but when others write what he does and says, it is not always so.

Colonel Fred said he had been having considerable trouble with the publishers or editors of the Century, who were to publish the war articles, Shiloh, Vicksburg, Wilderness and Appomattox, and that they had made his father very angry; that they wanted him to change the word Rebel in his article to Confederate and the word Union to Federal. He said that finally General Grant wrote a short letter demanding that his articles be published as written. Fred further said that his father had written three articles, but that he did not believe he would write any more. Sherman said :

This trying to soften treason by expunging the words of the General was wrong, and that if it kept on, pretty soon the sons of Southern soldiers would consider it as much of an honor that their fathers fought under Lee as the sons of Union soldiers that their fathers fought under Grant; that the line of Union and Rebel, of loyalty and treason, should be always kept distinct.

I remarked :

As long as our friends live it will, but the tendency all the time is to wipe out history; to forget it; to forgive, excuse and soften, and when all the soldiers pass from this age it will be easy to slip into the idea that one side was as good as the other.

Sherman said :

It was a conspiracy until Sumpter was fired upon, after that it was a rebellion.

Governor Woodford came in and Sherman related to him what Fred Grant had said, but Woodford made no response. Fred also said his father had written his life from boyhood to

Donelson; had written Shiloh, Vicksburg, Granada, Chattanooga, and the march of Sherman from Memphis to Chattanooga, and the Wilderness; said his father had omitted writing for four days. He asked me to come up and see his father evenings.

When you compare these statements existing then with the leniency that exists today, you can see what a marked change there is.

Virginia has placed in the rotunda of the Capitol in Washington, the statue of General Lee, without any protest or criticism from the citizens, and with only an occasional criticism from the veterans.

During a trip from New York to Cincinnati, to attend a meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, the question of the transcontinental lines came up, and Sherman expressed a wish that when the lines from Portland, Oregon, which were being constructed by way of Tacoma and Seattle, and so on north to the Canadian Pacific were completed, we could make a trip, starting from New York and going by way of California, and thence north and back by way of the Canadian Pacific, ending our trip and making the circle complete in New York. I said to him:

General, whenever that connection is made I will take a car and we will make the trip. You shall select your party. I have never seen the Canadian Pacific, and I will wait and go with you.

A short time before he died, in 1891, he was in my office in New York, and was standing at the window looking at the grand view of New York bay. He said to me: "Dodge, have you noticed that that line between Seattle and the Canadian Pacific is nearly completed?" I answered and said, "I had not, but when it is I am ready to make the trip."

While he lay dead in New York the connection of those lines was made. It was the only thing which he seemed to

express a great desire to accomplish before he rounded out his life, and it is the regret of my life that he was unable to do so. I left New York a few days afterward.

General Sherman died February 14, 1891. I had left him only a week before, when he appeared to me perfectly well. I was en route to the Pacific coast, attending to my duties, when at Omaha I received a dispatch from his family, telling me of his death and requesting my return.

I immediately returned to New York and went directly to the family, and found that the funeral arrangements were under the direction of Major-General Henry C. Slocum and Major-General O. O. Howard, both of whom had been Army and Corps commanders in General Sherman's army.

He was given a military funeral, the procession being under the command of Major-General O. O. Howard, commanding the Department of the East, and the pallbearers were Major-Generals J. M. Schofield, O. O. Howard, D. E. Sickles, G. M. Dodge, J. M. Corse, Wager Swayne, Stewart L. Woodford, Rear-Admirals D. L. Braine, J. A. Greer, Professor H. L. Kendrick and General Joseph E. Johnston.

It was a very imposing procession from the house on 75th street to the Ferry. The streets were lined with immense crowds. The remains were taken on a funeral train on the Pennsylvania railroad to St. Louis. There the Society of the Army of the Tennessee was the guard of Honor, and the Military had charge of the procession there, his remains being carried on an artillery caisson, and the streets there for miles were lined with citizens.

The Society of the Army of the Tennessee marched immediately in the rear of the caisson, and the scenes along the march were very impressive—at times negroes, viewing the procession, would often step out from the sidewalk and drop on their knees and offer prayer as the caisson bearing the remains passed.

At the burial in the cemetery at St. Louis, the services were performed by Father T. E. Sherman. General Schofield stood by my side at the side of the grave, and as the son of General Sherman read the service without a tremor, Schofield, with tears in his eyes, turned to me and said: "How long could you do that?" I answered, "Not a moment." And on the return from the grave to our cars I asked Father Sherman, knowing what his feelings must be, how he could go so quietly through the ceremony, even to giving the order for the firing of the salute?

And his answer was: "I could not do it, only that it was my duty."

General Sherman was born on February 8, 1820, therefore was a few days over 71 years old, and apparently in full vigor, mentally and physically when he died.

My own thoughts as to General Sherman were given upon his death to a New York journal as follows:

I was with General Sherman from Corinth to Atlanta during the war. We implicitly obeyed him, because we saw that he was master of the art of war, and we soon learned that apparently, in an outward sense, he had no sympathy outside of his duties. He was called a tycoon by some soldiers on that account, but no soldier received an order of his with any doubt. They believed any order he gave meant victory. After the war, at the reunion, at the banquet table, in his own house, in business circles, a greater man, a kinder man and a more lovable man it has never been my lot to meet. I speak of him as a friend who, from the first time I ever met him, has been almost a father to me. I speak of him enthusiastically, for my heart approves what my head knows of the General.

General Sherman in the war and General Sherman after the war, however, were two distinct persons. During the war he was of, all commanders, most exact and exacting. There was with him but one thing for a soldier to do, and that was his duty. He was sometimes gruff and sometimes seemed a hard task master, and yet, within his heart, no commander thought more of his men and was more wrapped up in their welfare. Since the war he grew gradually milder, kinder, warmer, deeper and more cordial. No great general has been easier of approach to the rich and poor alike. No man has per-

sonally done more to aid those who fought under him and in their need appealed to him for help. His charities to his old soldiers forced economies that he should not have made. Wherever he went he was the center of friends who crowded around him.

Every Saturday he would come to my office, No. 1 Broadway, and watch the foreign steamers go out and come in. You could see them round Sandy Hook, and his comments on them were always very interesting.

I do not regard the march from Atlanta to the sea as the great military achievement of General Sherman. It was a bold march, and made the General's name forever famous. The Atlanta campaign was a far greater achievement, with men well drilled, well commanded—a battle every day. The campaign of Atlanta was a succession of brilliant victories. The march to the sea was a romance. It is sung all over the world, and is the most noted because it split the Confederacy in two without a struggle, and because Sherman cast loose and staked his army, as people thought, recklessly. But he knew there was no force to stop him before he got to Savannah. But infinitely greater in a military sense was the march from Savannah to Goldsborough. Here Sherman had a small army, about half of what he started with from Chattanooga. He was cut off from all supplies and it was impossible for any men from the north to reach him. He marched into the face of all the forces that could be concentrated in all the South, with the enemy doubling up before him. It was an occasion that required generalship of the highest order, military strategy and remarkable courage and fortitude. I know nothing in the history of the war that was a greater or more brilliant or more successful achievement, except Vicksburg. In a military sense it made Sherman. It is only a few days ago that I was talking with one of the greatest generals of Europe, and he expressed to me the same opinion. I think that down in his heart General Sherman himself regarded the march from Savannah as his best title to military greatness.

General Sherman's private life was perfect. He was a model husband and a loving father. His private life is as beautiful and as sacred as his military life was distinguished. On religious matters I don't know the exact nature of his belief. His wife was a devout Catholic. No one knew her but to love her, a woman beautiful in her devotion to her church, and the General doubtless regarded her religious beliefs with favor and reverence.

If General Sherman had a weakness—I speak now of the time during the war—no one ever found it out. He was always the same. He was never despondent. He never seemed to

have a doubt. To all appearances he was too great for discouragements, too courageous to entertain even a possibility of failure, and of too much faith to entertain an idea of anything but ultimate success. He rode at the head of the best drilled and disciplined army the world ever saw, as one on whom was laid the heaviest weight of a great responsibility, but who believed that the outcome was as certain as the sun was to rise on the morrow. The things that affected others did not affect him. What others hoped, he felt and believed with his whole heart and soul. Grant himself, made greater by the final victory of the war, was in almost all things different from Sherman; but in loyalty, in faith and confidence in their own plans, they were alike. General Sherman never had any patience with grumblers and growlers, criticisers of orders and the "I told you so's." I remember well a meeting between one of these officers and General Sherman. General Sherman sized up the growler and said: "What are you complaining about? You are an officer. You ought to get down on your knees and thank Heaven you are even allowed to carry a musket in the great cause for which we are fighting." The General passed on and the growler was silenced.

Upon the death of General Sherman, in 1891, and at the next meeting of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in Chicago, October 8, 1891, the following committee was appointed for the purpose of erecting a monument in Washington in honor and memory of General Sherman:

Major-General Grenville M. Dodge, Colonel J. F. How, Brigadier-General Andrew Hickenlooper, Brigadier-General John W. Noble, Colonel David B. Henderson, Major S. E. Barrett, Colonel Augustus Jacobsen, Colonel W. McCrory, Colonel Cornelius Cadle.

That committee, with the aid of Congress, raised \$123,969.91 for the erection of the monument. By the act of Congress, approved July 5, 1892, making it's appropriation, the Sherman Monument commission was created, consisting of the president of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, the Secretary of War, the Commander of the Army of the United States.

The erection of the monument was under the supervision of the following officers of the Corps of Engineers: Col-

onel John M. Wilson, 1895-1897; Lieutenant Jno. S. Sewell, 1897; Colonel Theodore A. Bingham, 1897-1903; Colonel Thomas W. Symons, 1903.

At the competition of models, Carl Rohl-Smith was selected as the sculptor of the monument, and the contract was awarded to him on November 18th, 1896.

Dedication of the monument was October 15, 1903. The military and naval pageant was restricted to the United States forces, army, navy and marine Corps, stationed in the vicinity of Washington, and the National Guard of the District of Columbia, under command of Lieutenant General S. B. M. Young.

The Societies of the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Potomac, Army of the Cumberland and Army of the Ohio, attended in a body, and were represented at the dedication orations. The President of the Commission at the dedicatory exercises gave the following description of the monument:

At the time of the death of General Sherman, he was president of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee. That Society immediately resolved to erect in Washington a suitable memorial to its great commander, and, with the aid of Congress, has given you this splendid life-work of art.

Immediately after the great review of all the armies in Washington, General Sherman went to his home in St. Louis. At that time I was in command of that department, and in describing the grand review of all the armies, Sherman said that he had witnessed the march of that magnificent and splendidly equipped Army of the Potomac, and felt a great desire that his army should make as creditable an appearance. After the review of the first day, he returned to his command across the Potomac, and called around him his commanding officers and told them what he had witnessed, urging them the necessity of their making known to their commands the necessity for them to brush up and put forth their best efforts in conduct and marching the next day.

As he rode at the head of his column up Pennsylvania avenue, when he reached the rise near the Treasury Department, he turned and looked down the avenue and saw his old army coming—with their old spirit, energy and swing—and was sat-

isfied that they would do their best; and he believed it was the happiest and most satisfactory moment of his life. The crowd seemed to appreciate his thoughts, and welcomed him with a great ovation. The sculptor, Carl Rohl-Smith, has endeavored to present General Sherman in bronz as he appeared at that moment, and you can all appreciate how ably and satisfactorily he has accomplished his work.

The two allegorical figures represent "war" and "peace," the effect of which probably no general officer more emphatically enforced than General Sherman.

The bas-reliefs represent on the north front the "march to the sea," on the east front Sherman at Chattanooga attacking Bragg's right, on the south front the battle of Atlanta on July 22, the greatest battle of the campaign, and Sherman walking before the campfire, with hands clasped behind him, in deep thought, while everything around him was sleeping. This is so characteristic that all who served under Sherman will appreciate it. He once said to me that we little knew how many anxious hours he passed in pacing in front of his tent in thought and planning while we were quietly sleeping.

The medallions represent the Army and Corps commanders of the Army of the Tennessee who served under Sherman. They are McPherson and Howard, Logan and Blair, Smith and Grierson, Ransom and Dodge.

The four arms of the service, engineers, cavalry, artillery and infantry, are each represented by a soldier as he appeared in campaign.

The mosaic walk surrounding the monument has in it the names of the principal battles in which General Sherman was engaged.

It was a great misfortune that the sculptor, Carl Rohl-Smith, died with his work only half completed, but it was a very fortunate circumstance that his wife, Mrs. Sarah Rohl-Smith, who is present today, could take up his work where he left it and carry it to so successful a completion, and on behalf of the commission, and of the societies of the four great armies here represented, and, I know, of all others who have seen this great work of art, I wish to extend to her our hearty thanks and appreciation of the great success she has achieved in the efficient and satisfactory manner in which this national statue has been completed.

The commission, through the courtesy of the United States Minister, has placed upon the tomb of Carl Rohl-Smith, in Copenhagen, Denmark, at this moment a suitable floral tribute to his memory, and in testimony of its appreciation of his great work.

Master William Tecumseh Thorndike, a grandson of General Sherman, unveiled the monument. The immense audience was then addressed by the President of the United States, who was followed by Colonel D. B. Henderson of the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General Daniel E. Sickles of the Army of the Potomac, General Charles H. Grosvenor of the Army of the Cumberland, and General Thomas J. Henderson of the Army of the Ohio.

We see then that General Sherman, as a soldier, and William Tecumseh Sherman as a citizen, were distinctly two different men. Sherman as a soldier asked nothing, would take nothing except duty from his subordinates, and he gave nothing but absolute loyalty and duty to a superior. He had the good will of every man who worked under him. I know of no man who ever received an order to make a march or go into battle, but felt he would make the one successful and win the other. Sherman had the nickname in the Army of the Tennessee of the "Old Tycoon," but the soldiers knew that he protected and looked after their interests, and they knew he would take care of them.


General Sherman, after the war, when he came into civil life, was one of the most generous of men. To the old soldiers and commanders who served under him, he could not be too gracious. At every opportunity he would push them to the front. At a dinner at his club, or at his home, he had a nice way or faculty of making every soldier believe that he had done something wonderful, or he gave him the credit of having done something that would give him standing wherever he was.

He spent a great portion of his income for the personal good of old soldiers, and no person could have traveled with him, as I have done, and see the expressions of love, sympathy and respect he received, but would value him as I do—for his large generosity and great deeds after the war. And, as a


statesman, his writings and speeches stamp him as able to grapple with any national problem.

It seems almost impossible for us who knew him from the beginning of the war to its close, and then to have known him from the close of the war to his death, to appreciate the two distinct qualities that made him superior in each of his two lives.

The patience, the firmness, the resolution with which he pursued his difficult campaign against Johnston from Chattanooga to Atlanta, constitute one of the finest achievements in history. The boldness of conception, the ingenuity of the plan, the accepting of desperate chances in giving Lee an opportunity to crush him in his campaign from Savannah to Goldsboro, will forever give Sherman prestige as a bold, fearless, strategical commander. Upon that campaign alone I am willing to stake Sherman's military reputation for all time.







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